Moore v. Henderson

• Decision Date: 30 April 2001
• Docket Number: No. 00 C 4316.,00 C 4316.
• Parties: Lynda MOORE, Plaintiff, v. William L. HENDERSON, Postmaster General, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

174 F.Supp.2d 767

Lynda MOORE, Plaintiff, v. William L. HENDERSON, Postmaster General, Defendant.

No. 00 C 4316.

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.

April 30, 2001.

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Ayesha Salima Hakeem, Law Offices of Ayesha S. Hakeem, Chicago, IL, for plaintiff.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

CONLON, District Judge.

Lynda Moore sues defendant her employer, the United States Postal Service, ("the postal service"), under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., for discrimination in the terms and conditions of her employment (Count I) and for retaliation (Count II). The postal service moves for summary judgment on all claims.

BACKGROUND

All facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted. Moore, who is African-American, began working as a temporary postal service employee in May 1994. Like all temporary employees, Moore supplemented the regular work force. Temporary employees work at mail belts, sorting mail by zip code into designated containers. Generally, temporary employees work on the bulk mail belt, unless needed on the priority mail belt. Sorting bulk mail involves heavier items, such as catalogs. Temporary employees are required to work overtime each week.

Jose Diaz ("Diaz") supervises the bulk mail belt. Moore claims that Diaz discriminated against her by allowing a white temporary employee and three Filipino temporary employees, including Brigida Black ("Black"), to leave the bulk mail belt and work on the priority mail belt. A month after she started, Moore believed she was subject to race discrimination when Black was taken off the bulk mail belt and allowed to work on the priority belt. Def. Rule 56.1 statement, Moore dep. at 33. Moore further contends Diaz treated her differently by excusing Black from working mandatory overtime. In late September 1994, a disagreement involving Black and Moore occurred while they worked on the same belt. Black remained on the belt, and Moore was moved to a different one. Pl.Ex. B at 47-48. Diaz did not personally investigate the disagreement. Id. at 20-24, 43-51; Pl.Ex. A at 21-23. Moore then told Diaz she planned to file an equal employment opportunity ("EEO") complaint against him for preferential treatment of Black. Once moved to the new belt, Moore continued to be loud and disruptive in the presence of other employees despite Diaz's request to lower her voice. Def. Ex. C; Pl.Ex. L, M. Diaz told Moore she was insubordinate, and Moore called him an "ignorant ass." Id.; Pl.Ex. M. Diaz terminated Moore that day, in part for the incident with Black, and for failure to follow instructions, conduct unbecoming a postal employee and insubordination because she refused to lower her voice, she disrupted the work unit, and directed a vulgar insult at him. Pl.Ex. D, Moore aff. at ¶¶ 35-39; Pl.Ex L-M; Def. Ex. A-C. With the exception of Moore's confrontation with Black, acting manager Alice Williams ("Williams"), who is African-American, witnessed Moore's behavior and concurred in her termination. Def. Rule 56.1 statement, Moore dep. at 83-84; Def. Ex. B-C.

Prior to her termination, Moore did not tell anyone she believed she was subject to race discrimination. She first contacted an EEO counselor the day after her termination, September 28, 1994. Three months later, Moore signed for her right to sue letter from the postal service's EEO processing center ("EEO center"), which notified Moore of her duty to report immediately any address change to the EEO center. Def. Ex. D. On the same day, Moore filed her formal EEO complaint, identifying 4327 W. 18th Street as her mailing address. Moore then moved three times prior to August 1997. Moore moved a fourth time in September 1999 to her present address. Moore failed to report her new addresses to the EEO center. However, she filed a change of address form with the post office for each move. Def. Rule 56.1 statement, Moore dep. at 78.

In July 1996, Hakeem and Associates, a law firm representing Moore, contacted the EEO center and requested to be copied on all future correspondence. Pl.Ex. J. The law firm's letterhead address is 175 W. Jackson. In November 1996, an attorney representing Moore at Hakeem and Associates confirmed this address. Def. Ex. E, Bunkley-Claybrooks aff. at ¶ 3. In spring 1997, the law firm relocated to 53 W. Jackson and began to maintain post office box 19728, but failed to report the new address to the EEO center. Id. at ¶ 6; Def. Ex. F.

In April 1998, the EEO center issued its final agency decision by certified mail to Moore's counsel at 175 W. Jackson, and by first class mail to Moore at 4327 W. 18th Street. Def. Ex. E, Bunkley-Claybrooks aff. at ¶ 6. These notices were returned as undeliverable. Id. at ¶ 7. In fall 1998, Hakeem and Associates again relocated, this time to 417 S. Dearborn. By letter, Moore's counsel advised the EEO center that she did not receive a final agency decision and requested she be contacted regarding the status of Moore's complaint. This letter bears a return address of post office box number 19728. An EEO center specialist called the firm's telephone number, and left a message requesting a return call. Id. at ¶ 9. The EEO specialist's call was not returned. Id. In early October 1998, the EEO center sent another copy of the final agency decision by certified mail to the law firm at post office box 19728. Id. at ¶ 10. The correspondence was returned to the EEO center with a notice that it was unclaimed by the addressee. Id.

A year and a half later, in late March 2000, Moore's counsel telephoned the EEO center and requested another copy of the final agency decision be mailed to 417 S. Dearborn, because neither she nor Moore received a copy. In early May 2000, an EEO specialist sent copies of the April 1998 decision to Hakeem and Associates at 417 S. Dearborn and to Moore. Moore filed this action on July 17, 2000.

DISCUSSION

I. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is proper when the moving papers and affidavits show there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); King v. National Human Res. Comm., Inc., 218 F.3d 719, 723 (7th Cir.2000). Once a moving party has met its burden, the non-movant must go beyond the pleadings and set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Silk v. City of Chicago, 194 F.3d 788, 798 (7th Cir.1999). The court considers the record as a whole and draws all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Bay v. Cassens Transp. Co., 212 F.3d 969, 972 (7th Cir. 2000). A genuine issue of material fact exists when the evidence is sufficient to support a reasonable jury verdict in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Insolia v. Philip Morris, Inc., 216 F.3d 596, 599 (7th Cir.2000).

II. Title VII's Limitations Period

A Title VII suit against the federal government must generally be filed within 90 days of the plaintiff's actual receipt of a final agency decision. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c); 29 C.F.R. § 1614.407; Elmore v. Henderson, 227 F.3d 1009, 1010-11 (7th Cir.2000). Although not a jurisdictional prerequisite, timely filing of a Title VII suit is a precondition, akin to a statute of limitations, that is subject to equitable tolling where appropriate. Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95-96, 111 S.Ct. 453, 112 L.Ed.2d 435 (1990); Gibson v. West, 201 F.3d 990, 993 (7th Cir.2000). To determine the 90-day period for filing a Title VII suit, the Seventh Circuit follows a three-pronged approach. See Bond v. American Med. Ass'n, 764 F.Supp. 122, 124 (N.D.Ill.1991); Trinkle v. Bell Litho, Inc., 627 F.Supp. 764, 765 (N.D.Ill.1986). First, the period usually begins to run when the plaintiff actually receives notice of the final agency decision. See Jones v. Madison Serv. Corp., 744 F.2d 1309, 1312 (7th Cir.1984); Bond, 764 F.Supp. at 124. If the plaintiff is represented by an attorney, and the EEO agency is informed of this fact, receipt by the attorney begins the running of the 90-day period. See Jones, 744 F.2d at 1312, 1314.

Second, where the person initially receiving the notice is someone other than the plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorney, the period does not begin to run until the plaintiff or his attorney actually receives the notice. See Archie v. Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers & Warehouse Workers Union, 585 F.2d 210 (7th Cir.1978); Trinkle, 627 F.Supp. at 765.

Third, where the plaintiff's receipt of the notice is delayed, a fault approach is used. See St. Louis v. Alverno Coll., 744 F.2d 1314, 1317 (7th Cir.1984); Trinkle, 627 F.Supp. at 765. Under this approach, delay caused by the fault of the plaintiff does not toll the 90-day period. Elmore, 227 F.3d at 1013; St. Louis, 744 F.2d at 1317. It is a plaintiff's responsibility to advise the EEO agency of a change in address. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.7(b); St. Louis, 744 F.2d at 1316-17; Barnes v. Ameritech, No. 99 C 2321, 2000 WL 204233, at *1 (N.D.Ill. Feb. 15, 2000). Failure to keep the EEO agency apprized of an address change constitutes fault. St. Louis, 744 F.2d at 1317. In this instance, the 90-day period began to run when the notice first arrived at the old address. Id. Failure to pick-up a notice sent by certified mail also triggers the limitations period. Houston v. Sidley & Austin, 185 F.3d 837, 839 (7th Cir.1999); see Bond, 764 F.Supp. at 125. Whether a plaintiff is at fault is considered on a case-by-case basis. Trinkle, 627 F.Supp. at 765. The plaintiff must take reasonable steps to ensure delivery of the notice. St. Louis, 744 F.2d at 1317. Where an attorney is to receive the notice on a plaintiff's behalf, she must take reasonable steps to ensure its delivery....