Moore v. Horne

• Decision Date: 17 November 1910
• Citation: 69 S.E. 409,153 N.C. 413
• Parties: MOORE v. HORNE.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

69 S.E. 409

153 N.C. 413

MOORE v. HORNE.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

November 17, 1910

Appeal from Superior Court, Anson County; Lyon, Judge.

Action by L. F. Moore against Hugh Horne. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed, and new trial granted.

These issues were submitted:

"First. Was the plaintiff injured by the defendant, Hugh Horne, as alleged in the complaint? Answer: Yes.

"Second. What damages, if any, is the plaintiff entitled to recover? Answer: Twenty-five hundred dollars."

Jas. A Lockhart and McLendon & Thomas, for appellant.

Robinson & Caudle, for appellee.

BROWN, J.

The evidence tends to prove that the defendant is insane, and has been so adjudged by proper proceedings, and was duly confined in jail and application made for admission in an asylum of the state. There is evidence offered tending to prove that prior thereto the defendant assaulted the plaintiff with a pistol and injured him.

The plaintiff does not claim punitive damages, but actual or compensatory damages only. A lunatic is liable in a civil action for any tort which he may commit. The proper measure of damages in an action against a lunatic for tort committed by him is compensation for the injuries sustained. It cannot include punitive damages. McIntyre v. Sholty, 121 Ill. 660, 13 N.E. 239, 2 Am. St. Rep. 140. In the foregoing case the lunatic shot and killed the deceased, and his estate was held liable in damages. The court excluded the evidence of insanity in the case, and the ruling of the trial court was affirmed. An insane person is just as responsible for his torts as a sane person. Williams v. Hays, 143 N.Y. 442, 38 N.E. 449, 26 L. R. A. 153, 42 Am. St. Rep. 743; Cooley on Torts (3d Ed.) 171; Shearman & Redfield on Negligence, § 122. Upon the same principle infants are held liable for their torts. Crump v. McKay, 53 N.C. 35; Smith v. Kron, 96 N.C. 397, 2 S.E. 533. It was therefore erroneous to admit evidence upon part of plaintiff that defendant was sane when he committed the act, unless plaintiff sought to have the jury impose smart money or punitive damages, which is not the case. This error may have been cured by the charge of the court in directing the jury not to allow punitive damages, but we call attention to it so as to guide the court below on another trial to the end that all such evidence be eliminated.

His honor, however, permitted plaintiff to prove that the defendant was arrested in a criminal proceeding for this alleged assault upon plaintiff, and further permitted the following question and answer: "Q. Mr. Redfearn, did you help to arrest Horne for the shooting of Fairley Moore? A. Yes, sir. Q. What did he do--what was his condition on that occasion? A. Well, I was outside the store and I heard scuffling, and Horne was cursing and trying to get loose, and the officer that had him had his handcuffs out and asked me to put them on him, and I did. I can't recall his language very well, but he was cursing and abusing people, and was drunk." To all of which defendant in apt time objected and noted exceptions. The admission of such evidence was entirely irrelevant to the matters at issue in this case, and was well calculated to harm the defendant, who denies in the pleadings that he committed any assault upon the plaintiff. The fact that he was arrested on a criminal Warrant charging defendant with the very assault which is made the foundation of this action is incompetent evidence here. It is no evidence that the defendant committed the assault as alleged in the complaint. The conduct of the defendant in resisting arrest under the warrant is wholly foreign to the matters at issue in this civil action. The introduction of such incompetent evidence was well calculated to inflame and prejudice the minds of the jurors against the defendant so as to possibly influence their judgment upon both issues submitted to them.

As the case is to be tried again, it is needless to discuss the other assignments of error.

New trial.

CLARK C.J. (dissenting).

The defendant in an ex parte proceeding was adjudged a lunatic. The plaintiff necessarily moved to have a guardian ad litem appointed. This was no estoppel on the plaintiff.

The evidence left no doubt that the defendant shot the plaintiff. Certainly there was ample evidence which justified the jury in so finding. The only proposition of law involved was that in this action if the defendant did the shooting he was liable for compensatory, but not for punitive damages, and the judge so told the jury. The defendant on cross-examination brought out much evidence tending to show that the defendant was insane at the time of the killing, which was not controverted, and the plaintiff on reexamination went into the same matters-for what purpose, on either side, does not appear. Among other questions asked was one as to the conduct of the defendant when arrested on the criminal charge. This question was asked not to show that the defendant was arrested, but to show his conduct on that occasion and was along the line of the cross-examination by defendant's counsel.

The real question of fact as to the defendant having done the killing and the amount of damages and the proposition of law which was correctly laid down by the court as to the measure of damages were in no wise affected by these matters brought out on the cross-examination and again worked over on the redirect. The evidence on both sides in this respect was irrelevant and immaterial. It could not possibly affect the result, and therefore was not ground for a new trial. This has been repeatedly held by this court. Collins v Collins, 125 N.C. 98, 34 S.E. 195; Spruill v. Columbia, 153 N.C. 48, 68 S.E. 911; Manufacturing Co. v. Townsend, Id.; ...