Silver v. Brown

• Decision Date: 11 January 1966
• Parties: , 409 P.2d 689 Phill SILVER et al., Petitioners, v. Edmund G. BROWN, as Governor, etc., et al., Respondents, The Senate of the State of California et al., Interveners. Philip ADAMS et al., Petitioners, v. Edmund G. BROWN, as Governor, etc., et al., Respondents, The Assembly of the State of California et al., Interveners. Sac. 7679, 7681.
• Court: California Supreme Court

Page 609

48 Cal.Rptr. 609

63 Cal.2d 841, 409 P.2d 689

Phill SILVER et al., Petitioners, v. Edmund G. BROWN, as Governor, etc., et al., Respondents, The Senate of the State of California et al., Interveners.

Philip ADAMS et al., Petitioners, v. Edmund G. BROWN, as Governor, etc., et al., Respondents, The Assembly of the State of California et al., Interveners.

Sac. 7679, 7681.

Supreme Court of California, In Bank.

Jan. 11, 1966.

Phill Silver, Hollywood, in pro. per., for petitioners in Sac. 7679.

Philip Adams, Edward Napier Thomson and Roland Adickes, San Francisco, in pro. per., for petitioners in Sac. 7681.

Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., Charles A. Barrett, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Sanford N. Gruskin, Deputy Atty. Gen., for respondents in Sac. 7679.

Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., Charles A. Barrett, Asst. Atty. Gen., Sanford N. Gruskin, Deputy Atty. Gen., and Herman F. Selvin, Los Angeles, for respondents in Sac. 7681.

Musick, Peeler & Garrett, Gerald G. Kelly, Richard T. Apel, William J. Emanuel, Bruce A. Bevan, Jr., Herman F. Selvin, Los Angeles, Adrian Kuyper, County Counsel (Orange), Seymour S. Pizer, Asst. County Counsel. Woodruff J. Deem, Dist. Atty. (Ventura), Paul L. McKaskle, Deputy Dist. Atty. and Conrad G. Tuohey, Fullerton, for interveners in Sac. 7679.

Phill Silver, Hollywood, in pro. per., Musick, Peeler & Garrett, Gerald G. Kelly, Richard T. Apel. William J. Emanuel, Los Angeles, Adrian Kuyper, County Counsel (Orange), Seymour S. Pizer, Asst. County Counsel, Woodruff J. Deem, Dist. Atty. (Ventura), Paul L. McKaskle, Deputy Dist. Atty, Garry, Dreyfus & McTernan, Benjamin Dreyfus, San Francisco, Donald P. McCullum, Oakland, and Conrad G. Tuohey, Fullerton, for interveners in Sac. 7681.

Edward Napier Thomson, San Francisco, in pro. per., Gerald N. Hill, San Francisco, Gabriel Solomon, Bakersfield, and John W. Scanlon, City Atty. (Hayward), as amici curiae in Sac. 7681.

James L. Blawie, Santa Clara, Albert Dehr and Putnam Livermore, San Francisco, as amici curiae in Sac. 7679 and 7681.

TRAYNOR, Chief Justice.

In these proceedings petitioners sought writs of mandate to secure reapportionment of both houses of the Legislature. In an opinion filed September 1, 1965 (Silver v. Brown, 63 A.C. 278, 46 Cal.Rptr. 308, 405 P.2d 132), we held that under the decisions of the United States Supreme Court the existing apportionments of both the Senate and the Assembly were invalid and that each house should be reapportioned in time for the 1966 elections. We concluded that the Legislature should have an opportunity to enact valid reapportionment legislation, but we announced temporary plans to become effective if the Legislature failed to enact valid plans of its own. We set forth limits within which an apportionment would carry at least a strong presumption of validity under the equal protection clause and beyond which it would be seriously suspect. Those limits are that no district depart from the ideal size by more than 15 percent and that a majority of the members of each house be elected by the voters of districts containing at least 48 percent of the total population. We retained jurisdiction to review any reapportionment legislation that might be enacted and to order our proposed plans into effect if necessary.

On September 17, 1965, the Governor called the Legislature into extraordinary session to consider reapportionment legislation. On October 21 the Legislature passed a bill, herein referred to as Chapter 3, reapportioning the Senate and the Assembly, and on October 27 the Governor signed it. (Stats.1965, Second Ex. Sess., ch. 3.) While the Legislature was still in session, certain technical errors were discovered in Chapter 3, and on November 3 both houses of the Legislature passed Senate Bill 13. It corrected technical errors in Chapter 3, made other minor changes therein, and afforded additional pension benefits to legislators affected by reapportionment. Owing to the pension provisions of Senate Bill 13, the Governor refused to sign it, and it has not gone into effect.

On November 24, the Governor presented an application pursuant to our retained jurisdiction requesting that Chapter 3 be construed to obviate the technical errors therein and approved as so construed. The Senate and the Assembly have joined in the Governor's application. Petitioners in both cases and certain interveners oppose the Governor's application and urge various alternative dispositions.

From the legislative history and statistical data presented in support of the Governor's application, it appears that in enacting Chapter 3 the Legislature undertook to reapportion itself by creating senatorial and assembly districts composed of contiguous territory that meet the 15 percent and 48 percent population limits set forth in our prior opinion. That purpose also appears from the provisions of Chapter 3 considered as a whole. When, however, the maps and census tracts that the Legislature used in drafting Chapter 3 were translated into descriptive terminology, certain ambiguities and errors appeared, which, if given literal effect, would defeat the legislative purpose.

The 8th and 11th senatorial districts, which elect two senators at large, are defined as all of Alameda County not included in the 14th senatorial district. For the 8th and 11th districts to be composed of contiguous territory and meet the 15 percent population limit, the City of Oakland must be included in the 8th and 11th districts, and it is clear that it was the Legislature's purpose so to provide. To achieve this purpose the boundary of the 14th district from its junction with the Oakland boundary must proceed easterly and northerly along the Oakland boundary to the Alameda County boundary, thereby excluding Oakland from the 14th district. Chapter 3 provides instead that the boundary of the 14th district shall proceed northwesterly along the Oakland boundary to the county boundary, thereby including Oakland in the 14th district and leaving the 8th and 11th districts composed of three noncontiguous parts. Chapter 3 also provides that Census Tracts 50, 62, 65, and 66 in Alameda County are to be excluded from the 14th district. There are two sets of such tracts in Alameda County, however, one labeled 'Oakland tracts' and one labeled 'Hayward tracts.' Exclusion of the Hayward tracts results in districts composed of contiguous territory, whereas exclusion of the Oakland tracts results in districts composed of noncontiguous territory. It appears from the legislative history that the Hayward tracts are the ones the Legislature meant to exclude.

In Los Angeles County one square block at approximately the point where the 21st, 23d, 26th, and 27th senatorial districts converge is not included in any of those districts as described in Chapter 3. As a result, that block is part of a district to which it is not contiguous, the 32d, which is described as all of the county not included in other senatorial districts. That block, however, is part of Census Tract 1903, and the legislative history shows that the Legislature meant to include tract 1903 in its entirety in the 21st district.

County officials of Solano County have objected that the boundary description in Charpter 3 of the part of the 2d senatorial district in that county does not conform to the so-called official county map. From the legislative history it appears, however, that the description in Chapter 3 referred to maps entitled 'County Road System, Solano County, California, prepared by the State-Wide Highway Planning Survey, Division of Highways, Department of Public Works, in cooperation with the United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of Roads, and the County, 1953, as revised in 1962,'

Chapter 3 describes the boundaries of the 11th assembly district in the identical language used to describe that district in the 1961 apportionment. (Elec.Code, § 30201; Stats.1961, ch. 1233.) The description includes references to supervisorial district boundaries that have been changed since 1961. From the legislative history it appears that Chapter 3 refers to the supervisorial district boundaries as they existed in 1961.

The description of the 76th assembly district in San Diego County was drafted on the erroneous assumption that University Avenue and La Mesa Boulevard in San Diego are the same street. The correct description appears from the legislative history.

The literal meaning of the words of a statute may be disregarded to avoid absurd results or to give effect to manifest purposes that, in the light of the statute's legislative history, appear from its provisions considered as a whole. (Select Base Materials, Inc. v. Board of Equalization, 51 Cal.2d 640, 645, 335 P.2d 672; Dickey v. Raisin Proration Zone No. 1, 24 Cal.2d 796, 802, 151 P.2d 505, 157 A.L.R. 324; County of Los Angeles v. Frisbie, 19 Cal.2d 634, 639, 122 P.2d 526; Pool v. Simmons, 134 Cal. 621, 622, 66 P. 872; Carpy v. Dowdell, 129 Cal. 244, 245, 61 P. 1126; California Loan etc. Co. v. Weis, 118 Cal. 489, 497, 50 P. 697.) The detailed legislative history of Chapter 3 does not appear in committee reports or recorded floor discussions or debates but in affidavits of legislative employees who participated in and were familiar with the drafting of the statute. In view of the peculiar problems presented by the recently-established judicial duty to enforce constitutional apportionment, we believe that we may properly rely on such affidavits in construing Chapter 3, particularly when, as in this case, both houses of the Legislature have indicated the accuracy of the data set forth in the affidavits by accepting such data as the basis for the corrective provisions of Senate Bill 13. In discussing judicial remedies for malapportionment, the United States Supreme Court pointed out that 'Remedial techniques in this new and developing area of the law will probably often differ with the circumstances of the challenged apportionment...