Montezuma Valley Irrigation Co. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of the Cnty. of Montezuma

• Decision Date: 12 November 2020
• Docket Number: Court of Appeals No. 19CA1588
• Citation: 486 P.3d 428
• Parties: MONTEZUMA VALLEY IRRIGATION COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. The BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF the COUNTY OF MONTEZUMA, Colorado, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

486 P.3d 428

MONTEZUMA VALLEY IRRIGATION COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.The BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF the COUNTY OF MONTEZUMA, Colorado, Defendant-Appellant.

Court of Appeals No. 19CA1588

Colorado Court of Appeals, Division II.

Announced November 12, 2020

Hoskin Farina & Kampf, John P. Justus, Karoline M. Henning, Grand Junction, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

John Baxter, County Attorney, Durango, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant

Opinion by JUDGE GOMEZ

¶ 1 A state statute allocates the responsibilities for any ditch that crosses a roadway: the ditch owner or creator must "construct" a culvert, bridge, or similar structure across the road; and the county must "maintain" that structure. But when the structure reaches the end of its useful life, who is responsible for replacing it?

¶ 2 This case requires us to answer that question. A ditch owner, Montezuma Valley Irrigation Company (MVIC), and a board of county commissioners, the Board of County Commissioners of the County of Montezuma (the county), disagree about which of them bore the responsibility for replacing a culvert that allowed irrigation water to flow through a ditch under a county road.

¶ 3 Section 43-5-305(1), C.R.S. 2019, assigns the responsibilities for ditches, races, drains, and flumes as follows:

Any person or corporation owning or constructing any ditch, race, drain, or flume in, upon, or across any highway shall keep the highway open for safe and convenient travel by constructing culverts, bridges, or similar structures over such ditch, race, drain, or flume. When any ditch is constructed across, in, or upon any highway, the person owning or constructing such ditch shall construct a culvert, bridge, or similar structure long enough to conduct the water from shoulder to shoulder from such road or highway or of such greater length as the board of county commissioners having jurisdiction thereover may require .... The board of county commissioners shall maintain said culvert, bridge, or similar structure after construction, in accordance with the provisions of section 37-84-106, C.R.S.

(Emphases added.) Section 37-84-106, C.R.S. 2019, in turn, provides that "[a]ll bridges constructed over any ditch, race, drain, or flume crossing any public highway, street, or alley, after construction, shall be maintained by and at the expense of the county or municipality in which such ditch, race, drain, or flume may be situated." (Emphasis added.) Because the General Assembly has broadly defined "highways," the provisions of section 43-5-305(1) apply to any public road. See § 43-2-201, C.R.S. 2019.

¶ 4 We conclude, as the district court did, that the county's statutory obligation under section 43-5-305(1) to "maintain" culverts, bridges, and similar structures includes the obligation to replace such structures. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

I. Background

¶ 5 MVIC is a mutual ditch and reservoir company formed in accordance with sections 7-42-101 through 7-42-118, C.R.S. 2019. It owns and maintains the U Lateral Ditch, which it uses to deliver irrigation water to its shareholders. The ditch passes under County Road W in Montezuma County.

¶ 6 At some point before 2017, a culvert was installed under County Road W where it intersects with the U Lateral Ditch to allow water from the ditch to pass under the road.¹ In 2017, the county determined the culvert had reached the end of its useful life and needed to be replaced to ensure the safety of travelers along the road. The county asked MVIC to pay for a new culvert or provide labor and equipment for the installation. MVIC declined to do so. So, in early 2018, the county replaced the culvert itself and sought reimbursement from MVIC.

¶ 7 In response, MVIC filed a complaint for declaratory judgment and a motion for summary judgment under C.R.C.P. 56(h), arguing that section 43-5-305(1) assigns responsibility for replacing the culvert to the county. The county responded that the statute assigns such responsibility to MVIC. The county also argued that summary judgment wasn't appropriate due to genuine issues of material fact regarding the parties’ statutory obligations.

¶ 8 In support of its position, the county submitted an affidavit by its road and bridge department superintendent, who explained that in the construction industry the word "maintenance" means work to keep an existing structure (like a culvert) in working condition. The word does not, he expressed, include work to replace an existing structure, which would be considered "new work." Based on his knowledge of the industry, he opined that the duty to maintain a culvert does not include the duty to replace that culvert.

¶ 9 The district court granted MVIC's summary judgment motion, concluding that there were no issues of material fact and that the statute charges the county with the responsibility for replacing the culvert. Accordingly, the court ordered that MVIC is not obligated to reimburse the county for the replacement costs.

II. Analysis

¶ 10 The county argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment because it ignored genuine issues of material fact and misinterpreted the statute. We address each argument in turn.

A. Genuine Issues of Material Fact

¶ 11 The county first contends that the district court erred because there were genuine issues of material fact that should've precluded a decision on summary judgment. We disagree.

¶ 12 C.R.C.P. 56(h) permits a party to move for a determination of a question of law. Coffman v. Williamson , 2015 CO 35, ¶ 11, 348 P.3d 929. We review de novo a trial court's order deciding a question of law under this rule. Id. at ¶ 12. Under the applicable summary judgment standard, "an order is proper under Rule 56(h) ‘[i]f there is no genuine issue of any material fact necessary for the determination of the question of law.’ " Id. (quoting C.R.C.P. 56(h) ). A genuine issue of material fact is one that, if resolved, will affect the outcome of the case. City of Aurora v. ACJ P'ship , 209 P.3d 1076, 1082 (Colo. 2009). The nonmoving party is given all favorable inferences from the undisputed facts, and all doubts as to the existence of a triable factual issue are resolved against the moving party. Coffman , ¶ 12.

¶ 13 The county argues that three genuine issues of material fact precluded determination of the question of law.

• First, because section 43-5-305(1) doesn't include the word "replace" or define the word "maintain," there is an issue of material fact as to who bears the burden of replacing the culvert.

• Second, its affidavit raised an issue of material fact concerning the meaning of the word "maintain."

• And third, there is an issue of material fact as to whether requiring it (and thus public taxpayers) to pay for a culvert conveying water to a private corporation's shareholders would create an absurd result.

¶ 14 We disagree with the county's characterization of these issues. All three issues involve questions of law, not fact. Discerning the meaning of specific words in a statute is a matter of statutory interpretation, not factfinding. "Statutory interpretation involves only questions of law ...." Smith v. Exec. Custom Homes, Inc. , 230 P.3d 1186, 1189 (Colo. 2010). And a genuine issue of material fact "cannot be raised by counsel simply by means of argument." People in Interest of S.N. v. S.N. , 2014 CO 64, ¶ 17, 329 P.3d 276 (quoting Sullivan v. Davis , 172 Colo. 490, 495, 474 P.2d 218, 221 (1970) ).

¶ 15 The county points out that, under section 2-4-101, C.R.S. 2019, "[w]ords and phrases that have acquired a technical or particular meaning, whether by legislative definition or otherwise, shall be construed accordingly." Thus, we must effectuate " ‘the commonly accepted technical or particular meaning’ of words that have acquired such meanings" within a specific industry or as a legal term of art. Sheep Mountain All. v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs , 271 P.3d 597, 604 (Colo. App. 2011) (citation omitted); see also DISH Network Corp. v. Altomari , 224 P.3d 362, 368 (Colo. App. 2009).

¶ 16 But the county superintendent's opinions concerning the common understanding of the word "maintain" in the present-day construction industry do not suggest that the word held the same meaning or that the General Assembly intended to apply that meaning when it adopted this statutory provision in 1883 or when it amended the provision in 1885 and 1947. See Sheep Mountain , 271 P.3d at 604 (rejecting a proposed interpretation of a term in an ordinance, as "no evidence in the record indicated that the drafters ... intended this plain meaning to apply"); see also People v. O'Neal , 228 P.3d 211, 214 (Colo. App. 2009) ("[T]he most relevant time period for determining a statute's meaning is the time when the statute was enacted ....").²

¶ 17 Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not err by disregarding the county superintendent's affidavit and deciding the legal issues in this case on summary judgment.

B. Statutory Interpretation

¶ 18 Next, the county contends that the district court erroneously interpreted section 43-5-305(1) when it concluded that the county's obligation to maintain a culvert includes an obligation to replace the culvert. Again, we disagree.

¶ 19 We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. McCoy v. People , 2019 CO 44, ¶ 37, 442 P.3d 379. Our primary purpose in construing a statute is "to determine and give effect to the intent of the legislature and adopt the statutory construction that best effectuates the purposes of the legislative scheme." People v. Yascavage , 101 P.3d 1090, 1093 (Colo. 2004). In doing so, we are guided by the basic principles of statutory interpretation. Id. We begin by looking to the plain language of the statute, reading words and phrases in context and construing them literally according to common usage unless they have acquired a technical meaning. Id. ; see also § 2-4-101. If the language is unambiguous, we look no further. Yascavage , 101 P.3d at 1093.

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