Moore v. City of Ctr. Point

• Citation: 319 So.3d 1223
• Decision Date: 01 May 2020
• Docket Number: 1171151
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court
• Parties: Michael MOORE, Wesley Farmer, and Briana DeBose v. CITY OF CENTER POINT and Redflex Traffic Systems, Inc.

319 So.3d 1223

Michael MOORE, Wesley Farmer, and Briana DeBose

v.CITY OF CENTER POINT and Redflex Traffic Systems, Inc.

1171151

Supreme Court of Alabama.

May 1, 2020

Rehearing Denied August 28, 2020

J. Doyle Fuller and Susan G. Copeland of Fuller & Copeland, Montgomery, for appellants.

Kendrick K. Nelson and Alton B. Parker, Jr., of Spain & Gillon, LLC, Birmingham; and H. Thomas Wells, Jr., Kacey L. Weddle, and Stewart James Alvis of Maynard, Cooper & Gale, P.C., Birmingham, for appellees.

BOLIN, Justice.

Michael Moore, Wesley Farmer, and Briana DeBose (hereinafter referred to collectively as "the plaintiffs") appeal from the Jefferson Circuit Court's dismissal of their declaratory-judgment action challenging the Center Point Automated Traffic Safety Act and the implementing City of Center Point ordinance providing for the automated photographic enforcement of red lights, stop signs, and speed limits within the corporate limits of the City of Center Point ("the City") on constitutional and statutory grounds.

Facts and Procedural History

In 2013, the Alabama Legislature enacted Act No. 2013-228, Ala. Acts 2013, a local act known as the "Center Point Automated Traffic Safety Act" ("the Act"), which authorized the automated photographic enforcement of traffic lights, stop signs, and speed limits within the corporate limits of the City. The Act became effective July 12, 2013. The legislature found in § 2(b) of the Act that vehicles that violate traffic-control regulations and signage within the corporate limits of the City were a dangerous problem; that automated traffic-camera enforcement was a highly accurate method of detecting traffic-control violations and reducing the number of traffic accidents, deaths, and injuries; that current Alabama law provides that failing to stop at a traffic-control signal and failing to abide by traffic signage and speed limits were criminal misdemeanors; and that a reduction in the number of drivers exceeding speed limits and running red lights and stop signs through a program using photographic evidence and enforcement to impose civil fines would promote and protect the health and welfare of the citizens of the City.

Section 4 of the Act empowered the City to

"adopt an ordinance providing for the utilization by the City or its designee of a photographic traffic signal enforcement system, a photographic stop sign enforcement system, and a photographic vehicle speed enforcement system to detect and record traffic signal violations, stop sign violations, and speeding violations in the City, to issue notices of civil violations by mail, and to collect fines for the recorded traffic signal violations, stop sign violations and speeding violations which may occur within the corporate limits of the City as provided in this act."

The legislature categorized a violation of the provisions of the ordinance authorized by the Act as a "civil violation" and made the penalty for such violation the payment of a civil fine. § 3(3). Section 3(10) of the Act defined a speeding violation as

"[a]ny violation of a motor vehicle at a speed that exceeds the legal maximum speed limits set forth in or adopted pursuant to Article 8, Chapter 5A, Title 32, Sections 32-5A-170 to 32-5A-178, inclusive, Code of 1975, or of any combination thereof; provided, however, that speed limits set by action of the Center Point City Council, if any, shall supersede the limits set in Article 8, Chapter 5A, Title 32, Sections 32-5A-170 to 32-5A-178, inclusive, Code of Alabama 1975. A speeding violation shall be a civil violation as defined in this act."

Section 3(12) of the Act defined a stop-sign violation as

"[a]ny violation of Section 32-5A-112, Code of Alabama 1975, wherein a vehicle proceeds into an intersection after failing to stop at a clearly marked stop line. A stop sign violation shall be a civil violation as defined in this act."

Section 3(14) of the Act defined a traffic-signal violation as

"[a]ny violation of Section 32-5A-31, Section 32-5A-32, or Section 32-5A-35, Code of Alabama 1975, or of any combination thereof, wherein a vehicle proceeds into a signalized intersection at a time while the traffic-control signal for that vehicle's lane of travel is emitting a steady red signal. A traffic signal violation shall be a civil violation as defined in the act."

On October 22, 2015, the City adopted Ordinance No. 2015-05 ("the ordinance"), which provided for the automated traffic-camera enforcement of red lights, stop signs, and speed limits within the corporate limits of the City through the imposition of a civil penalty for those motorists photographed violating traffic-control regulations.¹ Section 1.1 of the ordinance states that the Center Point City Council found that there was a high incidence of drivers "running" red lights and stop signs and violating speed limits; that automated traffic-camera enforcement is an effective method for detecting violations of traffic-control regulations and for reducing the number of those violations and decreasing the number of traffic accidents, deaths, and injuries; and that a reduction in the number of violations of traffic-control regulations through the use of automated photographic enforcement and the imposition of civil liability would help to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the citizens of the City.

Section 2.1 of the ordinance categorized a violation of the provisions of the ordinance as a "civil violation" and imposed the payment of a civil fine as a penalty. The definitions of a "speeding violation," a "stop sign violation," and a "traffic signal violation" in the ordinance are identical to the definitions of those terms in the Act. Sections 3.1 and 3.2 of the ordinance impose a $60 civil fine for a traffic-signal violation and a stop-sign violation, respectively. Section 3.3 of the ordinance imposes a civil fine of between $60 and $160 for speeding violations, depending on the number of miles per hour the violator is traveling over the speed limit.

Moore and Farmer allege that they were ticketed through the use of the automated photographic equipment in 2017 for running a red light within the corporate limits of the City. DeBose alleges that she was ticketed through the use of the automated photographic equipment in 2017 for not stopping at a stop sign within the corporate limits of the City.

On February 6, 2018, the plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of a putative class of individuals who had received notice of violation pursuant to the Act, sued the City and Redflex Traffic Systems, Inc.² (hereinafter referred to collectively as "the defendants"), seeking, among other things, a judgment declaring that the Act and the ordinance are unconstitutional and violative of Alabama law. The plaintiffs sought a declaration that the Act violated §§ 89, 104(14), and 105, Ala. Const. 1901. The plaintiffs further sought a declaration that the ordinance violated §§ 11-45-1 and 32-5-1, Ala. Code 1975. Additionally, the plaintiffs sought an order enjoining the City from ticketing individuals through the use of automatic traffic-enforcement cameras and a refund of all fines collected based on the use of the automatic traffic-enforcement cameras.

On March 14, 2018, the defendants moved the trial court, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., to dismiss the declaratory-judgment complaint against them, arguing that the plaintiffs had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.³ On May 8, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a response in opposition to the motion to dismiss. On June 27, 2018, the trial court entered an order granting the motion to dismiss, holding, among other things, that neither the Act nor the ordinance violated §§ 89, 104, and 105 of the Alabama Constitution of 1901. This appeal followed.

Standard of Review

This Court has stated the appropriate standard of review for an appeal from an order granting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss as follows:

" ‘On appeal, a dismissal is not entitled to a presumption of correctness.... The appropriate standard of review under Rule 12(b)(6) [, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] is whether, when the allegations of the complaint are viewed most strongly in the pleader's favor, it appears that the pleader could prove any set of circumstances that would entitle [the pleader] to relief. ... In making this determination, this Court does not consider whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but only whether [the plaintiff] may possibly prevail. ... We note that a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper only when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle the plaintiff to relief.’ "

Carr v. International Refining & Mfg. Co., 13 So. 3d 947, 952 (Ala. 2009) (quoting Nance v. Matthews, 622 So. 2d 297, 299 (Ala. 1993) ). Further,

" ‘[f]or a declaratory-judgment action to withstand a motion to dismiss there must be a bona fide justiciable controversy that should be settled. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 472 So. 2d 640, 641 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984) ; Smith v. Alabama Dry Dock & Shipbuilding Co., 293 Ala. 644, 309 So. 2d 424, 427 (1975). The test for the sufficiency of a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment is whether the pleader is entitled to a declaration of rights at all, not whether the pleader will prevail in the declaratory-judgment action. Anonymous, 472 So. 2d at 641.

" ‘The lack of a justiciable controversy may be raised by either a motion to dismiss or a motion for a summary judgment. Smith, 309 So. 2d at 427. See also Rule 12, Ala. R. Civ. P.; Rule 56, Ala. R. Civ. P. However, a motion to dismiss is rarely appropriate in a declaratory-judgment action. Wallace v. Burleson, 361 So. 2d 554, 555 (Ala. 1978). If there is a justiciable controversy at the commencement of the declaratory-judgment action, the motion to dismiss should be overruled and a declaration of rights made only after an answer has been submitted and evidence has been presented. Anonymous, 472 So. 2d at 641.

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