Moore v. Jimmy Dean/Sara Lee Foods, Inc.

• Decision Date: 31 October 2007
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 06-S-1216-NW.
• Citation: 520 F.Supp.2d 1359
• Parties: Pamela MOORE, Plaintiff, v. JIMMY DEAN/SARA LEE FOODS, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama

520 F.Supp.2d 1359

Pamela MOORE, Plaintiff, v. JIMMY DEAN/SARA LEE FOODS, INC., Defendant.

Civil Action No. 06-S-1216-NW.

United States District Court, N.D. Alabama, Northwestern Division.

October 31, 2007.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Pamela Moore, Tuscumbia, AL, Pro se.

John J. Coleman, III, Kathryn Morris Willis, Burr & Forman LLP, Birmingham, AL, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

LYNWOOD SMITH, District Judge.

Believing she was discriminated against, and ultimately discharged, on the basis of her race, Pamela Moore filed this lawsuit against Sara Lee Foods, Inc., on June 21, 2006.¹ After engaging in discovery, defendant moved for summary judgment on April 5, 2007.² Recognizing plaintiff's status as a pro se litigant, this court entered a detailed submission order reminding plaintiff of her obligation to respond to the motion,³ but plaintiff's eventual responses were wholly noncompliant — both with the submission order and, with the portion of the Uniform Initial Order that governs summary judgment briefing.⁴

Accordingly, the court entered orders striking plaintiff's responses and holding that she had admitted all of defendant's allegedly undisputed facts.⁵ Cf. Digioia v. H. Koch & Sons, 944 F.2d 809, 811 n. 6 (11th Cir.1991) (same situation under a local rule); Brandon v. Lockheed Martin Aeronautical Systems, 393 F.Supp.2d 1341, 1347 (N.D.Ga.2005) (same). See also Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 670 (11th Cir.1990) ("[W]e hold that a pro se litigant does not escape the essential burden under summary judgment standards of establishing that there is a genuine issue as to a fact material to his case in order to avert summary judgment"), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 933, 111 S.Ct. 2056, 114 L.Ed.2d 461 (1991); Brown v. United States Patent & Trademark Office, 06-14716, 2007 WL 446601, at * 1 (11th Cir. Feb. 13, 2007) ("Although pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed ..., ordinary rules of procedure and summary judgment apply.").

As the court recognized previously, however, a nonmovant's failure to controvert a statement of undisputed fact cannot "absolve the district court of even checking whether the citation [of record evidence] supports the assertion," because [s]uch an approach would derogate the truth-finding functions of the judicial process by substituting convenience `for facts." Giannullo v. City of New York, 322 F.3d 139, 143 n. 5 (2d Cir.2003). For that reason, the court has thoroughly reviewed the record and defendant's brief, and now concludes that defendant's motion for summary judgment is due to be granted; for at least two reasons. First, to the extent plaintiff intended to sue her employer, she has named the wrong entity as defendant. Second, even if plaintiff intentionally sued an entity other than her employer, her claims fail on the merits.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides, in part, that summary judgment not only is proper, but "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) (emphasis supplied). Thus, "the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265, (1986).

The party asking for summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the court, by reference to materials on file, that there are no genuine issues of material fact to be decided at trial. Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir.1991). The moving party discharges this burden by "showing" or "pointing out" to the court that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590, 593 (11th Cir.1995) (per curiam). When the moving party has discharged its burden, the nonmoving party cannot rest upon the pleadings; rather, Rule 56(e) requires the party opposing summary judgment to go beyond the pleadings, and to demonstrate by affidavit or other appropriate means that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial.⁶ See also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Jeffery, 64 F.3d at 593-94.

That said, summary judgment may not be granted by default. Trustees of Central Pension Fund of International Union of Operating Engineers and Participating Employers v. Wolf Crane Service, Inc., 374 F.3d 1035, 1040 (11thCir.2004). Thus, in reviewing the record, "the court must review all evidence and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing summary judgment." Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Haves v. City of Miami, 52 F.3d 918, 921 (11th Cir.1995)). Inferences in favor of the non-moving party are not unqualified, however. "[A]n inference is not reasonable if it is only a guess or a possibility, for such an inference is not based on the evidence, but is pure conjecture and speculation." Daniels v. Twin Oaks Nursing Home, 692 F.2d 1321, 1324 (11th Cir.1982). Moreover,

[t]he mere existence of some factual dispute will not defeat summary judgment unless that factual dispute is material to an issue affecting the outcome of the case. The relevant rules of substantive law dictate the materiality of a disputed fact. A genuine issue of material fact does not exist unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a reasonable jury to return a verdict in its favor.

Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1023 (quoting Haves, 52 F.3d at 921). See also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (asking "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law").

II. SUMMARY OF RELEVANT FACTS

Defendant, Sara Lee Foods, Inc., operates a Jimmy Dean meat processing plant and company store in Florence, Alabama.⁷ Plaintiff, who is African American, worked as a cashier at the company store from July 2001 to January 2004, though she readily admits that she understood her actual employer was a temporary employment agency known as "Kelly Services."⁸ In addition to her own admissions, the evidence on file strongly suggests that Kelly Services controlled the terms and conditions of plaintiff's employment while she was assigned to the company store operated by defendant.⁹ Plaintiff was, for instance, paid by Kelly Services; her benefits were conferred by Kelly Services; her application for employment was submitted to Kelly Services; her on-site supervisors at the company store — the only individuals with the power to discipline plaintiff — were Kelly Services employees; and plaintiff knew that Kelly Services could decide at any given time to end her assignment at defendant's company store and move her to another location.¹⁰

Despite this, plaintiff did not file suit against Kelly Services. Instead, she sued Sara Lee Foods, Inc. Her chief complaint is the way that a Sara Lee employee, Connie Mason-Bevis, treated her while she worked at the company store.¹¹ Bevis, who is Caucasian, began working at the company store as a supervisor in September 2003.¹² Plaintiff alleges a slew of arguably trivial slights by Bevis, such as refusing to allow her to bring food into the store or shop during her shift, questioning her about the presence of flyers or advertisements in the store, and frowning at her when she greeted African American customers — none of which seriously altered the terms and conditions of her employment.¹³ (She also alleges she was given unfavorable assignments, such as reloading shelves, rotating meat in the freezers, and unloading trucks, but cannot state with any degree of certainty whether Caucasian company store workers were exempted from these tasks, arid other testimony indicates they were not.¹⁴) All of that said, plaintiff's main gripe with Bevis is her alleged role in the termination of plaintiffs employment with Kelly Services.¹⁵

Plaintiff was discharged on January 14, 2004, by Sandra Treadway, Kelly Services's on-site supervisor at defendant's company store.¹⁶ The discharge resulted from Bevis's investigation into the disappearance of fifteen cases of pork chops from the company store.¹⁷ Bevis viewed a surveillance video and observed several customers walking out of the store without paying for items, including pork chops, as plaintiff looked on.¹⁸ Treadway was consulted, and eventually plaintiff was asked to view the video herself and write a statement explaining what had transpired.¹⁹ She did so, admitting that she saw the customers leaving the store without paying, and further confessing that a reasonable observer of the video could conclude that she allowed this to occur in violation of work rules.²⁰ This was the sole reason for the termination of plaintiffs employment with Kelly Services,²¹ and plaintiff concedes that the termination decision was made by Kelly Services, not by defendant or any of defendant's agents or employees.²² Nevertheless, plaintiff contends that Bevis "had them [Kelly Services] to terminate me."²³

III. DISCUSSION OF LAW

A. Prefatory Matters

Plaintiff does not state, in her complaint or elsewhere, the legal basis for her claims. In the absence of any statement to the contrary, the court presumes she intends to pursue relief under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981.

Title VII makes it unlawful for a covered employer "to discriminate...