Robert S. Abbott Pub. Co. v. Annunzio

Decision Date23 March 1953
Docket NumberNos. 32390 and 32391,s. 32390 and 32391
Citation414 Ill. 559,112 N.E.2d 101
PartiesROBERT S. ABBOTT PUB. CO. v. ANNUNZIO et al.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

Prescott, Burroughs & Taylor, and Milton M. Laff, all of Chicago (Euclid L. Taylor, Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.

Ivan A. Elliott, Atty. Gen. (William C. Wines, Raymond S. Sarnow, and A. Zola Groves, Chicago, of counsel), for appellee the Director of Labor.

Leon M. Despres, of Chicago (Samuel D. Golden, Chicago, of counsel), for appellees George Christly, et al.

MAXWELL, Justice.

We here have two appeals under the provisions of the Administrative Review Act of this State, both involving the issue of unemployment benefits claimed by certain employees, under the Illinois Unemployment Compensation Act. The issues in both cases are the same and they have been here consolidated for opinion.

The Robert S. Abbott Publishing Company, appellant, hereinafter referred to as employer, is engaged in the printing and publishing business in the city of Chicago. The appellees in one case (other than the Director of Labor) were composing room employees, and in the other case appellees were the mailing room employees, all claiming benefits for a certain period of unemployment, caused by a work stoppage attributed to a labor dispute.

The factual situation of the composing room employees is more complicated than that of the mailing room employees and we shall first discuss the interpretation of the statute and the legal issues involved as to the composing room employees, alone.

A deputy of the Division of Unemployment Compensation determined that all composing room workers, subject to the bargaining jurisdiction of Chicago Typographical Union No. 16 and in the employ of the employer, were ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits from December 6, 1947, until such date as their unemployment was no longer due to a stoppage of work which existed because of a labor dispute. On individual appeals, claimants alleged to the Director of Labor that the circumstances of their continued unemployment had changed and that they were no longer unemployed due to a stoppage of work which existed because of the labor dispute at the premises at which they were last employed. The deputy's second determination still found claimants ineligible for benefits and an appeal to the Director of Labor followed The Director of Labor found and determined that claimants were entitled to benefits commencing July 10, 1948, and this decision was then appealed to the superior court of Cook County which affirmed the decision of the Director of Labor.

The essential facts in the record of this case disclose that the employer is engaged in the business of publishing a weekly newspaper in addition to printing under contract for others. The employer employs approximately 140 workers, 28 of whom are employed in the composing room as linotype, monotype, hand operators, make-up men, proof readers and machinists, both journeymen and apprentices. Claimants were all workers in this composing room under the foregoing classifications.

The terms and conditions of employment of the claimants during the period in question were not reduced to any formal labor contract between the employer and the union but were determined by the labor contract which existed between the union and the Chicago Newspaper Publishers Association, said association being composed of the five metropolitan dailty newspapers published in the city of Chicago. Although not a member of said association, the employer provided wages and working conditions for its composing room workers similar to those announced in the formal agreement between said association and the union. The last such contract expired October 20, 1947. Negotiations between claimants and employer for new terms and conditions followed. On November 24, 1947, the association advised the union that it would not meet the new wage scale demands, and on the evening of the same day the composing room workers of the five metropolitan Chicago daily newspapers left their jobs. A union representative testified that the wage scale demands applied to all union members employed by any company which traditionally paid the prevailing newspaper scale; this included composing room workers of the employer. Claimants, however, did not leave their jobs on November 24, 1947, but on the following day the employer received a telegram from the union president advising of the new wage scale voted by the union. Claimants requested a decision from the employer on the same day. On the following day claimants indicated they could not continue working unless the new wage demands were met and on November 26, 1947, the employer advised claimants that the new wage scale would be paid temporarily from the date of the union's telegram. On December 4, 1947, the employer, in a letter replying to said telegram, advised the union that the temporary arrangement of payment of the new wage scale would be terminated December 5, 1947, and that thereafter the wage scale in effect prior to November 25, 1947, would prevail. Without going into the details, it is sufficient to state that a strike followed and that there was a cessation and stoppage of work in the employer's composing room on December 6, 1947. Substitute processes were adopted by the employer to continue business for approximately four weeks. During the week of February 7, 1948, the company commenced to hire workers for the composing room to fill the vacancies created by the absence of claimants, and by April 17, 1948, all of the news items appearing in employer's paper were set in type in the usual and normal way. However, most of the advertising still was being prepared by the substitute photoengraving process. A survey of employment data from the composing room during this period reveals that by July 10, 1948, the company had employed in the shop the same number of workers which were usually and normally employed prior to the time of the strike controversy. These newly employed workers, when qualified, were paid at the rate prevailing November 24, 1947, and enjoyed all privileges extended to regular employees of the employer.

The evidence further disclosed that the employer's composing room occupied a separate area within the company premises. The claimants were all subject to the jurisdiction of the union and were the only workers of the employer subject to this particular union. Negotiations between the union and employer were of no avail. During all of the time of the controversy the employer published its weekly newspaper. There is no question that all the claimants were employed by the employer up to December 6, 1947, when they became unemployed by reason of the controversy concerning the new wage scale. They thereafter filed claims for unemployment compensation benefits and, as hereinbefore stated, the deputy determined they were ineligible to receive benefits by reason of the provisions of section 7(d) of the Unemployment Compensation Act. Ill.Rev.Stat., 1949, chap. 48, par. 223.

The issue presented here is whether a claimant who in the first instance is ineligible to receive benefits where his original unemployment was due to a stoppage of work because of a labor dispute at the plant of his employer, is later entitled to receive benefits when that employer's plant is operating at full production, claimant has been permanently replaced, and a full force of workers is employed at the employer's plant. The answer to this problem lies in the interpretation of section 7 of the Unemployment Compensation Act which reads as follows: 'An individual shall be ineligible for benefits-* * * (d) for any week with respect to which it is found that his total or partial unemployment is due to a stoppage of work which exists because of a labor dispute at the factory, establishment, or other premises, at which he is or was last employed, provided, that this subsection shall not apply if it is shown that (1) He is not participating in or financing or directly interested in the labor dispute which caused the stoppage of work and (2) He does not belong to a grade or class of workers of which immediately before the commencement of the stoppage, there were members employed at the premises at which the stoppage occurs, any of whom are participating in or financing or directly interested in the dispute; provided, that if in any case separate branches of work which are commonly conducted as separate businesses in separate premises are conducted in separate departments of the same premises, each such department shall, for the purpose of this subsection, be deemed to be a separate factory, establishment, or other premises.'

The facts as hereinabove stated are substantially those contained in the findigns of fact of the administrative agency which heard this case. These findings are now attacked by the employer in this court and from our examination and review of the record we cannot say that they are manifestly against the weight of the evidence in this case. The questions as to whether claimants were replaced and full production resumed are question of fact resolved by the Director of Labor. This court is without power to disturb findings of fact which are not manifestly against the weight of the evidence and where there is evidence in the record to substantiate such findings. Mohler v. Department of Labor, 409 Ill. 79, 97 N.E.2d 762, 24 A.L.R.2d 1393; Oswald v. Civil Service Comm., 406 Ill. 506, 94 N.E.2d 311; Local Number 658 v. Brown Shoe Co., 403 Ill. 484, 87 N.E.2d 625.

The employer has also questioned the rights of claimants to benefits for the alleged reason that they did not qualify under section 6 of the Illinois Unemployment Compensation Act. The employer did not raise this question by notice as required by the regulations of the Director of Labor and also failed to urge the same at the time of hearing, and we,...

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