Moore v. Montefiore Med. Ctr.
| Docket Number | 22-cv-10242 (ER) |
| Decision Date | 03 November 2023 |
| Parties | GLORIA MOORE, Plaintiff, v. MONTEFIORE MEDICAL CENTER, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Gloria Moore, proceeding pro se, commenced this action pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), alleging religious discrimination against her former employer Montefiore Medical Center (“Montefiore”) because she was fired for seeking an exemption to a coronavirus (COVID-19) vaccine requirement. Doc. 1.
Montefiore brings the instant motion to dismiss the complaint, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim. Doc. 22. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted.
1. COVID-19 & New York State Department of Health S (“NYSDOH”) Response
On March 1, 2020, New York State Governor Andrew Cuomo confirmed that the first case of COVID-19 was discovered in New York.[2] On March 11, 2020, the World Health Organization declared COVID-19 to be a global pandemic.[3] On August 23, 2021, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration approved the first COVID-19 vaccine (the “Vaccine”).[4]
On August 26, 2021, NYSDOH issued an emergency rule directing hospitals, nursing homes, hospices, adult care facilities, and other healthcare entities to require all medically eligible “personnel”[5] employed by them to be fully vaccinated against COVID-19 (the “DOH Mandate”). 10 N.Y.C.R.R. § 2.61(c) (2021). he DOH Mandate provided for medical exemptions, but no religious or other exemptions. § 2.61(d). he DOH Mandate permitted-but did not require-hospitals and healthcare entities to reassign employees who qualified as “personnel” if they had religious objections to receiving the Vaccine.[6] Failure to comply with the DOH Mandate subjected a hospital to the possible revocation of its operating license. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2806(1) (McKinney 2010).[7] 2. Moore's Request for a Religious Exemption from the DOH Mandate
Moore is a Christian woman who worked for Montefiore for twenty years as a nurse's aide and then customer service receptionist.[8] Doc. 27 at 1. During the pandemic, Moore never contracted COVID-19 and consistently implemented safety and protection measures that aligned with (and sometimes exceeded) Montefiore's guidelines, such as wearing a mask and advocating for the installation of barriers to promote social distancing. Id. at 3. Montefiore is a medical center and hospital system located in the Bronx.
In September 2021, in response to a New York State court issuing an injunction preventing the enforcement of the DOH Mandate for failure to provide a religious exemption, Montefiore provided its employees with a Religious Exemption Request Form that they could submit if they had religious objections to receiving the Vaccine.[9]Id. at 1-2; Doc. 23 at 8-9. On September 25, 2021, Moore submitted the form, asserting that her religious beliefs prohibited her from receiving the Vaccine. Doc. 24-1. Specifically, Moore identified the Vaccine as a “foreign toxin[] with harmful or unknown effects,” the receipt of which “violates fundamental aspect[s] of [her] faith.” Id. at 3. In her Religious Exemption Request Form, Moore quotes several Bible verses, but she does not explicitly identify herself as a Christian. Id. Tie next day, Moore alleges that she was notified by FedEx that Montefiore had not received her Religious Exemption Request Form. Doc. 27 at 2.
Moore also alleges that at some point between September 27, 2021, and October11, 2021, she received a letter (which she no longer has in her possession) providing that Montefiore never received her exemption request.[10] Id. On October 11, 2021, Moore resubmitted her Religious Exemption Request Form. Id. On October 22, 2021, Moore received a letter denying her exemption request and retroactively terminating her employment as of October 16, 2021.[11] Id. At no point prior to her termination did Montefiore mention the DOH Mandate to Moore. Id. at 3-4.
Meanwhile, Moore alleges that one of her colleagues, who tested positive for COVID-19, continued working notwithstanding the virus. Id. at 2. Additionally, Moore claims that another employee (a manager at the Fordham Plaza Montefiore location) continues to be employed by Montefiore even though he never received the Vaccine and never had a medical exemption. Id. at 3. Moore does not identify the religious affiliations or job duties of either of these colleagues, nor the title or position of the individual who tested positive. See id. at 2-3.
On September 29, 2022, prior to commencing this action, Moore received a Notice of Right to Sue Montefiore from the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Doc. 1 at 8. On December 2, 2022, Moore filed the instant complaint alleging that she was terminated after she requested a religious exemption from the Vaccine requirement and asserting claims for religious discrimination and religious retaliation pursuant to Title VII. Id. at 5. On February 10, 2023, the Court referred the case for mediation. Doc. 3. On March 9, 2023, Montefiore filed a motion to dismiss, Doc. 7, which the Court dismissed without prejudice pending the completion of mediation, Doc. 11. On June 15, 2023, mediation was held but was unsuccessful. Doc. 17 at 1.
On June 27, 2023, Montefiore requested a pre-motion conference prior to submitting its motion to dismiss. Doc. 17. Tie Court granted Montefiore leave to file the motion, which was filed on July 26, 2023, Doc. 22. In its motion, Montefiore argues that the complaint failed to state a Title VII claim because it had no discretion to grant a religious exemption to an employee who qualified as “personnel” under the DOH Mandate and should therefore be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Doc. 23.
When ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Nielson v. Rabin, 746 F.3d 58, 62 (2d Cir. 2014). Tie Court is not required to credit “mere conclusory statements” or “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) ). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Tie plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to show “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). If the plaintiff has not “nudged [her] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, [the] complaint must be dismissed.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; accord Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680.
The question in a Rule 12 motion “is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.” Sikhs for Just. v. Nath, 893 F.Supp.2d 598, 615 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting Villager Pond, Inc. v. Town of Darien, 56 F.3d 375, 378 (2d Cir. 1995)). “[T]he purpose of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) ‘is to test, in a streamlined fashion, the formal sufficiency of the plaintiff's statement of a claim for relief without resolving a contest regarding its substantive merits'” or “weigh[ing] the evidence that might be offered to support it.” Halebian v. Berv, 644 F.3d 122, 130 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
The Court holds submissions by pro se litigants to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980) (per curiam) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)); see also Young v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., No. 09-cv-6621 (SAS), 2010 WL 2776835, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2010) (). Although “pro se status ‘does not exempt a party from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law,'” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 477 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983)), courts read the pleadings and opposition papers submitted by pro se litigants “liberally and interpret them ‘to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest,'” McPherson v. Coombe, 174 F.3d 276, 280 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994)). he obligation to read a pro se litigant's pleadings leniently “applies with particular force when the plaintiff's civil rights are at issue.” Jackson v. NYS Dep t of Lab., 709 F.Supp.2d 218, 224 (S.D.N.Y 2010) (citing McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 2004)).
Title VII prohibits employers from “discriminating] against any individual with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's . . . religion.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Employers must accommodate an employee's religion unless the employer proves that it would cause an “undue hardship” to do so. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). Religious discrimination claims under Title VII may be framed under a disparate treatment theory or a denial of religious accommodation theory. Livingston v. City of N.Y, 563 F.Supp.3d 201, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 2021).
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