Monroe v. Grider

Decision Date08 August 1994
Docket NumberNo. 05-93-00864-CV,05-93-00864-CV
Citation884 S.W.2d 811
PartiesClaudia June MONROE, et al., Appellants, v. Allen GRIDER and Rodney Neal, Appellees.
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

David R. Weiner, Thomas J. Stutz, Dallas, for appellants.

David M. MacDonald, Dallas, for appellees.

Before BAKER, OVARD and MORRIS, JJ.

OPINION

BAKER, Justice.

Monroe sued Grider and Neal 1 for injuries she suffered when Neal ran into her with Grider's golf cart. Monroe sued Neal for negligence and Grider for negligent entrustment of his golf cart to Neal. The trial court instructed a verdict for Grider on Monroe's negligent entrustment claim. Grider requested rule 13 sanctions against Monroe claiming her negligent entrustment cause of action was groundless and brought in bad faith. 2 The trial court ordered Monroe and her counsel to pay Grider's attorney's fees as a sanction for bringing the negligent entrustment claim. The jury found Monroe and Neal each fifty-percent liable for Monroe's injuries. The trial court entered judgment against Neal on the jury's verdict.

Monroe claims the trial court incorrectly granted Grider's motion for an instructed verdict. Monroe and her counsel appeal the trial court's order imposing rule 13 sanctions. Monroe also argues the jury's finding of zero damages for past physical pain and mental anguish is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. We overrule Monroe's points of error complaining about the instructed verdict and rule 13 sanctions. We sustain Monroe's point of error complaining about the jury's zero damage award for past physical pain and mental anguish. We affirm the trial court's judgment in part and reverse the trial court's judgment in part.

INSTRUCTED VERDICT
A. Relevant Facts

Monroe played in a golf scramble at McKinney Country Club. After the scramble was over, Monroe continued to play golf with several friends and Neal. Monroe rode with Neal in Grider's golf cart. At the fourth hole, Neal ran into Monroe as she stepped in front of the golf cart. Monroe fell and fractured her wrist. She also suffered a groin injury. The jury found Neal and Monroe were each fifty-percent negligent in the accident.

Monroe testified she relied on Neal's previous collision with Scotty Griffin in Grider's golf cart to support her negligent entrustment claim. Monroe admitted she had no personal knowledge that Neal was an incompetent driver. Pam Simmons testified Neal told her "he wrecked it [Grider's golf cart] or he hit something. I don't remember what he said. He said he rolled it or hit it or something." Grider testified Neal told him that Neal intentionally bumped Scotty Griffin's golf cart to prevent it from tipping over. Grider testified Neal has driven Grider's golf cart on many occasions without incident. All witnesses testified they had never seen Neal drive a golf cart incompetently.

B. Applicable Law
1. Standard of Review

In reviewing the granting of an instructed verdict, we determine whether any evidence of probative force exists to raise a fact issue on the material questions presented. We consider all evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the trial court instructed the verdict. We disregard all contrary evidence and inferences. Collora v. Navarro, 574 S.W.2d 65, 68 (Tex.1978). If any conflicting evidence of probative value on any theory of recovery exists, an instructed verdict is improper. White v SouthwesternBellTel.Co.Inc.,651S.W.2d260,262 (Tex.1983).

A trial court properly instructs a verdict if: (1) the nonmovant's pleadings are defective and cannot support a judgment; (2) conclusive evidence shows the movant's entitlement to judgment or negates the nonmovant's entitlement to judgment; or (3) the evidence does not raise a fact issue on one or more elements of the nonmovant's cause of action. Edlund v. Bounds, 842 S.W.2d 719, 723 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1992, writ denied).

2. Negligent Entrustment

The elements of a negligent entrustment claim are: (1) entrustment of the vehicle by an owner; (2) to an incompetent driver; (3) that the owner knew or should have known was unlicensed, incompetent, or reckless; (4) that the driver was negligent on the occasion in question; and (5) that the driver's negligence proximately caused the accident. Williams v. Steves Indus., Inc., 699 S.W.2d 570, 571 (Tex.1985). Knowledge of the driver's incompetency when the owner gives consent is an essential element of a negligent entrustment action. Briseno v. Martin, 561 S.W.2d 794, 795 n. 1 (Tex.1977).

C. Application of Law to the Facts

Monroe contends she presented evidence raising a fact issue on her negligent entrustment claim. The sole basis for Monroe's negligent entrustment claim was Neal's previous collision in Grider's golf cart. Monroe argues that fact alone raises a material fact issue. We disagree. Involvement in a previous collision alone does not create an inference or conclusion that a driver is incompetent or reckless. The record shows Neal intentionally collided with another golf cart to prevent it from rolling over.

Monroe said she did not know whether Neal was incompetent, contrary to her negligent entrustment allegation. Monroe testified she had no personal knowledge that Neal was incompetent. She saw Neal drive a golf cart before and after the accident and never saw anything showing Neal was incompetent or reckless. Monroe testified she believed Neal was incompetent based on the accident causing her injuries. Monroe did not present evidence showing Neal was at fault, incompetent, or reckless in the first collision.

Monroe claims that because Grider knew about Neal's previous collision in Grider's golf cart, he knew or should have known of Neal's incompetence. We disagree. Grider's awareness of the previous collision did not require him to suspect Neal was incompetent. Grider testified he believed Neal was a competent and experienced driver. Neal had driven Grider's golf cart on many occasions without incident. Grider never saw Neal drive a golf cart in a reckless or incompetent manner. Even assuming Neal's incompetence, Monroe's evidence did not raise a material fact issue on whether Grider knew or should have known of any incompetence. We overrule Monroe's first point of error.

SANCTIONS
A. Factual Background

In her original petition, Monroe alleged a claim for negligent entrustment against Grider. The parties conducted discovery for more than a year before trial. Monroe propounded one set of interrogatories. Grider propounded two sets of interrogatories and one set of requests for admissions. The record contains certifications of Grider's and Neal's depositions taken in October 1991. Monroe filed her third amended original petition on March 6, 1992. Monroe did not change or add to her negligent entrustment allegation in her third amended original petition.

In Monroe's answers to Grider's interrogatories, she stated the facts she relied on for her negligent entrustment claim. She stated that:

Grider and Neil knew each other prior to the date of the incident. Grider allowed Neil to drive his cart on the date of the incident. Upon further discovery, Plaintiff will supplement.

Ms. Monroe heard that Defendant Neil was driving Defendant Grider's golf cart approximately one (1) week prior to her accident on May 27, 1990 at which time Defendant Neil flipped and/or overturned the golf cart.

On appeal, Monroe states she based her negligent entrustment claim solely on Neal's involvement in the previous collision in Grider's golf cart.

Monroe answered Grider's requests for admission in January 1992. Monroe admitted that before and after the accident, she never saw Neal drive a golf cart in a reckless or incompetent manner. When asked to admit or deny that Neal was a competent golf cart driver, Monroe answered she did not know. In her answers to Grider's interrogatories, Monroe said that she had no personal knowledge that Neal was an incompetent golf cart driver.

At trial, Grider testified about the previous collision. Neal told Grider that Neal intentionally bumped Griffin's golf cart to prevent it from tipping over. Grider testified he had never seen anything showing Neal was an incompetent golf cart driver. At the rule 13 sanctions hearing, Griffin testified he was thrown out of his golf cart. After he was thrown out, Neal hit the back of his golf cart to prevent it from tipping over and causing injury to Griffin's passenger. Griffin admitted he did not know how Neal hit the back of his golf cart because he was thrown from the golf cart. Griffin also testified Neal was a very competent golf cart driver.

The trial court made the following findings to support imposing rule 13 sanctions: 3

(1) The evidence established that at the time Defendant Alan Grider entrusted his golf cart to Defendant Rodney Neil that Defendant Rodney Neil was a competent golf cart operator;

(2) The evidence established that Defendant Alan Grider did not know and/or should not have known that Defendant Rodney Neil was a reckless or incompetent golf cart operator;

(3) The evidence established that Defendant Rodney Neil had operated Defendant Alan Grider's golf cart in a safe manner when driving Defendant Alan Grider's golf cart on approximately thirty (30) prior occasions and that Defendant Alan Grider acted as a reasonably prudent person when he entrusted his golf cart to Defendant Rodney Neil;

* * * * * *

(6) In response to Requests for Admissions propounded by Defendant Alan Grider, Plaintiff responded that she did not know if Defendant Rodney Neil was a competent golf cart driver; and

(7) Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Alan Grider were brought in bad faith because Plaintiff and Plaintiff's counsel were aware of or had ample access to evidence through discovery which clearly defeated Plaintiff's cause of action against Defendant Alan Grider, yet Plaintiff and Plaintiff's counsel continued to prosecute such...

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