Monsalve v. State

• Decision Date: 13 September 1999
• Docket Number: No. S99A0854.,S99A0854.
• Citation: 271 Ga. 523,519 S.E.2d 915
• Parties: MONSALVE v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

519 S.E.2d 915

271 Ga. 523

MONSALVE v. The STATE.

No. S99A0854.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

September 13, 1999.

Reconsideration Denied October 15, 1999.

Stepp & Randazzo, Glynn R. Stepp, Lawrenceville, for appellant.

Daniel J. Porter, District Attorney, Dawn H. Taylor, Assistant District Attorney, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Adam M. Hames, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

SEARS, Justice.

Appellant Miguel Angel Monsalve appeals his convictions for felony murder, felony theft by taking, and conspiracy to commit armed robbery.¹ Finding the evidence sufficient to support his convictions, and finding no error in the trial court's rulings, we affirm.

Construed most favorably to the verdict, the evidence introduced at trial showed that on November 3, 1995, appellant and his co-defendants Nhek, Kundert, Velasco, and Medina discussed robbing someone. The group drove in Kundert's car to Velasco's home to retrieve a gun, and then drove to an apartment complex where appellant stole a red Mitsubishi. Appellant and Nhek rode in the stolen Mitsubishi, with appellant driving, while the others rode in Velasco's car. After the two cars became separated, appellant and Nhek spotted a young woman driving a car, and appellant stated, "Let's get that one." When the young woman parked her car in front of her boyfriend's apartment, appellant pulled the Mitsubishi along side her. Nhek jumped out of the car, confronted the woman, and demanded money. She got back into her car and began screaming and honking her horn. Nhek shot her in the head, killing her. Appellant drove Nhek from the scene and, along with his co-defendants, later dumped the stolen Mitsubishi into a lake.

At appellant's trial, Velasco and Kundert testified on behalf of the State. Appellant's videotaped custodial statement was played for the jury, in which he admitted planning to rob somebody, stealing the Mitsubishi, and being present when Nhek shot the victim.

1. Viewed most favorably to the verdict, the evidence was sufficient to enable any rational trier of fact to find appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted.² Anyone who aids and abets in the commission of a crime is a party thereto and may be charged with and convicted of that crime.³ Appellant's videotaped statement to police, which was corroborated by his co-defendants, authorized the jury to conclude that he initiated the idea to commit an armed robbery and conspired with the others to commit the crime, stole the Mitsubishi and disposed of it after the crime, identified the woman who would become the murder victim, parked the Mitsubishi along side the victim's car, waited while Nhek attempted to rob the victim and shot her, and drove the car away from the crime scene after the murder was committed.

2. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence his videotaped in-custody statement, because the statement was not voluntary and was obtained without a knowing and intelligent waiver of rights. At a pre-trial hearing concerning the tape's admissibility, appellant testified that even though he offered no resistance when arrested, he was handled roughly, pushed, punched and pulled by Detective King of the Gwinnett County Police. He also testified that King spoke abusively to him while he was being transported to police headquarters. Appellant also stated that when he was walking to the interrogation room, King told him he had better answer the questions asked of him by another detective, or else he would have to face King later. Appellant claims King's intimidation, threats, and coercion rendered his in-custody statement involuntary.

We note that it was explained at the pre-trial hearing that the police videotape equipment had malfunctioned at the beginning of appellant's in-custody interview, and hence the State did not offer recorded evidence of any waiver of rights made by appellant in connection with his custodial interview. However, the trial court heard testimony from Gwinnett County Detective Burnette, who (along with Detective King) had arrested appellant, and who had conducted the in-custody interrogation. Detective Burnette testified that at the time of arrest, he read appellant his Miranda rights from a pre-printed card, and appellant stated that he understood those rights. Burnette also testified that once they got to police headquarters, he Mirandized appellant again, and appellant then agreed to speak with Burnette about the crimes. Furthermore, appellant testified at the pre-trial hearing that before he was interviewed at the police station, he was advised of his rights (including his rights to remain silent and to have a lawyer present at his interrogation), that he understood those rights, and that he willingly gave his statement to police. Hence, the trial court was authorized to conclude that appellant's videotaped statement was made voluntarily after a knowing and intelligent waiver of rights.

Regarding appellant's claim of abusive treatment and coercion, we note that appellant testified that Detective Burnette did not threaten or coerce him during his in-custody interview, and the only evidence of Detective King's allegedly abusive behavior is ap...