Moore v. City of Garfield Heights
| Decision Date | 19 November 2012 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 1:12-CV-1700 |
| Parties | Ronnie Moore, Plaintiff, v. City of Garfield Heights, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio |
Memorandum of Opinion and Order
Pro se plaintiff Ronnie Moore filed this action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986 and 18 U.S.C . §§ 241 and 242 against defendants City of Garfield Heights, Garfield Heights Municipal Court Judges Deborah Nicastro and Jennifer Weiler, attorney Clifford Babcock, and "100 John and Jane Does." In the Complaint, plaintiff claims defendants violated his constitutional rights during the course of municipal court traffic, criminal, and small claims proceedings, as well as a federal bankruptcy action.
Plaintiff has also filed a Motion to proceed In Forma Pauperis. (Doc. 2). That request is granted.
Plaintiff has filed a number of pleadings in this action, all of which are difficult to decipher. As best the Court can determine, it appears plaintiff is challenging traffic, criminal, and small claims proceedings against him in the Garfield Heights Municipal Court, as well as a federal bankruptcy action in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Ohio.
With regard to the pending traffic and criminal proceedings, plaintiff alleges the following facts. On October 29, 2011, Garfield Heights police officers initiated a traffic stop of plaintiff's vehicle for a broken tail light and expired license plates. The traffic stop apparently escalated and plaintiff was removed from his vehicle, arrested, and detained for seven hours before being released on bond.1 Plaintiff asserts the officers did not have probable cause to either stop or arrest him. He claims they kidnaped him, vandalized his vehicle, unlawfully detained him, and "jailed him against his will."
Plaintiff appeared before Judge Weiler of the Garfield Heights Municipal Court on November 9, 2011. When plaintiff refused to enter a plea to the charges against him, Judge Weiler indicated she would enter a plea of not guilty. Plaintiff objected to the entry of any plea on his behalf and claims Judge Weiler was "practicing law from the bench." (Doc. 3 at 3). He also complains that a prosecutor was not present at this hearing and asserts the municipal court, therefore, lost jurisdiction. He claims the entire proceeding violated his due process rights and constituted a sham legal process. It is unclear, but it appears from the docket that proceedings relating to the October 29, 2011 incident are still pending in the Garfield Heights Municipal Court. See Garfield Municipal Court Docket for Case Nos. CRB 1102234, TRD 1110423A, and TRD 1110423B.
Plaintiff also alleges generally that his due process rights were violated by a garnishment order entered against him by Garfield Heights Municipal Court Judge Deborah Nicastro in connection with small claims proceedings instituted by the City of Maple Heights to collect unpaid RITA taxes. See Garfield Heights Municipal Court Case No. CVI 0703231. It appears defendant Cliff Babcock, an attorney with Babcock & Wasserman, represented the City of Maple Heights in these proceedings. Id. Plaintiff also alleges his due process rights were violated during the course of federal bankruptcy proceedings before Judge Patricia Morgenstern-Clarren. See In re Ronnie Moore, Case No. 11-14105 (N.D. Ohio 5/13/11).
On July 2, 2012, Plaintiff filed a two paragraph "Civil Complaint" against defendant City of Garfield Heights. (Doc. 1). Three weeks later, plaintiff filed a document entitled "Affidavit of Civil Rights Violations and Due Process of Law," which provides greater factual detail regarding his municipal traffic violations case. (Doc. 3). Finally, on September 10, 2012, plaintiff filed a "Petition and Complaint in the Nature of a Suit for Deprivation of Federally Protected Rights under Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Affidavit of Facts in Support." (Doc. 4). In this pleading, plaintiff names several additional defendants, provides further factual allegations regarding his municipal traffic and small claims proceedings, and asserts numerous legal claims.2 Specifically, plaintiff asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 and 1986 and 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 for the following: "(1) Sham Legal Process under Color of Law, (2) Violation of Bankruptcy Orders, (3) Judicial Contempt of Court, (4) Theft by Deception, (5) Fictitious Allegations, (6) Harassment andTrespass on Personal Property without a court order, (7) Conspiracy to Commit Fraud, (8) Denial of Due Process, (9) Right to Defense Arguments, (10) Denial to Right to Truth in Evidence, (11) Constitutional Violations (including Amendment violations), (12) Vandalism, (13) Misprision of Felony, (14) Vandalizing Personal Property, (15) Denial of Medical Attention, and (16) Unlawful Wage Garnishment." (Doc. 4 at 9). He seeks $10,000,000.00 in damages.
Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), the district court is required to dismiss an in forma pauperis action under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact.3 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989); Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990); Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law or fact when it is premised on an indisputably meritless legal theory or when the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. A cause of action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it lacks "plausibility in the complaint." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564 (2007).
A cause of action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it lacks "plausibility in the complaint." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564 (2007). A pleading must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009). The factual allegations in the pleading must be sufficient to raise the right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the Complaint are true. Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555. The Plaintiff is not required to include detailed factual allegations, but must provide more than "an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pleading that offers legal conclusions or a simple recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not meet this pleading standard. Id. In reviewing a Complaint, the Court must construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff. Bibbo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 151 F.3d 559, 561 (6th Cir.1998).
As an initial matter, the Court finds Judges Nicastro and Weiler are immune from liability as a matter of law. Judicial officers are generally absolutely immune from civil suits for money damages. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9 (1991); Brookings v. Clunk, 389 F.3d 614, 617 (6th Cir. 2004); Barnes v. Winchell, 105 F.3d 1111, 1115 (6th Cir. 1997). This far-reaching protection is needed to ensure that the independent and impartial exercise of judgment is not impaired by the exposure of potential damages. Barnes, 105 F.3d at 1115. For this reason, absolute immunity is overcome only in two situations: (1) when the conduct alleged is not performed in the judge's judicial capacity; or (2) when the conduct alleged, although judicial in nature, is taken in complete absence of all jurisdiction. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11-12. See also Leech v. DeWeese, 689 F.3d 538, 542 (6th Cir. 2012).
Plaintiff cannot overcome the presumption of immunity under the first criteria. Thedetermination of whether an action is performed in the defendant's judicial capacity depends on the "nature" and "function" of the act, not on the act itself. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 13; Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978). Looking first to the "nature" of the act, the Court must determine whether the conduct giving rise to the claim is a function generally performed by a judge. Stump, 435 U.S. at 362. This inquiry does not involve a rigid scrutiny of the particular act in question, but rather requires only an overall examination of the judge's alleged conduct in relation to general functions normally performed by judges. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 13. Second, an examination of the "function" of the act alleged requires the Court to assess whether the plaintiff dealt with the judicial officers in their respective judicial roles.
Applying these principles, it is evident on the face of the pleading that Judges Weiler and Nicastro were acting in their judicial capacities at all times that the conduct alleged in plaintiff's filings occurred. Presiding over small claims, traffic, and misdemeanor criminal proceedings are all actions normally performed by municipal court judges. Furthermore, plaintiff interacted with these Judges only when they were performing their duties as judicial officers. Plaintiff cannot overcome the broad application of judicial immunity under this criteria.
Judicial immunity can also be defeated when the conduct alleged, although judicial in nature, is taken in complete absence of all jurisdiction. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11-12; Barnes, 105 F.3d at 1116. When the immunity of the judge is at issue, the scope of the judge's jurisdiction is to be broadly construed. Stump, 435 U.S. at 356-57. A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he or she took was performed in error, done maliciously, or was in excess of his or her authority. Id. Actions taken in complete absence of all jurisdiction are those acts which are clearly outside of the subject matter jurisdiction of the court over which the judge presides. Kingv. Love, 766 F.2d 962, 965 (6th Cir. 1985)....
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