Monsanto Chemical Co. v. Thornbrough
Decision Date | 01 July 1958 |
Docket Number | No. 5-1575,5-1575 |
Parties | MONSANTO CHEMICAL COMPANY, Appellant, v. C. R. THORNBROUGH et al., Appellees. |
Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Davis & Ragsdale, El Dorado, for appellant.
McMath, Leatherman & Woods, Little Rock, for appellees.
The question in this case is whether 232 employees of the appellant were entitled to receive unemployment compensation during the latter part of a strike, after the appellant, by using supervisory employees, had resumed production at its plant. The Board of Review, whose decision was affirmed by the circuit court, held that the applicants were eligible for benefits. By this appeal Monsanto asks us to reverse that decision and to direct that the payment of these benefits not be charged to its account. See Call v. Luten, 219 Ark. 640, 244 S.W.2d 130.
Several weeks after the expiration of the contract between Monsanto and the union representing its employees, negotiations for a new contract failed, and the union called an economic strike, effective March 2, 1956. Picket lines were established, and the plant was idle until April 27. The appellees do not seek unemployment compensation for the period while the plant was not in operation. On April 27 Monsanto, by utilizing the services of 91 supervisory employees, was able to resume at least partial production. Beds were moved into the plant, which was operated twenty-four hours a day. On and after May 19 applications for benefits were filed by 232 of the 339 striking employee. The claims involve a three-week period ending June 8, when the labor dispute was settled and the workers returned to their jobs.
The first question is one of law and centers upon the interpretation of this language in the statute: 'An individual shall not be eligible for benefits for any week with respect to which it is found that his unemployment is due to a stoppage of work which exists because of a labor dispute at the factory, establishment, or other premises at which he is or was last employed [with two provisos that are unimportant here].' Ark.Stats.1947, § 81-1105(f).
The issue turns upon what is meant by the phrase, 'a stoppage of work.' These words appear in the unemployment acts of many other states and have been frequently construed. It could be argued that the language refers to a cessation of work on the part of the employee, in which case the phrase would be synonymous with unemployment. That construction was in fact adopted in Oklahoma, but there the rule was later changed by an amendment to the statute.
Elsewhere it has been pointed out that the Oklahoma view makes the reference to a stoppage of work meaningless, for the statutory sentence has already mentioned unemployment and presupposes the existence of that condition. See Williams, 'The Labor Dispute Disqualification,' 8 Vanderbuilt L.Rev. 338; Sakrison v. Pierce, 66 Ariz. 162, 185 P.2d 528, 173 A.L.R. 480. Consequently the view is now generally accepted that the stoppage of work means a cessation of business activity at the employer's establishment rather than unemployment on the part of the applicant for benefits. The authorities were reviewed in Abbott Pub. Co. v. Annunzio, 414 Ill. 559, 112 N.E.2d 101, where the court observed that the majority interpretation is followed in nineteen states, while the minority rule has been applied administratively in Colorado and judicially in Oklahoma.
We have no hesitancy in assigning to our statute the meaning that has been almost unanimously given to its language in other jurisdictions. Not only does the majority rule adhere to the basic principle that every word in a statute must be given effect if possible; it also recognizes and carries out the legislative policy of avoiding favoritism toward either side in a labor dispute. As the court stated in Saunders v. Maryland Unemployment Comp. Bd., 188 Md. 677, 53 A.2d 579, 581:
The next question is whether the stoppage of work at the Monsanto plant had ended when the present claims were filed, on and after May 19. This is an issue of fact, upon which we must affirm the Board of Review's findings if supported by substantial evidence. Terry Dairy Products Co. v. Cash, 224 Ark. 576, 275 S.W.2d 12. We are unable to say that the record is devoid of such evidence.
There is really not a great deal of conflict in the proof concerning this issue. February was the last month of normal...
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