Mooney v. Ill. Educ. Ass'n

• Decision Date: 11 April 2019
• Docket Number: Case No. 1:18-cv-1439
• Citation: 372 F.Supp.3d 690
• Parties: Stacey MOONEY, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. ILLINOIS EDUCATION ASSOCIATION; Congerville-Eureka-Goodfield Education Association, as representative of the class of all chapters and affiliates of the Illinois Education Association; and National Education Association, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of Illinois

372 F.Supp.3d 690

Stacey MOONEY, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff,

v.ILLINOIS EDUCATION ASSOCIATION; Congerville-Eureka-Goodfield Education Association, as representative of the class of all chapters and affiliates of the Illinois Education Association; and National Education Association, Defendants.

Case No. 1:18-cv-1439

United States District Court, C.D. Illinois, Peoria Division.

Signed April 11, 2019

Jonathan F. Mitchell, Mitchell Law PLLC, Austin, TX, Norman Rifkind, Law Office of Norman Rifkind, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff.

John M. West, April H. Pullium, Bredhoff & Kaiser LLC, Washington, DC, Ronald G. Stradt, Illinois Education Association - NEA, Springfield, IL, for Defendants.

ORDER & OPINION

JOE BILLY McDADE, United States Senior District Judge

This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 11). Plaintiff has filed a response (Doc. 14) and Defendants have filed a reply with the Court's leave (Doc. 18). Although Defendants requested oral argument (Doc. 11 at 2), the Court denies the request because this matter can be decided on the papers. The matter is therefore ripe for review.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Stacey Mooney is a public school teacher in the Eureka Community School District # 140 and resides in Tazewell County, Illinois. (Doc. 1 at 2). Over the course of her nearly three decades of teaching, she has declined to join Defendant Illinois Education Association or its affiliates, Defendant Congerville-Eureka-Goodfield Education Association and Defendant National Education Association, because she "disapproves of their political advocacy and collective bargaining activities" and "the excessive salaries" paid to high-ranking union officials. (Doc. 1 at 2).

Though not a member of any union, Plaintiff was nevertheless required by law to pay "fair-share" fees to Defendants. (Doc. 1 at 2). Relying on the Supreme Court's recent ruling in Janus v. American Federation of State, County, & Municipal Employees, Council 31 , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S.Ct. 2448, 201 L.Ed.2d 924 (2018),¹ Plaintiff now seeks reimbursement of the fair-share fees she and the putative class members paid to Defendants.

DISCUSSION

The discussion of this case must begin with the Supreme Court's decision in Janus , which held the Illinois law requiring certain employees pay fair-share fees violated the First Amendment. Prior to Janus , Illinois law was as follows:

Under the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (IPLRA), employees of the State and its political subdivisions are permitted to unionize. See Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 5, § 315/6(a) (West 2016). If a majority of the employees in a bargaining unit vote to be represented by a union, that union is designated as the exclusive representative of all the employees. §§ 315/3(s)(1), 315/6(c), 315/9. Employees in the unit are not obligated to join the union selected by their co-workers, but whether they join or not, that union is deemed to be their sole permitted representative. See §§ 315/6(a), (c).

Janus , 138 S.Ct. at 2460. Because "the union is required by law to provide fair representation for all employees in the unit, members and nonmembers alike," and "[e]mployees who decline to join the union are not assessed full union dues," the law required non-union employees to pay fair-share fees, "a percentage" of the full union fee. Id. These fees could not be used for political expenditures. Id. at 2460–61.

A similar scheme was held constitutional in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education , 431 U.S. 209, 97 S.Ct. 1782, 52 L.Ed.2d 261 (1977). Id. at 2460. Prior to Janus , the Supreme Court "cited Abood favorably many times, and ha[d] affirmed and applied its central distinction between the costs of collective bargaining (which the government can charge to all employees) and those of political activities (which it cannot)." Id. at 2497 (Kagan, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, in recent years the Supreme Court twice cast doubt on Abood 's continuing validity. Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, Local 1000 , 567 U.S. 298, 311, 132 S.Ct. 2277, 183 L.Ed.2d 281 (2012) ("Acceptance of the free-rider argument as a justification for compelling nonmembers to pay a portion of union dues represents something of an anomaly ...."); Harris v. Quinn , 573 U.S. 616, 635, 645–46, 635, 134 S.Ct. 2618, 189 L.Ed.2d 620 (2014) (stating "[t]he Abood Court's analysis is questionable on several grounds" and declining to extend Abood because of its "questionable foundations.").

In Janus , the Supreme Court overruled Abood , holding state laws compelling public employees who are not union members to pay fair-share fees to a union violate the free-speech rights of those non-union employees. 138 S.Ct. at 2460. The Supreme Court concluded " Abood was wrongly decided" and refused to allow "unconstitutional exactions"—mandatory fair-share fees—"to continue indefinitely." Id. at 2486.

Plaintiff is not the first to offer an argument based on Janus seeking recovery of fair-share fees paid prior to its pronouncement. Among this Court's colleagues to have considered these suits, there is a consensus concluding fair-share fees collected prior to Janus may not be recovered. Danielson v. AFSCME, Council 28, AFL-CIO , 340 F.Supp.3d 1083, 1087 (W.D. Wash. 2018) ; Cook v. Brown , 364 F.Supp.3d 1184, 1193-94, No. 18-cv-1085, 2019 WL 982384, at *8 (D. Or. Feb. 28, 2019) ; Carey v. Inslee , 364 F.Supp.3d 1220, 1231-34, No. 18-cv-5208, 2019 WL 1115259, at *8–10 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 11, 2019) ; Crockett v. NEA-Alaska , 367 F.Supp.3d 996, 1006-07, No. 18-cv-0179, 2019 WL 1212082, at *6 (D. Alaska Mar. 14, 2019) ; Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31 , No. 15-cv-1235, 2019 WL 1239780, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 18, 2019) ; Hough v. SEIU Local 521 , No. 18-cv-4902, 2019 WL 1274528, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2019) ; Lee v. Ohio Educ. Ass'n , 366 F.Supp.3d 980, 982, No. 18-cv-1420, 2019 WL 1323622, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 25, 2019). For following reasons, the Court joins this growing consensus.

I. Good-Faith Defense

Defendants argue Plaintiff's primary claim—that under Janus she and the putative class members are entitled to a refund of all the fair-share fees they paid prior to Janus —is barred by a good-faith defense available to private parties sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 11 at 1). They assert this defense is particularly warranted here because the conduct was authorized by state statutes, which were not only presumptively valid, but valid under the Supreme Court's holding in Abood . The existence and contours of this good-faith defense are a matter of first impression in this District. On review, the Court concludes private parties facing a § 1983 lawsuit may advance a good-faith affirmative defense and Defendants have successfully done so in this case.

A. Type of Motion & Legal Standard

As an initial matter, Defendants have erred by making this argument under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) rather than Rule 12(c) or Rule 56. The good-faith defense is an affirmative defense. See Wyatt v. Cole , 504 U.S. 158, 169, 112 S.Ct. 1827, 118 L.Ed.2d 504 (1992) ("[W]e do not foreclose the possibility that private defendants faced with § 1983 liability ... could be entitled to an affirmative defense based on good faith ...."); Cook , 364 F.Supp.3d at 1191, 2019 WL 982384, at *6.² "[C]ourts should usually refrain from granting Rule 12(b)(6) motions on affirmative defenses." Brownmark Films, LLC v. Comedy Partners , 682 F.3d 687, 690 (7th Cir. 2012). Whether to dismiss a case due to an affirmative defense is a question properly resolved under Rule 12(c). Yassan v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. , 708 F.3d 963, 975 (7th Cir. 2013). Though Plaintiff does not object to the improper usage of Rule 12(b)(6), the Court declines to consider this portion of Defendants' motion under that Rule.

Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit has "found such procedural missteps [are] harmless when all the facts necessary to rule on the affirmative defense are properly before the court on the motion to dismiss." United States v. Rogers Cartage Co. , 794 F.3d 854, 861 (7th Cir. 2015) ; see also Brownmark , 682 F.3d at 692 ("The district court could properly consider an affirmative defense in the context of a motion for summary judgment, which it did here, regardless of the caption [the defendant] used."). Indeed, this particular procedural misstep "is of no consequence because [the] standard of review is the same." Veit v. Frater , 715 F. App'x 524, 526–27 (7th Cir. 2017). "To survive a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a complaint must ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Wagner v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. , 840 F.3d 355, 357–58 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). "A claim has ‘facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’ " Id. at 358 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ). And "[i]n assessing a motion for judgment on the pleadings," the Court draws "all reasonable inferences and facts in favor of the nonmovant, but need not accept as true any legal assertions." Id.

B. There is a Good-Faith Defense for Private Parties Sued Under § 1983

Plaintiff never quite argues the good-faith defense does not exist. (See Doc. 14 at 23 ("There is much to be said in support of a ‘good faith’ defense that shields private defendants from liability for damages that result from an innocent but unconstitutional seizure of property.") (emphasis in original) ). However, she repeatedly indicates in that direction (e.g. Doc. 14 at 16 ("There is obviously no ‘good faith’ defense in the text of section 1983") ), uses quotation marks to offset the words "good faith," and spends over a page arguing Defendants overstated the support in the judiciary for the defense (Doc. 14 at 21-23). The Court therefore infers she...