Trinkle v. Bell Litho, Inc., No. 85 C 2205.

CourtUnited States District Courts. 7th Circuit. United States District Court (Northern District of Illinois)
Writing for the CourtCarl S. Tominberg and Fredric Bryan Lesser, Chicago, Ill., for defendant
PartiesAnn TRINKLE, Plaintiff, v. BELL LITHO, INC., Defendant.
Docket NumberNo. 85 C 2205.
Decision Date07 February 1986

627 F. Supp. 764

Ann TRINKLE, Plaintiff,
v.
BELL LITHO, INC., Defendant.

No. 85 C 2205.

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, E.D.

February 7, 1986.


Ann Trinkle, pro se.

Carl S. Tominberg and Fredric Bryan Lesser, Chicago, Ill., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MORAN, District Judge.

This is a Title VII pregnancy discrimination case in which plaintiff has moved for appointment of counsel. In a memorandum and order dated October 22, 1985, this court continued consideration on the appointment-of-counsel petition until plaintiff (1) demonstrated her efforts to obtain private counsel and (2) explained why she didn't file her complaint here until four months after the EEOC sent her right-to-sue letter.

Defendant seized on the timing question and deposed plaintiff to determine the facts revolving around the right-to-sue letter. Now that the court has a better idea of what went on, it has decided plaintiff deserves court-appointed counsel.

In September 1984 the EEOC informed plaintiff that it had dismissed her charge and that she should expect the right-to-sue letter in the mail. Her EEOC file shows that although a letter was sent by certified

627 F. Supp. 765
mail on November 15, 1984, it was returned unclaimed on December 7. Plaintiff claims she never received either the letter or any notice that certified mail was waiting for her. At the end of February 1985 plaintiff called the EEOC to inquire when the letter would be sent. After several phone calls of this nature she finally just went down to the EEOC and picked up a right-to-sue letter. She filed her complaint here the next day, March 18, 1985

The 90-day filing requirement in Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), operates as a statute of limitations which can be tolled or waived. Jones v. Madison Service Corp., 744 F.2d 1309, 1314 (7th Cir. 1984), citing Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982). In our first memorandum and order we had assumed that tolling or waiver of the 90-day requirement was the issue. However, given the facts as we now understand them, the question is whether the 90 days begins to run on receipt of actual or constructive knowledge of one's right to sue.

The Seventh Circuit has developed a three-pronged approach to the issue. In cases where the right-to-sue letter is mailed to plaintiff's residence but received by someone other than the plaintiff, the 90 days commences on the date the claimant "actually receives" the letter. Archie v. Chicago Truck Drivers, etc., 585 F.2d 210, 216 (7th Cir.1978) (letter received by plaintiff's wife, who didn't give it to plaintiff for nine days); Killingham v. Board of Governors of State Colleges and Universities, 549 F.Supp. 225 (N.D.Ill.1982). In cases where the right-to-sue letter is sent to...

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8 practice notes
  • Flynn v. Dyzwilewski, No. 85 C 8618.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 7th Circuit. United States District Court (Northern District of Illinois)
    • September 19, 1986
    ...F. Supp. 773 counsel in one paragraph for a case which would be summarily dismissed in the next. See, e.g., Trinkle v. Bell Litho, Inc., 627 F.Supp. 764, 766 (N.D.Ill.1986). A similar claim in which a federal prisoner alleged a conspiracy and "frame-up" by judges, a United States attorney, ......
  • Moore v. Henderson, No. 00 C 4316.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 7th Circuit. United States District Court (Northern District of Illinois)
    • April 30, 2001
    ...follows a three-pronged approach. See Bond v. American Med. Ass'n, 764 F.Supp. 122, 124 (N.D.Ill.1991); Trinkle v. Bell Litho, Inc., 627 F.Supp. 764, 765 (N.D.Ill.1986). First, the period usually begins to run when the plaintiff actually receives notice of the final agency decision. See Jon......
  • Banks v. Rockwell Intern. N. Am. Aircraft Operations, No. C-2-84-1119.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 6th Circuit. United States District Courts. 6th Circuit. Southern District of Ohio
    • August 4, 1987
    ...the E.E.O.C. informed of the claimant's correct address as is required by the applicable regulations. In Trinkle v. Bell Litho, Inc., 627 F.Supp. 764 (N.D.Ill.1986), the court divided the problems with notice of right to sue into three categories. If the right to sue letter has been sent to......
  • Harding v. Fort Wayne Foundry/Pontiac Div., Inc., Civil No. 1:95cv189.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 7th Circuit. United States District Court of Northern District of Indiana
    • March 13, 1996
    ...122, 124 (N.D.Ill.1991); Tyler v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 1987 WL 19553 (N.D.Ill. Nov. 5, 1987); Trinkle v. Bell Litho, Inc., 627 F.Supp. 764 In the present case neither the first or second prong is applicable. Thus, this court must determine whether the delay in receiving the Right to......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
8 cases
  • Flynn v. Dyzwilewski, No. 85 C 8618.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 7th Circuit. United States District Court (Northern District of Illinois)
    • September 19, 1986
    ...F. Supp. 773 counsel in one paragraph for a case which would be summarily dismissed in the next. See, e.g., Trinkle v. Bell Litho, Inc., 627 F.Supp. 764, 766 (N.D.Ill.1986). A similar claim in which a federal prisoner alleged a conspiracy and "frame-up" by judges, a United States attorney, ......
  • Moore v. Henderson, No. 00 C 4316.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 7th Circuit. United States District Court (Northern District of Illinois)
    • April 30, 2001
    ...follows a three-pronged approach. See Bond v. American Med. Ass'n, 764 F.Supp. 122, 124 (N.D.Ill.1991); Trinkle v. Bell Litho, Inc., 627 F.Supp. 764, 765 (N.D.Ill.1986). First, the period usually begins to run when the plaintiff actually receives notice of the final agency decision. See Jon......
  • Banks v. Rockwell Intern. N. Am. Aircraft Operations, No. C-2-84-1119.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 6th Circuit. United States District Courts. 6th Circuit. Southern District of Ohio
    • August 4, 1987
    ...the E.E.O.C. informed of the claimant's correct address as is required by the applicable regulations. In Trinkle v. Bell Litho, Inc., 627 F.Supp. 764 (N.D.Ill.1986), the court divided the problems with notice of right to sue into three categories. If the right to sue letter has been sent to......
  • Harding v. Fort Wayne Foundry/Pontiac Div., Inc., Civil No. 1:95cv189.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 7th Circuit. United States District Court of Northern District of Indiana
    • March 13, 1996
    ...122, 124 (N.D.Ill.1991); Tyler v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 1987 WL 19553 (N.D.Ill. Nov. 5, 1987); Trinkle v. Bell Litho, Inc., 627 F.Supp. 764 In the present case neither the first or second prong is applicable. Thus, this court must determine whether the delay in receiving the Right to......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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