Monroe v. Tielsch

Decision Date15 August 1974
Docket NumberNo. 42854,42854
Citation84 Wn.2d 217,525 P.2d 250
Parties, 71 A.L.R.3d 736 Allan B. MONROE et al., Petitioners, v. George P. TIELSCH, Chief of Police of the City of Seattle, Respondent.
CourtWashington Supreme Court

Larry Lund, Juvenile Div., Seattle, for petitioners.

J. Roger Nowell, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Seattle, for respondent.

BRACHTENBACH, Associate Justice.

The petitioners, aged 10, 14, 14 and 16, moved to expunge all of their 'arrest records held by the Seattle Police Department, the King County Juvenile Court's intake records, social files and legal files.'

The event which precipitated petitioners' motion was a petition alleging each to be delinquent for having committed the offense of indecent liberties in violation of RCW 9.79.080. One of the petitioners was charged also with assault and another also with shoplifting, possession of a dangerous weapon and burglary.

At the hearing on the indecent liberties charge, the alleged victim, with the acquiescence of her father, declined to testify. The charges were dismissed.

The petition to expunge was aimed at not only the indecent liberties charges but other records as indicated above. The motion was denied.

With regard to the dissemination of arrest records to prospective employers, Justice Finley's concurring opinion reflects exhaustive research and analysis. Rather than extending this opinion by parallel approach, we adopt that portion of his concurring opinion and its holding that a juvenile's arrest record may not be released under any circumstances to prospective employers or nonrehabilitative educational institutions.

Complete expunction of petitioners' arrest records, juvenile court files and what they have categorized as social and legal files, however, would be contrary to the underlying philosophy of our juvenile law. The purpose of our juvenile court law, RCW 13.04, has been protection, guidance and rehabilitation, not punishment. 'Its operation is intended to check the criminal tendency in its inception, and protect the unformed character in the facile period from improper environment and influences.' In re Lundy, 82 Wash. 148, 151, 143 P. 885, 886 (1914).

In implementing that philosophy and purpose the statute provides for probation counselors to assist the juvenile court. The law directs the counselor to 'inquire into the antecedents, character, family history, environments and cause of dependency or delinquency of every alleged dependent or delinquent child brought before the juvenile court . . .' RCW 13.04.040. In short, the judge, facing one of the most difficult tasks in the judicial system, needs all the help and information possible to reach a decision as to how to best correct and aid the juvenile before him. Obviously that decision may be a literal turning point in the young offender's life.

One of the facts which the court should have available is the prior involvement of the juvenile with alleged acts of violation of the law. That proof comes from the arrest record. The facts of this case demonstrate the absurdity of expungement. Let us assume that one of these particular petitioners is later before juvenile court and his arrest records have been expunged. The court would be unaware that one of these petitioners had been arrested in a period of 17 months for robbery, vandalism, shoplifting, rape; assault, larceny, burglary, carrying a concealed weapon and curfew violation. We have lost not only our senses, but our touch with reality if we think such a record would not have a valid bearing on the judge's decision as to how to treat the offender. With that record the court could inquire into the circumstances of each arrest and its disposition. Without it the court is denied information which could have a substantial influence on its effort--not to punish, but to aid and rehabilitate the offender. The compelling interest of the state in the availability of arrest records of juveniles is perfectly obvious.

This court has held specifically that arrest records are admissible in a hearing to determine whether to try a juvenile as an adult. In re Sheppard v. Rhay, 73 Wash.2d 734, 440 P.2d 422 (1968); In re Williams v. Rhay, 73 Wash.2d 770, 440 P.2d 427 (1968).

Throughout our juvenile court act there is vested a large measure of discretion in the juvenile court to take appropriate steps at appropriate times to protect an arrested juvenile from the public exposure of his arrest as well as the disposition thereof. In the name of privacy, that discretion should not be subject to disturbance absent an abuse thereof.

Law enforcement agencies have a legitimate interest in juvenile arrest records. In 1972, 25.6 percent of all arrests reported by the Federal Bureau of Investigation were of persons under the age of 18 years. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Crime in the United States Table 32, at 126 (1972). Traditionally law enforcement has an interest in more than making a juvenile arrest and then thrusting that juvenile into the court system. The same FBI report, Table 21, discloses that in 1972 45 percent of all juvenile offenders taken into custody were handled within the department and released, obviously by an informal disposition. Thus in dealing with juveniles who are frequently as mobile as any other part of our society, law enforcement officials should have the assistance of the past involvement of the juvenile with offenses as reflected by arrests.

If, as petitioners contend, juveniles are entitled to an automatic expunction of their arrest records, it is obvious that neither law enforcement nor the juvenile court would ever have a true picture of the developing pattern of any juvenile. If each arrest is expunged, no record will ever be developed and all of those interested in the guidance and rehabilitation of the juvenile would be without the means to properly evaluate the conduct of the juvenile when he or she is next back within the system.

For the foregoing reasons, the trial court is affirmed.

HALE, C.J., and HUNTER, HAMILTON, STAFFORD and WRIGHT, JJ., concur.

FINLEY, Associate Justice (concurring in part and dessenting in part).

On July 26, 1972, petitions were filed in the Juvenile Department of the Superior Court for King County alleging that petitioners were delinquent per RCW 13.04.010, and had committed the criminal offense of indecent liberties as defined by RCW 9.79.080, on June 26, 1972. At a subsequent fact-finding hearing on September 21, 1972, the prosecuting witness, with the acquiescence of her father, declined to testify. The presiding juvenile court judge then dismissed the charges with prejudice.

At the fact-finding hearing, the petitioners moved to expunge all records relative to the incident of June 26, 1972. This motion was continued and later broadened to encompass the expunction of police arrest records, juvenile department social files and legal files pertaining to All of petitioners' arrests on suspicion of having committed various criminal offenses. The motion to expunge all pertinent records was considered by the juvenile court on April 27, 1973, and denied. Petitioners sought review of this ruling by writ of certiorari which was granted to consider the merits of the questions presented therein.

The record reveals that, including the incident of June 26, 1972, petitioners, Allan Bernard Monroe, aged 10, Alonzo Monroe, Jr., aged 14, Clarence Webb, Jr., aged 14, and Mathion Powell, Jr., aged 16, had been arrested on 1, 5, 6, and 13 occasions respectively. Petitioners allege that maintenance and dissemination of their records of arrest will stigmatize them as 'arrestees'. It is asserted that many of the same disabilities which attach to one who is convicted of a criminal offense also attach to one who is merely arrested upon suspicion of criminal misconduct. The existence of these records, it is urged, constitutes an invasion of their constitutional right of privacy, and will work to deny the petitioners substantial educational and vocational opportunities merely because of their arrestee status. The petitioners by their motion to expunge are seeking to alleviate or avoid the discrimination and prejudice which essentially results from their arrestee but non-convicted record status.

Respondent, Chief of Police Tielsch, argues that there is no statutory provision for the expounction of arrest records, and further, Article VI, section 6 of the Seattle City Charter requires that, '(t)he chief of police shall keep a correct record of all arrests, showing the time and cause of complaint upon which each arrest was made . . .' The respondent asserts that arrest records provide a valuable tool as a predictive factor in determining the probability of future anti-social behavior. The identification components of an arrest record, consisting primarily of photographs and fingerprints, are said to be of inestimable value in the identification and apprehension of criminals. In oral argument, Respondent urged that identification information is so highly essential to law enforcement operations that expurgation should not be granted Regardless of the circumstances of arrest. 1

DISSEMINATION OF ARREST RECORDS TO PROSPECTIVE EMPLOYERS

Petitioners, however, offer persuasive evidence that misuse of arrest records by non-law enforcement personnel can seriously hamper or endanger the employment and educational opportunities of the arrestee. It appears that an arrest record in the world of commerce, as a practical matter, transmutes the legal presumption of innocence into one of guilt. 2 The stigmatization as an arrestee, petitioners contend, automatically closes the door to many job opportunities otherwise available to the non-arrested applicant.

There is abundant evidence that the non-convicted arrestee is subjected to substantial discriminatory sanctions in the job market place. In a survey of prospective employers, 64 percent would refuse to consider an employment candidate with an arrest...

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11 cases
  • Com. v. Shipps
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • May 12, 1987
    ...is arrested for an offense classified as a felony but who is later charged with delinquency because of age. 15 See Monroe v. Tielsch, 84 Wash.2d 217, 525 P.2d 250 (1974). The defendant also challenges testimony by Darren Carey that the gun he had seen in the defendant's bedroom on the night......
  • Police Com'r of Boston v. Municipal Court of Dorchester Dist.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • March 16, 1978
    ...records may be of assistance in informally disposing of the matter without the necessity of judicial involvement. Monroe v. Tielsch, 84 Wash.2d 217, 525 P.2d 250 (1974). The court also felt that the information contained in such arrest records was an indispensable adjunct to the rehabilitat......
  • Loder v. Municipal Court
    • United States
    • California Supreme Court
    • September 2, 1976
    ...F.Supp. 968; Davidson v. Dill (1972) 180 Colo. 123, 503 P.2d 157; Eddy v. Moore (Wash.App.1971) 487 P.2d 211; but see Monroe v. Tielsch (1974) 84 Wash.2d 217, 525 P.2d 250. The distinction was recognized by a New York court: 'Whereas other jurisdictions were without legislative pronouncemen......
  • U.S. v. M.R.M.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
    • January 25, 2008
    ...law enforcement nor the juvenile court would ever have a true picture of the developing pattern of any juvenile." Monroe v. Tielsch, 84 Wash.2d 217, 525 P.2d 250, 251 (1974); see also P. W.G. v. State, 682 So.2d 1203, 1208 (Fla.App. 1st Dist.1996) (sister court's constitutional decision tha......
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