Montfort v. Trek Resources, Inc.
| Decision Date | 22 June 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 11-05-00001-CV.,11-05-00001-CV. |
| Citation | 198 S.W.3d 344 |
| Parties | Kenneth Lee MONTFORT, Appellant, v. TREK RESOURCES, INC., Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Rick Dunbar, William M. Ucherek II, Ucherek Law Firm, P.C., Abilene, for appellant.
William H. Hoffmann, Jr., Eastland, for appellee.
Panel consists of WRIGHT, C.J., and McCALL, J., and STRANGE, J.
This case arises out of a dispute between Trek Resources, Inc. (the owner and operator of an oil and gas leasehold estate) and Kenneth Lee Montfort (the surface owner). Trek is also the owner of the underground water rights and freshwater gathering system on the subject property. Trek brought this action against Montfort seeking to permanently enjoin him from interfering with its leasehold operations. Trek also sought a declaratory judgment on a number of issues. In part, Trek requested a declaratory judgment that it had no obligation to furnish fresh water to Montfort. Montfort also sought injunctive and declaratory relief. After a bench trial, the trial court issued a permanent injunction enjoining Montfort from interfering with Trek's leasehold operations. The trial court also entered a judgment declaring, among other things, that Trek had no obligation to furnish fresh water to Montfort.
In three appellate issues, Montfort challenges the permanent injunction and the declaratory judgment and asserts that the trial court erred in denying his request for declaratory judgment. We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the permanent injunction. However, based on our finding that Trek has the obligation to furnish fresh water to Montfort, we modify the permanent injunction as set forth below, reverse the declaratory judgment, render judgment that Trek has the obligation to furnish fresh water to Montfort for use at his house and for the purpose of watering his livestock, and remand the issue of attorney's fees to the trial court for further consideration.
The dispute in this case arises from Trek's operation of the North Pioneer Unit in Eastland County, Texas. The North Pioneer Unit is an extensive secondary recovery oil field unit, consisting of about sixty-two producing oil wells, fifty-five saltwater injection wells, fifty-five freshwater wells, and "miles and miles" of associated flow lines. The water flood program was put into place in the unit about twenty years ago; and, in operating the unit, Trek injects about 420,000 gallons of fresh water each day. Montfort owns 653 surface acres within the unit, and there is one well per each six or seven acres of Montfort's surface estate.
Trek acquired its mineral interest in the North Pioneer Unit from Citation 1987 Investment Limited Partnership, effective July 2000. Citation had operated the North Pioneer Unit for a number of years; and, during its operation of the unit, Citation owned the mineral estate and the 653 surface acres currently owned by Montfort. On June 12, 2000, Montfort's predecessor-in-interest, Edward L. White, purchased the surface estate from Citation. Citation executed a special warranty deed in connection with the sale of the surface acres to White. In the special warranty deed, Citation reserved and excepted from the conveyance title to the freshwater gathering system and to the underground water rights. As consideration for the deed, Citation agreed to furnish fresh water to the house on the subject property and to White for the purpose of watering his livestock. Trek purchased its mineral interest from Citation with notice of Citation's special warranty deed to White. Montfort acquired the surface estate from White on December 18, 2003.
On January 5, 2004, Trek filed an application for a temporary restraining order, temporary injunction, and permanent injunction, seeking to enjoin Montfort from interfering with its leasehold operations. Trek alleged that Montfort had interfered with its operations in a number of ways, including locking out Trek's pumpers and service companies from the property. The trial court entered a temporary restraining order. On January 9, 2004, Montfort filed his answer, counterclaim, declaratory judgment action, and action for injunctive relief. Thereafter, both parties filed additional pleadings seeking various injunctive and declaratory relief. On October 15, 2004, after four evidentiary hearings relating to the requests for injunctive relief and the trial in this case, the trial court entered its order for issuance of a permanent injunction and declaratory judgment and denying Trek's request for attorney's fees. The trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of its judgment.
The trial court's permanent injunction ordered Montfort to desist and refrain from committing the following acts:
a. interfering or preventing [Trek], its agents, servants and/or employees from ingress and egress on, over and across [Montfort's] property or any adjoining properties on which [Trek] has a leasehold interest.
b. locking out [Trek] from [Montfort's] property or any other properties on which [Trek] has leasehold operations.
c. blocking in any way [Trek's] routes of ingress and egress on, over and across [Montfort's] property or any other properties on which [Trek] conducts leasehold operations and accesses from [Montfort's] property.
d. operating, or attempting to operate, manipulate, or attempting to manipulate, any of [Trek's] leasehold equipment and/or facilities, including, but not being limited to oil and gas leasehold facilities or fresh water facilities, including pipelines, valves, or any other facilities of [Trek] located on [Montfort's] property or any other property on which [Trek] conducts leasehold operations.
e. interfering in any way with [Trek's] transport of oil, gas, fresh water, produced water or any other substance within, onto or off of [Montfort's] property or within, onto or off of any other properties on which [Trek] conducts leasehold operations, including, but not being limited to, pipeline transports, truck transports or any other methods of transport utilized by [Trek] on their leasehold interests.
f. making frivolous and false complaints to the Texas Railroad Commission concerning [Trek's] leasehold operations on [Montfort's] property.
g. drilling, completing, pumping or attempting to drill, complete or pump or otherwise removing any subsurface water from any well bore on [Montfort's] estate[.]
h. interfering in any way with [Trek's] production of [Trek's] subsurface water on [Montfort's] surface estate[.]
i. access to any subsurface water well bore or equipment on or in said subsurface water well on [Montfort's] surface estate[.]
j. operating any equipment used for the purpose of removing or pumping subsurface water from [Montfort's] surface estate.
In his first appellate issue, Montfort argues that the trial court erred in granting Trek a permanent injunction.
The trial court ordered the following in its declaratory judgment:
a. That [Trek] has no obligation to furnish [Montfort] fresh water to his house and livestock from [Trek's] fresh water facilities.
b. That [Trek] is the owner and holder of the fee title to the underground water rights on [Montfort's] surface estate and that [Montfort] has no right to the underground water on [his] surface estate.
c. That [Trek] owns the cattle guards on [Montfort's] property.
d. That [Trek] has a legal right to operate its fresh water facilities on [Montfort's] property.
e. That [Montfort] has no standing to make any claims or demands relative to the Unitization Agreement attached to [Montfort's] counterclaim as Exhibit "D."
f. That [Trek] has a legal right to utilize [Montfort's] property for the purpose of accessing [Trek's] leasehold interest on adjacent properties.
g. That [Trek] has no obligation to [Montfort] to plug [its] fresh water wells on [Montfort's] property.
In his second appellate issue, Montfort complains that the trial court erred in granting declaratory judgment in favor of Trek. Specifically, Montfort asserts that the trial court erred in declaring the matters set forth in Paragraphs a, b, c, and e above.
In his third appellate issue, Montfort asserts that the trial court erred in denying his petition for declaratory judgment. Specifically, Montfort contends that the trial court erred (1) in denying him the declaration that he is entitled to uninterrupted water furnished to the house and for livestock, (2) in denying him the declaration that Trek remove trash and debris from the property, and (3) in denying him the recovery of his attorney's fees.
Montfort's first issue challenges the issuance of the permanent injunction. Montfort asserts that there was no evidence or, alternatively, insufficient evidence to support the issuance of the injunction. An applicant for permanent injunctive relief must establish the following four elements: (1) the existence of a wrongful act; (2) the existence of imminent harm; (3) the existence of irreparable injury; and (4) the absence of an adequate remedy at law. Jordan v. Landry's Seafood Rest., Inc., 89 S.W.3d 737, 742 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. denied) (op. on reh'g); Swate v. Medina Community Hosp., 966 S.W.2d 693, 700 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. denied).
We review a trial court's ruling on applications for permanent injunctions for an abuse of discretion. Operation Rescue-Nat'l v. Planned Parenthood of Houston and Southeast Tex., Inc., 975 S.W.2d 546, 560 (Tex.1998); Stein v. Killough, 53 S.W.3d 36, 40-41 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2001, no. pet.). A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d...
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