Moore v. Matthews, Civil No. SKG-05-1496.

• Decision Date: 24 August 2006
• Docket Number: Civil No. SKG-05-1496.
• Citation: 445 F.Supp.2d 516
• Parties: Tracy Renee MOORE, et al. v. Wauker Leigh MATTHEWS, et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

445 F.Supp.2d 516

Tracy Renee MOORE, et al. v. Wauker Leigh MATTHEWS, et al.

Civil No. SKG-05-1496.

United States District Court, D. Maryland.

August 24, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Michael Patrick Smith, Salsbury Clements Bekman Marder and Adkins LLC, Baltimore, MD, for Tracy Renee Moore, Allan E. Moore and Dorothy Moore.

Paul D. Bekman, Salsbury Clements Bekman Marder and Adkins LLC, Baltimore, MD, for Dorothy Moore.

Steven E. Leder, The Leder Law Group LLC, Towson, MD, Melodie M. Mabanta, Leder Law Group LLC, Baltimore, MD, for Wauker Leigh Matthews.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GAUVEY, United States Magistrate Judge.

The case involves a maritime dispute stemming from a jet ski accident at the 2002 Kent County High School senior class picnic. Pending before the Court is Defendant Wauker Leigh Matthews' ("Defendant") Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to all claims made by Tracy Renee Moore, Allan E. Moore, and Dorothy Moore ("Plaintiffs"). (Paper No. 55). The issue is fully briefed. A hearing was held on August 22, 2006. For the reasons discussed below, defendant's motion for summary judgment is hereby GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I. Factual Background

The following facts are undisputed. On June 6, 2002, the Kent County High School held its senior class picnic at Drayton Retreat Center. Drayton Manor is a thirtythree acre parcel of land along Still Pond Creek just off the Chester River.

After lunch, several students, including plaintiff Tracy Moore ("plaintiff Moore"), Brittany Garvey, and defendant went down to the beach area where two students, Robert Bramble and Matthew Kennedy, were operating their jet skis. (Paper No. 58, Exh. B at 3). Robert Bramble was operating a Bombardier SeaDoo that was owned by his aunt. Bramble stated that the SeaDoo can be driven more than sixtythree miles per hour. (Paper No. 64, Exh. 1 at 2). Matthew Kennedy was operating a Yamaha that was owned by his older brother. Kennedy's jet ski could go sixtyfive miles per hour in perfect conditions. (Paper No. 55, Exh. 11 at 2). For approximately the next forty-five minutes, Bramble and Kennedy transported students around the creek on their jet skis. (Paper No. 58, Exh. B at 3).

Garvey asked Kennedy to let her take out the jet ski with plaintiff Moore. (Id. at 3-4). He agreed. Plaintiff Moore and Garvey drove the Kennedy jet ski around the bend to a cove, where they took turns operating the jet ski. (Paper No. 55, Exh. 4 at 3). Plaintiff Moore had only used a jet ski once before; in 2002 she had driven a jet ski for an hour. (Paper No. 55, Exh. 8 at 3). Plaintiff Moore does not have a boat license, and has only been on a boat twice before. (Id.)

Subsequently, defendant asked Robert Bramble if he could use the Seadoo Bombadier. (Paper No. 58, Exh. D at 5). Defendant had used a jet ski previously, and had his boater safety license. (Paper No. 55, Exh. 8 at 3). To receive the boater safety license, he had to attend a series of classes and take a test.¹ (Id.). Defendant spent ten minutes on the jet ski, cruising around the cove. (Paper No. 55, Exh. 3 at 3-4). He does not recall how fast he was going, or whether any other jet skis or boats were on the water. (Id.)

After Matthew Kennedy asked defendant to tell plaintiff Moore and Garvey to return to shore, defendant drove his jet ski out to the cove. (Paper No. 55, Exh. 3 at 6). When he reached plaintiff Moore and Garvey, defendant told them it was time to head back. (Paper No. 55, Exh. 4 at 3). Both jet skis then started driving back to shore. (Id.) Plaintiff Moore was driving the Kennedy jet ski, and Garvey was the passenger. (Paper No. 55, Exh. 4 at 5). Defendant testified that as they left the cove the Kennedy jet ski was in front of him and to his right. (Paper No. 59, Exh. 1 at 8). To get a better line into shore, defendant changed course so that plaintiff was on his port side. (Id.). He was around 40 yards or 120 feet behind plaintiff's jet ski, and he maintained this distance as they headed back to shore. (Id. at 8).

Garvey testified that plaintiff Moore drove the jet ski back really fast, almost at top speed. (Paper No. 55, Exh. 4 at 6). She knew plaintiff Moore was racing defendant back to shore, but Garvey never looked to see how fast he was driving or where his jet ski was. (Id. at 6, 11, 12). Robert Bramble testified that he saw both jet skis heading back to shore. He estimates that the jet skis were moving "as fast as they could go", but plaintiff Moore was moving faster than the defendant. (Paper No. 64, Exh. 1 at 2).

Because Garvey and plaintiff Moore lost track of defendant, plaintiff Moore started to slow down and looked back over her shoulder, causing the boat to veer to the left or right. (Paper No. 55, Exh. 4 at 7, 12). Ultimately, the jet ski turned into a sharp, unexpected 180 degree turn. Because Garvey was not prepared for the turn, she fell backwards off to the left of the jet ski backwards to the side. (Id. at 7).

All of a sudden, defendant recalls seeing the other jet ski turn 180 degrees, so that it faced him. (Paper No. 59, Exh. 1 at 9). As the jet ski turned, defendant saw Garvey fall into the water. (Id. at 7). He knew Garvey was in the water to his left, no more than five feet away from the other jet ski. (Id. at 7). The jet ski and plaintiff Moore were slightly to his right. (Id. at 8). Defendant did not want to hit Garvey in the water, and he felt at that time that he had a better chance of avoiding a collision if he turned to the right. (Paper No. 59, Exh. 1 at 6-7).

Defendant concluded there was going to be a collision when he was about ten feet away from the accident. (Id. at 5). From that moment until the collision, he testified that no more than thirty seconds passed. (Paper No. 55, Exh. 3 at 5) Ultimately, defendant collided head on with the other jet ski.

When Garvey surfaced, a couple of seconds later, the jet skis had already collided. (Paper No. 58, Exh. B at 5-6). Plaintiff Moore has no recollection of the incident. (Paper No. 58, Exh. A at 2). No one else witnessed the collision.

After the collision, defendant swam back to plaintiff Moore to ensure she was all right. Ultimately, he helped assist plaintiff Moore back to shore. (Paper No. 55, Exh. 3 at 8). As a result of the collision, plaintiff Moore suffered multiple damages.

The following fact is in dispute. Plaintiff Dorothy Anne Moore stated that defendant told her on the day following the accident at the hospital that he was going too fast to stop. (Paper No. 58, Exh. H at 2). Although defendant remembered visiting plaintiff Moore at the hospital, he does not recall making this statement. (Paper No. 59, Exh. 1 at 3). As will be discussed below, the parties disagree as to what reasonable inferences may be drawn from the facts.

II. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED.R.CIV.P. 56(C). Thus, summary judgment is appropriate when it is clear that no genuine issue of material fact remains unresolved and an inquiry into the facts is unnecessary to clarify the application of the law. Haavistola v. Community Fire Co. of Rising Sun, 6 F.3d 211, 214 (4th Cir.1993). A material dispute exists if the facts may affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

The moving party has the burden of initially showing the absence of a genuine issue concerning any material fact. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). Then the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to "make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). When a nonmoving party fails to make such showing, summary judgment is appropriate because the nonmoving party would be unable to establish an element of her claim at trial. Id.

To survive summary judgment, the nonmoving party must produce "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial," and may not rest upon the "bald assertions of his pleadings." FED.R.Civ.P. 56(e). Summary judgment is inappropriate if a reasonable factfinder could find for the nonmoving party at trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

At the summary judgment stage, the court must view the evidence and inferences to be drawn from that evidence "in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." The non-moving party is to "have the credibility of his evidence as forecast assumed, [and] all internal conflicts in it resolved favorably to him." Miller v. Leathers, 913 F.2d 1085, 1087 (4th Cir. 1990) (quoting Charbonnages de France v. Smith, 597 F.2d 406, 414 (4th Cir.1979)). However, if the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment may be granted if the nonmoving party fails to adduce evidence to support an essential element of the claim. See Moore's Federal Evidence § 56.11[1][b].

III. Analysis

In the complaint, plaintiffs alleged that defendant was negligent in his handling of the jet ski. As a direct and proximate result of the negligence, Plaintiff Tracy Moore and her parents, plaintiffs Allen and Dorothy Moore suffered damages. (Paper No. 1 at 2-3). Defendant Matthews now moves for summary judgment with respect to all claims made against him by the plaintiffs, because the evidence fails to show that he was negligent or otherwise not in compliance with the Inland Navigational Rules. He contends that the evidence shows plaintiff Tracy Moore's negligence was the sole cause of the accident.² (Paper ...