Mook v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Summit Cnty.
| Decision Date | 18 February 2020 |
| Docket Number | Supreme Court Case No. 18SC499, Supreme Court Case No. 18SC544,Supreme Court Case No. 18SC434 |
| Citation | 457 P.3d 568 |
| Parties | Gilbert D. MOOK, Trustee; and Carol S. Mook, Trustee, Petitioners v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF SUMMIT COUNTY, Colorado and Board of Assessment Appeals, Respondents. Board of Assessment Appeals and Board of County Commissioners of Summit County, Colorado, Petitioners, v. Karen L. Kelly, Trustee, Respondent. Board of County Commissioners of Summit County, Colorado, Petitioner, v. Marilyn Hogan and Marc Hogan, Respondents. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Attorneys for Petitioners Gilbert D. Mook and Carol S. Mook; Respondent Karen L. Kelly; and Respondents Marilyn Hogan and Marc Hogan: Ryley Carlock & Applewhite, F. Brittin Clayton III, Denver, Colorado
Attorneys for Petitioner/Respondent Board of County Commissioners of Summit County, Colorado: Jeffrey L. Huntley, County Attorney Juliane T. DeMarco, Assistant County Attorney Franklin Celico, Special Assistant County Attorney, Breckenridge, Colorado
Attorneys for Respondent/Petitioner/Amicus Curiae Board of Assessment Appeals: Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General Emmy A. Langley, Assistant Solicitor General Krista Maher, Assistant Attorney General Evan P. Brennan, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado
Attorneys for Amici Curiae Boards of County Commissioners of the Counties of Boulder, Chaffee, Douglas, Eagle, Garfield, Grand, Jefferson, La Plata, Larimer, Mesa, Park, Pitkin, Routt, and San Miguel: Michael A. Koertje, Boulder County Attorney's Office, Boulder, Colorado, Jennifer A. Davis, Chaffee County Attorney's Office, Salida, Colorado, Dawn L. Johnson, Douglas County Attorney's Office, Castle Rock, Colorado, Christina C. Hooper, Eagle County Attorney's Office, Katherine Parker, Eagle, Colorado, Katharine Johnson, Garfield County Attorney's Office, Glenwood Springs, Colorado, Christopher Leahy, Grand County Attorney's Office, Hot Sulphur Springs, Colorado, Rebecca Klymkowsky, Jefferson County Attorney's Office, Rachel Bender, Jason Soronson, Golden, Colorado, Kathleen L. Moore, La Plata County Attorney's Office, Durango, Colorado, David P. Ayraud, Larimer County Attorney's Office, Frank N. Haug, Fort Collins, Colorado, J. Patrick Coleman, Mesa County Attorney's Office, John R. Rhoads, Andrea Nina Atencio, Grand Junction, Colorado, Michow Cox & McAskin LLP, Christiana McCormick, Marcus McAskin, Greenwood Village, Colorado, Laura C. Makar, Pitkin County Attorney's Office, Aspen, Colorado, Erick Knaus, Routt County Attorney's Office, Lynaia South, Steamboat Springs, Colorado, Amy T. Markwell, San Miguel County Attorney's Office, Telluride, Colorado
Attorneys for Amici Curiae Colorado Counties, Inc. and the Special Districts Association of Colorado: Hall & Evans, L.L.C., Mark S. Ratner, Denver, Colorado
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Durango School District 9-R: Semple, Farrington, Everall & Case, P.C., Darryl L. Farrington, Denver, Colorado
¶1 These three Summit County property tax cases enable us to unravel the mysteries of what constitutes "residential land" under section 39-1-102(14.4)(a), C.R.S. (2019).
¶2 Why is this definition important? Residential land is taxed at a lower rate than vacant land. And while we will only explore these three cases (and a companion case) today, hundreds of Colorado property owners assert that their combinations of residential and vacant parcels qualify as "residential land" under section 39-1-102(14.4)(a). They all seek corresponding tax abatements.
¶3 Section 39-1-102(14.4)(a) defines residential land as "a parcel or contiguous parcels of land under common ownership upon which residential improvements are located and that is used as a unit in conjunction with the residential improvements located thereon."
¶4 This means that for vacant land to qualify as residential land, it must be: (1) contiguous with residential land; (2) used as a unit with residential land; and (3) under common ownership with residential land. We address one of these statutory requirements in each case before us today.1
¶5 We conclude as follows:
¶6 We begin by summarizing the facts and procedural history of each case.
¶7 The Mooks own two parcels of land in Summit County. One parcel contains the Mooks' house, and it's classified as residential land ("the residential parcel"). The other parcel is undeveloped, and it's classified as vacant land ("the subject parcel"). The parties agree that these two parcels don't physically touch—the Homeowners' Association ("HOA") owns an approximately seventeen-foot-wide strip of land that completely separates the two properties. That strip provides other members of the HOA access to adjacent public land.
¶8 The Mooks petitioned the Board of County Commissioners of Summit County ("BCC") to reclassify the subject parcel from vacant land to residential land. The BCC denied their petition, and the Mooks appealed to the Board of Assessment Appeals ("BAA"). The BAA upheld the BCC's decision. Notably, the BAA determined that contiguous parcels are those that are "physically connected." Here, the residential and subject parcels don't physically touch, and the BAA "was not persuaded that the use of the subject lot in conjunction with the residential lot was sufficient to defeat the plain meaning of contiguity." Thus, the BAA concluded that the two parcels aren't contiguous, and it denied the Mooks' appeal.
¶9 The Mooks again appealed; however, a unanimous division of the court of appeals affirmed the BAA. Mook v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs , No. 17CA0437, ¶ 7, 2018 WL 2066712 (Colo.App., May 3, 2018). The division concluded that the plain and ordinary meaning of contiguous is "touching along boundaries often for considerable distances." Id. at ¶ 13 (quoting Contiguous , Webster's Third New International Dictionary (2002)). Accordingly, the division held that for two parcels to be contiguous under section 39-1-102(14.4)(a), the boundaries of those parcels must touch. Id. Therefore, it upheld the BAA's determination that the subject parcel isn't contiguous to the residential parcel. Id. at ¶ 14.
¶10 We granted the Mooks' petition for certiorari review.
¶11 The Hogans own three parcels of land in Summit County. Together, these parcels form an "L" shape. One parcel contains the Hogans' house, and it's classified as residential land ("the residential parcel").
¶12 A second parcel directly touches the residential parcel. Part of the Hogans' deck extends from their house onto this parcel. Although originally classified as vacant land, the Hogans successfully petitioned to reclassify this parcel as residential land ("the reclassified parcel"). That reclassification is not before us.
¶13 A third parcel directly touches the reclassified parcel. This parcel contains an unpaved driveway, but it's otherwise undeveloped. This parcel remains classified as vacant land ("the subject parcel").
¶14 The Hogans appealed the subject parcel's classification to the BCC, which upheld the vacant-land classification. The Hogans then filed an appeal with the BAA.
¶15 Both Marc Hogan and the county assessor testified before the BAA regarding the Hogans' use of the subject parcel. Mr. Hogan testified that the Hogans use the subject parcel to walk their dog, gather firewood, park vehicles and a trailer, and secure scenic views with a privacy buffer. The county assessor concluded that the Hogans don't use the subject parcel as a unit with the residential and reclassified parcels. In making that determination, she relied on the Assessors' Reference Library ("ARL").2 According to the assessor, these ARL guidelines required the Hogans to engage in more "active" uses of the property if the parcels are to be deemed "used as a unit." Further, she concluded that the subject parcel must contain a residential improvement, which it does not. The BAA agreed. The Hogans appealed.
¶16 A division of the court of appeals reversed the BAA, holding that the BAA erred regarding the "used as a unit" requirement. Hogan v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs , 2018 COA 86, ¶¶ 1, 14, ––– P.3d ––––. The division first concluded that the two ARL guidelines, on which the assessor based her classification, impose requirements that exceed section 39-1-102(14.4)(a)'s plain language. See id. at ¶¶ 17–18, 23. Further, the division noted that the statute doesn't require that landowners engage in "active" property uses; thus, the BAA erred to the extent it concluded that only "active" uses can satisfy the "used as a unit" element. Id. at ¶¶ 29, 35. Finally, the division concluded that the statute's plain language doesn't require that each parcel contain a residential improvement. See id. at ¶ 42. The division therefore remanded this case with directions for the BAA to "employ the correct legal standards ... and redetermine whether the Hogans are entitled to reclassification of [the subject parcel]." Id. at ¶ 46.
¶17 We granted the BCC's petition for certiorari review.
¶18 Karen L. Kelly serves as the trustee for two separate trusts that each own a parcel of land in Summit County. A house sits on one parcel, which is classified as residential land ("the residential parcel"). The other parcel remains undeveloped, and it's classified as vacant land ("the subject parcel"). Title to the residential parcel is held in a qualified personal residence trust (the Karen L. Kelly 2011 Irrevocable Trust), while title to the subject parcel is held in...
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