Monroe v. Middlebury Conservation Com'n
Decision Date | 29 June 1982 |
Citation | 447 A.2d 1,187 Conn. 476 |
Parties | Jesse MONROE et al. v. MIDDLEBURY CONSERVATION COMMISSION et al. |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
J. Warren Upson, Waterbury, for appellant (defendant Pomperaug Valley water authority).
Perley H. Grimes, Jr., Kent, for appellees (plaintiffs).
Before HEALEY, PARSKEY, ARMENTANO, SHEA and SPADA, JJ.
On April 22, 1980, the named plaintiff, as nominee for a partnership known as "Aquaventure," submitted an application to the defendant Middlebury conservation commission for final review of a proposal to install two recharge basins, commonly referred to as aquifers, in 32 ± acres of land owned by the plaintiffs in Middlebury, a portion of which land is subject to regulation as an inland wetland. The conservation commission is designated as the inland wetland agency for the town of Middlebury. The installation of these basins would permit the plaintiffs to test the potential yield of some twenty-six wells previously installed on the subject property in 1979 with the prior permission of the conservation commission.
The creation of these basins requires removal of some 92,700 cubic yards of sand and gravel. An application for an earth removal permit was duly filed with the Middlebury planning and zoning commission on or about February 7, 1980.
The defendant William P. Longo is the first selectman of the town of Middlebury. By letter dated March 21, 1980 from William J. Buckley, Sr., sanitary engineer of the state department of health services, Longo was informed that in 1978 the department had given conceptual approval to the proposed well field as a possible source of water for the Watertown water and sewer authority. Longo, by letter dated April 11, 1980, responded that he was surprised by the state action and informed Buckley that the proposed watershed lies within the jurisdiction of the Pomperaug Valley water authority and that, in the opinion of the Middlebury town attorney, proper application would have to be made to the water authority, the conservation commission, and the planning and zoning commission. Longo sent a copy of the correspondence to the conservation commission which thereupon sought an opinion from the town attorney.
By letter dated March 20, 1980, the water authority, acting through its attorney, advised the named plaintiff that he was not entitled to process his application before either the conservation or zoning commission until he had taken the steps mandated by the charter of the water authority. A letter, dated May 6, 1980, to the same effect was sent by the Middlebury town attorney to the plaintiffs' attorney.
Upon refusal of the several commissions to process the plaintiffs' applications until the plaintiffs had processed their application before the water authority, the plaintiffs sought an injunction to compel the conservation commission to conduct a public hearing on the plaintiffs' application for recharge basins, to compel the zoning commission to conduct a public hearing on the plaintiffs' application for an earth removal permit, and to restrain the water authority from interfering with the plaintiffs' right to a public hearing before the conservation commission and the defendant Longo from interfering with the plaintiffs' right to a public hearing before both commissions. The trial court found that the plaintiffs were entitled to the claimed hearings, granted injunctive relief accordingly, and the defendants appealed.
In their appeal, the defendants claim: (1) that the plaintiffs should have been required to seek a writ of mandamus against both commissions; (2) that the trial court erred in concluding that the plaintiffs were not required to process their application first with the water authority; and (3) that there was no factual basis for the issuance of an injunction against Longo.
We first consider the defendants' contention that a mandatory injunction should not have been issued because of the availability of an adequate remedy at law, to wit, a writ of mandamus. Both mandamus and mandatory injunction are extraordinary remedies. Milford Education Assn. v. Board of Education, 167 Conn. 513, 518, 356 A.2d 109 (1975). "Relief by way of mandatory injunction is an extraordinary remedy granted in the sound discretion of the court and only under compelling circumstances." Simmons v. Budds, 165 Conn. 507, 515, 338 A.2d 479 (1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 940, 94 S.Ct. 1943, 40 L.Ed.2d 291 (1974). Ordinarily, an injunction will not lie where there is an adequate remedy at law. Hartford v. American Arbitration Assn., 174 Conn. 472, 476, 391 A.2d 137 (1978). Ordinarily, mandamus will not lie where the aggrieved party has an adequate remedy either at law or in equity. Milford Education Assn. v. Board of Education, supra, 167 Conn. 519, 356 A.2d 109; State ex rel. Howard v. Hartford Street Ry. Co., 76 Conn. 174, 184, 56 A. 506 (1903). Mandamus is not only "generally viewed as a remedy at law"; Stolberg v. Caldwell, 175 Conn. 586, 613, 402 A.2d 763 (1978); but usually it is also the appropriate remedy in situations where: (1) the duty to be performed is ministerial; (2) the party applying for the writ has a clear legal right to have the duty performed; and (3) there is no other sufficient remedy. Milford Education Assn. v. Board of Education, supra, 167 Conn. 518, 356 A.2d 109. There are situations, however, where the use of one remedy rather than the other involves a matter of semantics. Bissey v. Marion, 104 Kan. 311, 178 P. 611 (1919); annot., 93 A.L.R. 1495, 1503 and cases cited therein; 42 Am.Jur.2d, Injunctions § 43. "If the [plaintiff] is entitled to relief, it is not of great importance whether we grant the relief by way of the legal writ of mandamus or the equitable remedy of injunction or by a combination of both." In re Alexander, 243 A.2d 901, 903 (D.C.App.1968).
The Pomperaug Valley water authority was created by Special Act of the 1969 General Assembly (Sp. Acts No. 174) Special Acts No. 72 of the 1971 General Assembly. At the time of trial, three towns (Middlebury, Southbury and Oxford) had voted to become members of the district authority so created. Basically, the aforesaid enactments grant powers to the water authority to provide, to maintain, and to construct water supply systems within the district where no such water supply system exists, or, in the alternative, to allow any town, city, borough, corporation, company, association or person intending to develop for water supply purposes a potential surface reservoir to commence such a water supply development so long as it comports with the regional supply plan of the Pomperaug Valley water authority for the member towns and so long as there exists an estimated dependable yield of more than 500,000 gallons of water...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Doe v. Maher
... ... Conservation Commission, 178 Conn. 173, 179, 422 A.2d 290 (1979) ... Monroe v. Middlebury Conservation Commission, 187 Conn. 476, 480, 447 A.2d 1 ... ...
-
Pamela B. v. Ment
... ... "to provide effective, convenient, direct, and complete relief"; Monroe v. Middlebury Conservation Commission, 187 Conn. 476, 482, 447 A.2d 1 ... ...
-
C. TERRY ENTERPRISES v. City of Hartford
... ... at law." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Monroe v. Middlebury Conservation Commission, 187 Conn. 476, 480, 447 A.2d 1 ... ...
-
Kent Literary Club of Wesleyan Univ. At Middletown v. Wesleyan Univ.
...of the court [but] only under compelling circumstances." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Monroe v. Middlebury Conservation Commission , 187 Conn. 476, 480, 447 A.2d 1 (1982) ; see also Cheryl Terry Enterprises, Ltd . v. Hartford , 270 Conn. 619, 650, 854 A.2d 1066 (2004) ("[m]andatory i......