Talley v. Unemployment Compensation Division of Industrial Accident Board

• Decision Date: 15 April 1942
• Docket Number: 6988
• Citation: 124 P.2d 784,63 Idaho 644
• Parties: FRANCES H. TALLEY, Appellant, v. UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION DIVISION OF THE INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT BOARD, Respondent
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

124 P.2d 784

63 Idaho 644

FRANCES H. TALLEY, Appellant, v. UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION DIVISION OF THE INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT BOARD, Respondent

No. 6988

Supreme Court of Idaho

April 15, 1942

UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION-PERSONAL ELIGIBILITY CONDITIONS-LEAVING EMPLOYMENT VOLUNTARILY-VESTED RIGHTS.

1. Under Unemployment Compensation Law, an employee who voluntarily quit her last employment had no "vested right" to benefits under her initial determination of eligibility, by reason of having filed her claim prior to enactment of an amendment disqualifying an employee who voluntarily quit last place of employment from benefits, and hence, denial of benefits to employee did not give amendment a prohibited retroactive effect. (Sess. Laws, 1936, 3d Ex Sess. c. 12, sec. 24; Sess. Laws, 1941, c. 182, secs. 3-1 3-7, 5.)

2. Claimant had burden to show her eligibility to compensation benefits. (Sess Laws, 1936, 3d Ex. Sess., c. 12, as amended.)

3. The purpose of the Unemployment Compensation Law is to provide unemployment compensation benefit to those unemployed through no fault of their own, and the law should be liberally construed to accomplish its humanitarian purpose.

APPEAL from the Industrial Accident Board.

Appeal from an order of the Board denying compensation under the Unemployment Compensation Law. Affirmed.

Board's ruling sustained. Costs to respondent.

Creed W. Mullins and Karl Jeppesen, for Appellant.

The unemployment compensation funds are held in trust both by the Federal and State governments for the benefit of wage earners in covered employments, and such wage earners thus have a vested interest in said funds. (State ex. rel. Taylor v. Robison, 59 Idaho 485, 491, 83 P.2d 983; Sec. 7 (d), Ch. 12, S. L. 1935 (3rd Ex. Sess.), p. 29.)

And this is particularly true after the amount due a claimant has been officially determined as was the case herein by the determination of May 6, 1941. (McBride v. Retirement Board of Alleghaney County, (Penn.), 199 A. 130; Double v. Iowa-Nebraska Coal Company, (Ia.), 201 N.W. 97, Annotation, 112 A. L. R. 1010; People v. Moore, 1 Idaho 662, 671.)

As applied to the facts of this case, Chapter 182, S. L. 1941, p. 401 is clearly retrospective, and thus in violation of law, in that to so operate it "takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, creates new obligations, imposes a new duty and attaches a new disability in respect to transactions already past." (Adleman v. Ocean Accident & Guaranty Co., (Md.) 101 A. 529; Wallace v. Oregon Short Line Ry. Co., 16 Idaho 103, 100 P. 904; Cook v. Massey, 38 Idaho 264, 220 P. 1088.)

Bert H. Miller, Attorney General, Thos. M. Robertson, Jr., and Paul B. Ennis, Assistant Attorneys General, for Respondent.

The words "in all respects eligible" in Sec. 3-7 (207) of the Unemployment Compensation Law can only be construed to mean "that claimant at present meets the eligibility conditions prescribed for future compensable weeks in the benefit year thus established by the filing of her first claim." Whether she will continue to meet these conditions in the future cannot, of course, be determined. (Unemployment Compensation Law, Sec. 3-7 (207); Unemployment Compensation Law, Sec. 4 (208).)

No person has a vested right to unemployment compensation benefits which is valid against repeal or amendment of the Unemployment Compensation Law. This is particularly true in cases where no benefits have become payable and the right to benefits has not been finally established. (Unemployment Compensation Law, Sec. (906); Adams v. Ernst (1939) 1 Wash. (2), 254, 95 P.2d 799; Pennie v. Reis, 132 U.S. 464 10 S.Ct. 149, 21 R. C. L. 242, Annotations, 54 A. L. R. 943, 98 A. L. R. 505, 112 A. L. R. 1009.)

BUDGE, J. Morgan, Holden, and Ailshie, JJ., concur. Givens, C.J., concurs in the conclusion.

OPINION

BUDGE, J.

Appellant Frances H. Talley began working in the office of Sigler's Studio in Boise, in November, 1936, as a color artist and receptionist, and was continuously so employed from that date until August 31, 1940, when she voluntarily quit. The next day she married and moved to Nampa, where she has since resided with her husband.

On April 29, 1941, appellant filed her claim for unemployment compensation, using one of respondent's form applications. On May 6, 1941, respondent issued to appellant an "Initial Determination," whereby appellant was found "in all respects" eligible to receive benefit payments in the amount of $ 11 per week and a total benefit amount of $ 187, with a disqualification for five weeks of voluntarily leaving her employment without good cause connected therewith.

An amendment to the Unemployment Compensation Law became effective May 8, 1941 (1941 Session Laws, Chapt. 182, sec. 3, p. 401.), providing that one of the personal eligibility conditions of a benefit claimant should be that his unemployment is not due to his voluntarily quitting of his last employment without good cause connected therewith. On July 22, 1941, the Unemployment Compensation Division of the Industrial Accident Board issued what it termed a "Corrected Initial Determination," whereby it then determined appellant ineligible for compensation because she had voluntarily quit her employment without good cause. On August 8, 1941, Claims Examiner George R. Gochnour denied appellant's request for a redetermination. On August 19, 1941, appellant filed a Petition for Hearing with the Industrial Accident Board, whereupon the Board directed a hearing be had before Bradshaw, Appeals Examiner. Hearing was duly had, and after finding the facts substantially as heretofore related, the appeals Examiner made the following conclusions of law:

"The claim filed by Frances H. Talley on 4-29-41 was a valid claim. An amendment to the Idaho Unemployment Compensation Law, effective May 7 [May 8], 1941, made one of the personal eligibility conditions of a benefit claimant that "his unemployment is not due to the fact that he left his last employment voluntarily without good cause connected with his employment." For a claim filed on 4-29-41 the determination issued on 5-6-41 was correct. On and after May 7, 1941 it becomes necessary to determine whether the claimant's unemployment for each week that she files claims for benefits is due to her voluntarily leaving her last employment without good cause connected with the employment. Benefits should be denied."

"The determination issued on 5-6-41 was given to the claimant with the understanding that benefits would become payable provided the claimant complied with all further eligibility requirements. When the law was amended, effective May 7 [May 8], 1941, it became necessary for the claimant to comply with the new requirements for eligibility. When the claimant was declared ineligible in the corrected determination given on 7-22-41, it should have been only for the period of time that her continued unemployment was due to her voluntarily leaving her last employment with R. H. Sigler. If during her benefit year established by her claim filed on 4-29-41 the claimant is unemployed, and such unemployment is not due to her voluntarily leaving her last employment without good cause connected with the employment, she shall, if otherwise eligible, be entitled to benefits with a weekly benefit amount of $ 11 and a total benefit amount of $ 187."

Whereupon the following orders were entered:

"Frances H. Talley is ineligible for benefits as long as her continued unemployment is due to her voluntarily leaving her employment with R. H. Sigler without good cause connected with her employment.

"If Frances H. Talley becomes unemployed during her benefit year starting 4-29-41, and such unemployment is not due to her voluntarily leaving her last employment without good cause connected with the employment, she shall, if otherwise eligible, be entitled to benefits with a weekly benefit amount of $ 11 and a total benefit amount of $ 187."

In other words, the Appeals Examiner concluded that appellant, having voluntarily left her last employment without good cause, was ineligible, under the 1941 amendment, to receive unemployment compensation; but further concluded that should she again be employed and thereafter become unemployed, not by reason of her voluntarily quitting, she, if not otherwise disqualified, would become eligible to unemployment compensation under her Initial Determination of April 29, 1941.

The Industrial Accident Board, on appeal, affirmed the Appeals Examiner's ruling denying appellant's eligibility to unemployment compensation, from which ruling of the...