Moore v. Panish

• Citation: 32 Cal.3d 535,186 Cal.Rptr. 475,652 P.2d 32
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (California)
• Decision Date: 18 October 1982
• Parties: , 652 P.2d 32 Lewis Collin MOORE, Petitioner, v. Leonard PANISH, as Registrar of Voters, etc., Respondent. L.A. 31548.

Page 475

186 Cal.Rptr. 475

32 Cal.3d 535, 652 P.2d 32

Lewis Collin MOORE, Petitioner, v. Leonard PANISH, as Registrar of Voters, etc., Respondent.

L.A. 31548.

Supreme Court of California.

Oct. 18, 1982.

Zetterberg & Zetterberg, Funglan Persimmon and Stephen I. Zetterberg, Claremont, for petitioner.

John H. Larson, County Counsel, Philip H. Hickok and Tighe F. Hudson, Deputy County Counsel, Los Angeles, for respondent.

REYNOSO, Justice.

The sole issue in this mandate proceeding is whether section 6402, subdivision (b) of the Elections Code ¹ prohibits petitioner from seeking election to his party's county central committee and to the board of directors of a nonpartisan municipal water district at the same primary election.

We conclude that section 6402, by its terms, does not apply to selection of party county central committees. It follows that subdivision (b), which serves only to limit its application, as well does not apply to such a committee office. (See Narver v. Jordan, (1916) 173 Cal. 424, 160 P. 245.)

The county advances three arguments in support of its position that the statute proscribes candidacy for both offices: (1) membership in the party central committee is a public office, thus, the statutory proscription applies; (2) there is need for certainty as to which office the candidate will accept; and (3) partisan and nonpartisan candidates should not be commingled. None of these arguments causes us to depart from our conclusion that the statute was not intended to restrict a candidate from running for party county central committee offices or to limit the field of candidates from which the voters might choose. ² Respondent has read entirely too much into the language of the section. ³

I

Petitioner, currently a member of the Los Angeles County Democratic Central Committee and of the Board of Directors of the Three Valleys Municipal Water District, sought re-election to both positions in the June primary election. He met the statutory party membership and residency requirements of the respective offices. There is no question that he timely tendered completed nomination papers for each office to the Los Angeles County Registrar of Voters in March of this year.

The respondent agreed to place petitioner's name on the ballot for the water district position but refused to accept nomination papers for the party committee position. Respondent acted on the advice of county counsel. He had warned petitioner he would not accept both nominations shortly after petitioner obtained the papers for circulation in February. County counsel informed petitioner that the refusal was based on section 6402, subdivision (b). County counsel interprets the subdivision's language that "No person may file nomination papers ... for more than one office at the same election" to bar a candidate from running at the same primary election both for membership on a party's county central committee and for the directorship of a municipal water district.

The same conflict arose between the parties in 1978 when petitioner sought to have his name placed on the June primary ballot as candidate for the same offices. (The water district was then called the Ponoma Valley Municipal Water District.) Upon respondent's refusal petitioner sought and obtained a writ of mandate from the Los Angeles County Superior Court permitting him to run for election to both positions. He was elected to both and was re-elected to the party central committee in 1980.

When respondent refused petitioner's present tender of papers, petitioner again sought a writ of mandate. He urged that the disposition of the 1978 case served to collaterally estop the court from reaching a different result. He further asserted that committee membership is not a public office for purposes of section 6402, subdivision (b). ⁴ After hearing, the superior court denied a writ of mandate without stating its reasons. ⁵ We issued an alternative writ and ordered that petitioner's name be placed on the ballot as a candidate for the Democratic Party County Central Committee. We later ordered that the votes cast for petitioner be counted, but that no certificate of election issue unless ordered by this court.

II

Respondent does not dispute that petitioner has met all statutory requirements for nomination to both positions, save for compliance with section 6402, subdivision (b).

Section 6402 provides:

"This chapter [pertaining to direct primary election] does not prohibit the independent nomination of candidates under the provisions of Chapter 6 (commencing at section 6800) of this division, subject to the following limitations:

"(a) A candidate whose name has been on the ballot as a candidate of a party at the direct primary and who has been defeated for that party nomination is ineligible for nomination as an independent candidate. He is also ineligible as a candidate named by a party central committee to fill a vacancy on the ballot for a general election.

"(b) No person may file nomination papers for a party nomination and an independent nomination for the same office, or for more than one office at the same election."

The fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the court should ascertain the legislative intent so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. To this end, every statute should be construed with reference to the whole system of law of which it is a part, so that all may be harmonized and have effect. (Select Base Materials, Inc. v. Board of Equalization (1959) 51 Cal.2d 640, 335 P.2d 672.) Accordingly, we examine section 6402 and its subdivision (b) in the context of the Elections Code.

Section 6402 is found in chapter 5, titled "Direct Primary," which is part of division 6 pertaining to nominations. The language has been part of California's election laws since enactment of the 1913 Direct Primary Law. (Stats. 1913, ch. 690, § 5, subd. 8, p. 1391.)

A direct primary is defined as "the primary election ... to nominate candidates to be voted for at the ensuing general election or to elect members of a party central committee." (§ 23; see also Stats. 1913, ch. 690, § 1, subd. 2, p. 1380.) Candidates for nonpartisan as well as partisan offices are selected. (§§ 6400, 6401; Stats. 1913, ch. 690, § 2, pp. 1381-1382.) ⁶

The institution of the direct primary system was not meant to prevent nomination of candidates by means of an independently circulated petition (see §§ 6402, 6800 et seq.). However, section 6402 places certain limitations on the process of independent nomination "subsequent to or in lieu of a primary election" pursuant to section 6800 et seq. Interpreting language of the 1913 Direct Primary Law which was nearly identical to the language of current section 6402, this court said: "It seems clear to us that the only reasonable construction that can be given to this provision is that it has reference only to attempted nominations under section 1188 of the Political Code 'subsequent to' or 'in lieu of any primary election.' [now § 6800 et seq.]." (Narver v. Jordan, supra, 173 Cal. at pp. 426-427, 160 P. 245.) ⁷

The code contemplates independent nomination of candidates for both partisan and nonpartisan public offices (see § 6800). Members of county central committees of the four qualified political parties, however, are to be elected at every direct primary election. (§§ 8870, 9370, 9720, 9760.) Any vacancies are to be filled by appointment of those who are elected at the primary election. (§§ 8829, 9329, 9706, 9831.) Thus, it is apparent that the code does not provide for nomination of committee candidates "subsequent to or in lieu of a primary election." Applying the analysis of Narver v. Jordan, supra, it follows that section 6402 and its subdivisions cannot apply to candidates for party county central committees.

The courts have long recognized the dual purposes of the direct primary law: (1) to enable the members of a given political party to name directly the party's nominees for public office, rather than selecting candidates through delegates to a party convention (Socialist Party v. Uhl (1909) 155 Cal. 776, 103 P. 181 (conc. opn. of Angellotti, J., at p. 795 [construing the 1909 Direct Primary Law] ); Edwards v. Jordan (1920) 183 Cal. 791, 795-796, 192 P. 856); and (2) to preserve the integrity of the parties by limiting the right to participate in the primary to persons who are committed to the principles of the party, sympathetic with its aims and loyal to its tenets (Socialist Party v. Uhl, supra, 155 Cal. at pp. 792-793, 103 P. 181; Independent Progressive Party v. County Clerks (1948) 31 Cal.2d 549, 552, 191 P.2d 6). Restrictions on the independent nomination process which have always appeared in section 6402 effectuate these purposes. ⁸ Applying the statute to prevent a person from seeking election to the party office and nomination to the nonpartisan office at issue here, however, has nothing to do with these purposes.

A statutory proscription against dual candidacy could also serve to prevent a candidate from running for incompatible offices. ⁹ At oral argument respondent expressly declined to invoke this purpose in the instant case. It does not appear that there is any incompatibility in the offices at issue here. Petitioner has successfully discharged the duties of both positions since 1978. Respondent does not contend this is improper.

Respondent does assert that section 6402, subdivision (b) prevents voter confusion by avoiding uncertainty as to which office a candidate will accept if elected. This argument assumes that the voters would believe the candidate could not perform the duties of both offices. Ultimately, the argument rests on a theory of incompatibility which respondent has declined to invoke. The fact that petitioner currently holds both offices he seeks undercuts the force of respondent's argument that his dual candidacy would create confusion and uncertainty as to which of the offices he...