Montano v. State

• Decision Date: 12 October 1984
• Docket Number: No. 1083,1083
• Citation: 468 N.E.2d 1042
• Parties: Bruno MONTANO, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee. S 377.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 1042

468 N.E.2d 1042

Bruno MONTANO, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.

No. 1083 S 377.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Oct. 12, 1984.

A. Leon Sarkisian, Merrillville, for appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen. of Ind., Lisa M. Paunica, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

PIVARNIK, Justice.

Defendant-Appellant Bruno Montano was tried by a jury in the Lake Superior Court, Criminal Division, for the crimes of murder and manslaughter. The jury found that he was guilty, but mentally ill, of the crime of voluntary manslaughter, a class B felony, in count I, and that he was guilty, but mentally ill, of the crime of murder, a class A felony, in count II. The trial judge subsequently committed Montano to the Department of Corrections for assignment to the proper facility for a term of twenty (20) years under Count I and a term of forty-five (45) years under Count II.

Appellant now raises four issues for our consideration in this direct appeal as follows:

1. error of the court in determining that Defendant was competent to stand trial;

2. sufficiency of the evidence regarding Defendant's sanity at the time of the crime;

3. denial of Defendant's motions for continuance; and

4. admission of photographic items into evidence.

The evidence showed that on June 22, 1982, defendant Bruno Montano killed his mother, Elisa Montano, and his niece, Marissa Velez, by striking them with a heavy metal wrench. The apparent reason for the incident was that Defendant's mother was in the process of preparing papers to commit the defendant to a mental institution and Defendant stated he did not want to return to the hospital.

I

Appellant Montano claims the trial court erred by permitting the cause to go to trial without properly determining Montano was competent to stand trial.

In July, 1982, the trial court appointed psychiatrists George Batacan, Lee Periolat, and Marcus Wigutow, to examine Defendant to determine his competency to stand trial. At a subsequent hearing, the trial court found the defendant not competent to stand trial and committed him to the Department of Mental Health. Subsequently, Dr. John Keating, a psychiatrist employed by the Logansport State Hospital, filed a report with the trial court which stated the defendant had attained the ability to understand the proceedings and was now competent to be tried. Defendant at that time moved for a hearing and the trial judge ordered a second examination to determine competency of the defendant. At a hearing on January 26, 1983, Drs. Batacan and Wigutow testified that the defendant was competent to stand trial despite the fact that Defendant was taking 400 milligrams of the psychotropic drug Thorazine. Dr. Wigutow testified the defendant was alert, well oriented, and had no clinical impediment which might prevent him from communicating with his attorney and standing trial. The medical testimony was that the taking of Thorazine does not contribute to incompetency, but rather is an aid to relax the patient, enable him to understand, concentrate, and work on the problem before him.

Immediately prior to trial on May 23, 1983, however, defense counsel objected to the commencement of trial because he claimed Defendant's competency was artificially induced by means of the drug Thorazine. Furthermore, he desired to introduce testimony of Dr. Peter Gutierrez, a family practice physician. The trial court found that having already determined competency to stand trial on the testimony of psychiatrists who had examined Defendant, and having found no evidence of an event or occurrence subsequent to that determination indicating a change in the defendant's mental condition, an additional hearing on competency was not required. We see no error in the manner in which the trial court handled this matter.

Appellant admits the trial court is vested with discretion to determine if reasonable grounds exist for believing a defendant is competent to stand trial. Where there has been a determination of competency to stand trial and no event or occurrence subsequent to the determination is offered to indicate a change to the trial court, he does not abuse his discretion in denying a further hearing on the subject. Buhring v. State, (1983) Ind., 453 N.E.2d 228. The record clearly shows the trial court gave careful and adequate consideration to the question of Defendant's competency here and, as a matter of fact, committed him for observation in the Department of Mental Health for some time. Following a report by a psychiatrist from that institution that Defendant was then competent to stand trial, the trial court ordered further examination and held an additional hearing on the subject. Those doctors then testified that the ingestion of the drug Thorazine would not be detrimental to the defendant's competency, but would be an aid to it. We agree with the State's contention that the defendant has neither shown the psychiatrists' evaluations were improper or inadequate, nor has he shown how additional testimony from Dr. Gutierrez would have materially changed matters. We accordingly find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Defendant competent to stand trial.

II

The jury found Defendant Montano to be guilty, but mentally ill, of both the crimes of murder and manslaughter. Montano now contends the jury verdict is contrary to law because he claims the evidence established that he was insane at the time of the commission of the offense.

It already has been firmly established that the burden of proving insanity is given to the person who interposes the defense. Ind.Code Sec. 35-41-4-1 (Burns 1979 Repl.) Taylor v. State, (1982) Ind., 440 N.E.2d 1109. The defendant here, therefore, is appealing from a negative judgment. Only where the evidence is without conflict and leads unalterably to a conclusion contrary to that reached by the trier of fact will the judgment be disturbed. Thomas v. State, (1981) Ind., 420 N.E.2d 1216. It is unquestionable that Defendant had mental and emotional problems. In fact, he had killed his mother and niece while his mother was in the process of having him committed to a mental institution. It is well established, however, that the existence of a mental disease or deficiency does not ipso facto render a defendant legally insane. Taylor, supra; Hill v. State, (1969) 252 Ind. 601, 251 N.E.2d 429; State v. Stacy, (1980) Tenn., 601 S.W.2d 696; People v. Ramsey, (1979) 89 Mich.App. 468, 280 N.W.2d 565. This was also recognized by our legislature in its passage of the statute implemented here in Defendant's conviction. Ind.Code Sec. 35-5-2-3 (Burns Repl.1979) (distinguishing insanity from mentally ill for purposes of rendering a verdict). The jury here heard both psychiatric and lay witnesses testify about Defendant's mental condition. The jury was entitled to consider both the lay and expert testimony in assessing Defendant's mental capacity at the time of the killing and was free to accept the lay testimony and reject the conclusions of the experts. Taylor, supra; Duvall v. State, (1981) Ind., 415 N.E.2d 718; Morris v. State, (1979) 270 Ind. 245, 384 N.E.2d 1022; Thomas, supra; Price v. State, (1980) Ind., 412 N.E.2d 783. Three expert witnesses testified here. Dr. Peter Gutierrez, a family practice physician, was unable to clearly say Defendant was either sane or insane at the time of the offense. Drs. Batacan and Wigutow testified that, in their opinion, the defendant was insane at the time of the commission of the crime. On cross-examination, however, Dr. Batacan testified he conducted three interviews and Defendant did not speak on two of those occasions. He furthermore did not conduct any physical or mental examination of Defendant but made his decision based solely on medical records and interviews with the defendant's family plus his observations of the defendant. Dr. Batacan testified it would be important to determine the actions of a subject before, during, and after a criminal act to formulate a conclusion as to sanity. Defendant's sister, Marina Montano, testified about her observations of Defendant...