Moore v. Commissioner of Employment Security

• Decision Date: 16 December 1954
• Citation: 197 Tenn. 444,273 S.W.2d 703,1 McCanless 444
• Parties: Basil A. MOORE v. COMMISSIONER OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY et al. 1 McCanless 444, 197 Tenn. 444, 273 S.W.2d 703
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Page 703

273 S.W.2d 703

Basil A. MOORE v. COMMISSIONER OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY et al.

1 McCanless 444, 197 Tenn. 444, 273 S.W.2d 703

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

Dec. 16, 1954.

William L. Moore, Nashville, for appellant, Commissioner.

Harry L. Garrett, Kingsport, for appellee, Claimant.

BURNETT, Justice.

Basil Moore filed a claim for unemployment compensation which was heard by the Appeals Referee. The Referee denied the claim. On appeal to the Board of Review that body, after hearing additional evidence of the claimant, likewise denied compensation. As a result of these two findings the present suit was instituted against the Commissioner of the Department of Employment Security and the last employer of Moore, Holston Defense Corporation.

This suit was brought in the Chancery Court by petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Board of Review of the Department of Employment Security above referred to.

The case was heard before the Chancellor on this petition for certiorari and the separate answers of the Commissioner and employer and the certified record of the Board of Review filed in accordance with the writ mentioned. At the conclusion of the hearing the Chancellor put down a decree holding in effect that there was no evidence in this record to sustain the finding of the Board of Review and that the record showed that the claimant was entitled to unemployment compensation benefits, and he, therefore, reversed the decision of the Board of Review. From this decree of the Chancellor the present appeal comes and we now have the matter for disposition.

The first contention is that the Chancellor went beyond his duty and function under the law in reviewing this proceeding. It is the contention of the appellant, Commissioner, that the only function of the Chancellor in cases of this kind is to review the record of the proceedings before the Board of Review, and to determine therefrom if there was any evidence in such record to sustain the Board's finding of fact, and, if so, that then it is the duty of the court, Chancellor in this instance, to apply the applicable law to such findings.

Code Section 6901.6(i) provides in part as follows:

'In any judicial proceeding under this section the findings of the board of review as to the facts, if there be any evidence to support the same, shall be conclusive and the jurisdiction of said Court shall be confined to questions of law. * * *'

In a number of cases this Court has dealt with the question here before us. Probably the most lucid statement of the application to be given this statutory provision is a statement of this Court in the case of Milne Chair Company v. Hake, 190 Tenn. 395, 403, 230 S.W.2d 393, 396, wherein this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Tomlinson, said:

'That being the situation, we cannot say that the decision of the Board of Review is not supported by substantial evidence. The fact that some, or all, of the members of this Court, might have reached a fact conclusion contrary to that reached by the Board of Review, had we been members of that Board, is immaterial, it being a situation as to which men may reasonably reach the conclusion reached by the Board. The language of our statute by which we are controlled is: 'the findings of the board of review as to the facts, if there be any evidence to support the same, shall be conclusive and the jurisdiction of said Court shall be confined to questions of law.'

"A clear limitation of our authority under this statutory prohibition just mentioned is this statement of the Supreme Court of the United States: 'The question presented is one of specific application of a broad statutory term in a proceeding in which the agency administering the statute must determine it initially.' To sustain the commission's application of this statutory term, we need not find that its construction is the only reasonable one or even that it is the result we would have reached had the question arisen in the first instance in judicial proceedings. The 'reviewing court's function is limited.' All that is needed to support the commission's interpretation is that it has 'warrant in the record' and a 'reasonable basis in law.' Unemployment Compensation Commission of Territory of Alaska v. Aragan, 329 U.S. 143, 67 S.Ct. 245, 250, 91 L.Ed. 136, 145". (Emphasis ours.)

Numerous other cases to the same effect are Adams v. American Lava Corporation, 188 Tenn. 69, 216 S.W.2d 728; Ezell v. Hake, 184 Tenn. 319, 198 S.W.2d 809; Reese v. Hake, 184 Tenn. 423, 199 S.W.2d 569; Clinton v. Hake, 185 Tenn. 476, 206 S.W.2d 889, and Miller v. Wiley, 190 Tenn. 498, 230 S.W.2d 979.

This being the law what is the condition of the record that was before the Chancellor? The Appeals Referee found on certain statements that were introduced before him, along with the depositions of the claimant which were taken before him, that the claimant 'was not available for work.' This decision as said was appealed to the Board of Review and that Board reviewed the record before it as was heard by the Appeals Referee and then heard the claimant again. From this testimony that Board found that the claimant.

'voluntarily quit his work due to the fact that he was working the swing-shift and he considered this change in his routine injurious to his health. He offered no medical or other evidence that the swing-shift was injurious to his...