United States v. Bailey

• Decision Date: 25 July 1985
• Docket Number: No. 84-240.,84-240.
• Parties: UNITED STATES, Appellant, v. Francis BAILEY, Appellee.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

495 A.2d 756

UNITED STATES, Appellant, v. Francis BAILEY, Appellee.

No. 84-240.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued November 27, 1984.

Decided July 25, 1985.

Thomas Tourish, Jr., Asst. U.S. Atty., Washington, D.C., with whom Joseph E. diGenova, U.S. Atty., Michael W. Farrell, Steven D. Gordon and Natalia M. Combs, Asst. U.S. Attys., Washington, D.C., were on the brief, for appellant.

Jennifer P. Lyman, Public Defender Service, Washington, D.C., with whom James Klein, Washington, D.C., was on the brief, for appellee.

Before FERREN, BELSON, and ROGERS, Associate Judges.

BELSON, Associate Judge:

The trial court dismissed an indictment charging appellee with second-degree burglary, D.C.Code § 22-1801(b) (1981), and grand larceny, id. § 22-2201, repealed and superseded by id. §§ 22-3811, -3812 (1984 Supp.), on the ground that appellee's rights under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, 18 U.S.C.app. at 545-48 (1982); D.C.Code §§ 24-701-705 (1981), had been violated.¹ On appeal, the government argues that the IAD does not apply to detainers lodged against federal prisoners if they are based on violations of the District of Columbia Code prosecuted by the United States Attorney in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. We affirm.

Appellee was convicted of interstate transportation of stolen property, 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1982), in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, and was incarcerated in the federal prison camp at Safford, Arizona. The United States Marshal lodged a detainer against appellee, dated March 30, 1983, based upon a warrant for his arrest for felonies allegedly committed in the District of Columbia. The detainer requested that the federal prison authorities notify the United States Marshal of the transfer or release of appellee. Apparently, the Safford prison officials failed to notify appellee of the existence of the detainer.² Shortly after appellee's transfer on June 14, 1983, to the federal prison camp in Tucson, Arizona, the prison officials there advised him of his right to request final disposition of the charges against him in the District of Columbia. The prison officials in Tucson sent the forms executed by appellee to the United States Marshal in Tucson, instead of directly to the appropriate prosecuting official and court as provided for by Article III(b) of the IAD.³

The United States Marshal Service, however, never forwarded these forms to the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia, the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, or any other official in the District.

Appellee was later brought to the District on a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, issued by the Superior Court on the petition of the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia. Appellee arrived in the District on December 14, 1983, and was arraigned in Superior Court on December 21, 1983.⁴ The judge continued the case for status hearing and trial. The trial court later granted appellee's motion to dismiss the indictment, ruling that: (1) appellee had invoked the IAD; (2) appellee was not brought to trial in the District within the 180-day time limit of Article III, and (3) the provisions of the IAD applied to prisoners such as appellee. On appeal, the government does not seek review of the first two findings; it contends only that the requirements of the IAD do not apply to appellee.

The IAD is an interstate compact entered into by the "United States on its own behalf and on behalf of the District of Columbia." 18 U.S.C. app. § 2 at 545 (1982); D.C.Code § 24-701 (1981). A detainer is a notice "`filed with the institution in which a prisoner is serving a sentence, advising that he is wanted to face pending criminal charges in another jurisdiction.'" United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 359, 98 S.Ct. 1834, 1846, 56 L.Ed.2d 329 (1978) (quoting H.R.REP. No. 1018, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970); S.REP. No. 1356, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1970 U.S.CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4864, 4865. Prior to the IAD, prisoners were not able to initiate legal proceedings to clear detainers based upon charges arising in jurisdictions other than the jurisdiction where they were incarcerated. H.R.REP. No. 1018 at 2; S.REP. No. 1356 at 2. The purpose of the IAD is "to encourage the expeditious disposition of such charges and to provide cooperative procedures among member States to facilitate such disposition." Mauro, 436 U.S. at 351, 98 S.Ct. at 1842.

Article III of the IAD provides that a prisoner may demand final disposition of the charges forming the basis of the detainer from a foreign jurisdiction.⁵ The official of the sending state having custody of the prisoner must notify the prisoner of the source and contents of any detainer lodged against him, and must inform the prisoner of his rights under the IAD.⁶ Article III(c). If the prisoner wishes to invoke his rights under the IAD he must submit to the official having custody written notice of the place of his imprisonment and a request for a final disposition of the charges giving rise to the detainer. Article III(a), (b). The official shall deliver the prisoner's written notice and request for final disposition, along with a prison certificate, to the "prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's jurisdiction." Id. The prisoner must be brought to trial in the receiving state on the charges underlying the detainer within 180 days after the prisoner has caused to be delivered the request for trial disposition.⁷ Article III(a). If the prisoner is not brought to trial within 180 days, the appropriate court of the receiving state shall dismiss the indictment, information, or complaint upon which the detainer is based. Article V(c).⁸ The court having jurisdiction may, however, grant any necessary or reasonable continuance for good cause shown.⁹ Article III(a).

The government contends that the IAD does not apply to detainers lodged against federal prisoners for prosecutions by the United States Attorney in the Superior Court. The government observes that appellee was in the custody of the United States in Arizona; the detainer was filed by the United States Marshal; the United States Attorney sought appellee's presence in the District; and the United States Attorney was the prosecutor in the Superior Court. According to the government, the District's status as a "state" in the IAD is limited to those instances in which the detainer is based upon an offense prosecuted by the District of Columbia Corporation Counsel, rather than the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia.¹⁰ Thus focusing on the identity of the prosecuting authority, the government argues that the IAD is simply inapplicable to the present detainer because the IAD does not apply to intra-jurisdictional detainers.¹¹

The trial court, on the other hand, concluded that the language, purpose, and legislative history of the IAD establishes that it applies to detainers lodged against federal prisoners based upon any D.C.Code charge tried in the Superior Court. In the view of the trial court, a distinction grounded upon the identity of the prosecutor is contrary to the plain meaning and purpose of the IAD. We agree with that view, and affirm the dismissal of the indictment against appellee.

The first step in statutory construction requires us to read the language of the statute and construe its words according to their ordinary sense and plain meaning. Peoples Drug Stores v. District of Columbia, 470 A.2d 751, 753-54 (D.C. 1983) (en bane). The IAD defines a "state" as: "a State of the United States; the United States of America; a territory or possession of the United States; the District of Columbia; the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico." Article II(a). The plain meaning of this definition is that the District is a "state" distinct from the United States. Each jurisdiction in the definition is separated by semicolons. The language suggests no limitation based upon the identity of the prosecuting authority.

Other provisions of the Act indicate that it contemplates the District of Columbia and its court system as wholly distinct from the United States. The IAD requires each party state to designate an officer to promulgate rules and regulations and provide information to effectuate the IAD. Article VII. Congress designated the Attorney General of the United States as the officer for the United States, and, distinctly, the Mayor of the District of Columbia as the officer for the District. 18 U.S.C.app. § 6 at 548; D.C.Code § 24-704.¹² The enacting legislation defines "Governor," as used in the IAD, separately with respect to the United States — the Attorney General — and with respect to the District — the Mayor. 18 U.S.C.app. § 3 at 547; D.C.Code § 24-702(a). It also defines the term "appropriate court" discretely with respect to the United States — "the courts of the United States" — and the District — "the courts of the District of Columbia." 18 U.S.C.app. § 4 at 547; D.C.Code § 24-702(b). Thus, in the IAD and throughout the enacting legislation adopted by Congress, the United States and the District of Columbia are listed as distinct jurisdictions without limitation by reference to the prosecuting authority.

The government argues that there is a statutory focus upon the identity of the prosecuting officer, citing the language of Article III(a) to the effect that the IAD is invoked by the prisoner's request for final disposition addressed "to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's jurisdiction." We disagree, however, that Article III(a) stresses the role of the prosecutor above that of the "appropriate court." To the contrary, Congress defined the term "appropriate court" differently for the United States and the District, 18 U.S.C.app § 4 at 457; D.C.Code § 24-702(b), but did not define the term "prosecuting officer." This lends support to the interpretation that...