Moore v. Bureau of Unemployment Compensation

• Decision Date: 22 November 1943
• Parties: MOORE v. BUREAU OF UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION et al.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

56 N.E.2d 520

73 Ohio App. 362

MOORE v. BUREAU OF UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION et al.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, First District, Hamilton.

November 22, 1943

Thomas J. Herbert, Atty. Gen., and John M Woy, of Columbus, for appellant Bureau of Unemployment Compensation.

Taft Stettinius & Hollister, of Cincinnati, for appellants Philip Carey Mfg. Co. and Leshner Division of Philip Carey Mfg. Co.

G F. Osler, of Cincinnati, for appellee.

MATTHEWS Judge.

This appeal presents the question of whether a married woman who leaves her employment, to re-establish a home by joining her husband who had provided a domicile for her and her children in a city other than that in which she had been employed, is entitled to unemployment compensation.

The Unemployment Compensation Board of Review ruled that the claimant could not serve a waiting period as defined by the Unemployment Compensation Act, or be paid benefits for the duration of any period of unemployment due to her voluntarily quitting work because of marital obligations. The board found also that she had quit her employment voluntarily because of marital obligations when she left her employment to reside with her husband in another city, and therefore, denied her claim.

On appeal to the Common Pleas Court the finding and order of the board of review was reversed and the order of the referee allowing the plaintiff's claim for benefits was reinstated. From that judgment, this appeal was taken.

The plaintiff quit work on August 11, 1941. She filed her claim for benefits on December 4, 1941. In the interim the Unemployment Compensation Act (Sections 1345-1 to 1345-35, General Code) was amended, effective October 1, 1941, 119 Ohio Laws, p. 821.

The plaintiff contends that when she quit on August 11, 1941, her rights under the law became fixed and vested and to apply the subsequent amendment to that event would violate the provisions of the Ohio Constitution against retroactive laws (Section 28 of Article II), and the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. It is also claimed that the law if applied as urged by defendants would impair the obligation of the marriage contract, contrary to the provisions in both Constitutions. As to this latter contention, it is sufficient to state that marriage has never been regarded as a contract within the constitutional prohibitions against laws impairing the obligation of contracts.

In 12 American Jurisprudence, 47, Section 416, it is stated:

'Marriage is not a contract within the meaning of the provision in the Constitution of the United States prohibiting states from impairing the obligation of a contract.'

Now, did the plaintiff's rights become fixed on August 11, 1941?

It is certain that her claim was not fully matured at that time. Ceasing to be employed was only the first step. Before she could obtain benefits it was necessary for her to seek and fail to obtain other employment and to establish her status as a person with capacity to work who was unable to obtain it at the time of filing her claim for benefits. In 11 American Jurisprudence, 1199, Section 370, it is said:

'A right cannot be regarded as vested, in the constitutional sense, unless it amounts to something more than a mere expectation of future benefit or interest founded upon an anticipated continuance of the existing general laws.'

That the Legislature did not intend to confer a vested right which it could not affect by subsequent legislation is clearly stated in the act, which was in force on August 11, 1941, in Section 1345-30, General Code, in which it is provided:

'All the rights, privileges, or immunities conferred by this act, or by acts done pursuant thereto, shall exist subject to the power of the general assembly to amend or repeal this act at any time.'

The reservation is in accordance with the general principle that laws are passed, amended and repealed as changed conditions dictate in the exercise of sound public policy. This process inevitably affects different members of the public in different degrees, but if that imposed liability it would tend to make our laws as unchangeable as those of the ancient Medes and Persians.

In 11 American Jurisprudence, 1200, Section 372, the rule is stated:

'There can, in the nature of things, be no vested right in an existing law which precludes its change or repeal * * *. In no case is there an implied promise on the part of the state to protect its citizens against incidental injury occasioned by changes in the law.'

In Talley v. Unemployment Compensation Division of Industrial Accident Board, 63 Idaho 644, 124 P.2d 784, the court applied a similar law to facts analogous to those in this case and reached the conclusion that the claim of vested right was without merit. We, therefore, hold that the plaintiff's rights must be determined by the...