Monsanto Co. v. Thrasher

Decision Date21 December 1970
Docket NumberNo. 8087,8087
Citation463 S.W.2d 25
PartiesMONSANTO COMPANY, Appellant, v. Bill THRASHER, Appellee.
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

Underwood, Wilson, Sutton, Heare & Berry and R. A. Wilson, Amarillo, for appellant.

Steed & Cook, Gene E. Steed, Perryton, for appellee.

JOY, Justice.

This is an appeal from an order overruling the plea of privilege of Monsanto Company. Affirmed.

The appellee farmed land in Ochiltree County, a part of which consisted of 90 acres of land upon which appellee planted corn. Prior to the planting of the corn appellee purchased a product manufactured and distributed by appellant under the trade name of 'Lasso', a herbicide used for pre-emergence weed control. Appellee planted the corn in the spring of 1969 and applied the herbicide within a few days thereafter. Weeds and grass came up rather abundantly and appellee brought this suit for breach of express and implied warranty of fitness for the purposes for which the herbicide was sold in that he suffered damages to his corn crop by reason of the failure of the herbicide to control the weeds.

The appellant contends that venue cannot be sustained because appellee failed to state a cause of action for the recovery of or for damages to land otherwise falling under Subdivision 14 of Art. 1995, Vernon's Ann.Civ.St. We agree with appellant in that a review of appellee's pleading fails to reveal any allegations of damages to the land and venue cannot be maintained under Subdivision 14.

Appellant next asserts that appellee has failed to prove a cause of action accruing under Subdivisions 23 and 27, Art. 1995, V.A.C.S. Both of those subdivisions provide for venue in suits against corporations, domestic and foreign, in the county where the cause of action or part thereof arose. Appellant further contends that appellee cannot recover for damages sustained by way of economic or commercial loss as opposed to damages for injuries of person or property. Further, appellant contends that the written warranty discloses a limitation of appellee's recovery right to the purchase price paid by him, which is a limitation specifically permitted by the Uniform Commercial Code and that appellee admits the purchase price has not been paid, therefore, he has no cause of action.

Appellant argues very ably that the suit by appellee is a suit for lost profits or a commercial loss as opposed to damages to property. The appellee herein has brought suit for damages to his corn crop by reason of the failure of the product expressly warranted being reasonably fit for the purposes for which it was intended, i.e. to control weeds. The appellee further alleges that the damage to the corn crop is measured by the difference between the value of the crop as produced with the weeds and the crop that would have been produced had the herbicide controlled the weeds as represented. We are of the opinion that is the only way that the damages to the corn crop can fairly be measured. We do not think it necessary to the decision to review the complete history of the rule of strict liability in other jurisdictions nor discuss the out of state cases urged by the appellant. The rule of strict liability has been...

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4 cases
  • Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co.
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • December 30, 1980
    ...from crops) in Eli Lilly & Co. v. Casey (Tex.Civ.App.1971), 472 S.W.2d 598, but as property damage to crops in Monsanto Co. v. Thrasher (Tex.Civ.App.1971), 463 S.W.2d 25, and in Geigy Chemical Corp. v. Hall (Tex.Civ.App.1970), 449 S.W.2d 115. See also Iacono v. Anderson Concrete Corp. (1975......
  • Nobility Homes of Texas, Inc. v. Shivers
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • July 15, 1976
    ...the recovery in such cases is to be based upon considerations of sales law separate and apart from the law of torts. Monsanto Company v. Thrasher, 463 S.W.2d 25, 27 (Tex.Civ.App.--Amarillo 1970, no writ). We decline to accept either rationale, and adopt the view that the legislature is of t......
  • Cline v. Prowler Industries of Maryland, Inc.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Delaware
    • June 3, 1980
    ...52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965); Monsanto Co. v. Alden Leeds, Inc., N.J.Super., 130 N.J.Super. 245, 326 A.2d 90 (1974); Monsanto Co. v. Thrasher, Tex.Civ.Ct.App., 463 S.W.2d 25 (1970); and (2) to allow contractutal waiver of strict tort liability on the basis of U.C.C. policy, Keystone Aeronautics ......
  • LeSueur Creamery, Inc. v. Haskon, Inc., 80-2003
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
    • September 17, 1981
    ...a satisfactory method of calculating property damage because of the special nature of the harm to LeSueur's milk. See Monsanto Co. v. Thrasher, 463 S.W.2d 25, 27 (Tex.1970) (Property damage to plaintiff's corn crop caused by failure of defendant's herbicide to control weeds measured by "the......

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