Moore v. Puget Sound Plywood, Inc.

Citation214 Neb. 14,332 N.W.2d 212
Decision Date08 April 1983
Docket NumberNo. 82-723,82-723
Parties, 36 UCC Rep.Serv. 82 Dennis MOORE and Lois Moore, Appellants, v. PUGET SOUND PLYWOOD, INC., Appellee.
CourtSupreme Court of Nebraska

Syllabus by the Court

1. Warranty. A description of goods which becomes a basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods conform to the description.

2. Uniform Commercial Code: Limitations of Actions. The period of limitations contained in Neb. U.C.C. § 2-725(2) (Reissue 1980) does not apply to express warranties.

3. Pleadings. Pleadings frame the issues upon which a cause is to be tried and advise the adversary as to what he must meet.

4. Pleadings. It is the facts well pleaded, not the theory of recovery nor legal conclusions, which state a cause of action.

5. Breach of Warranty: Notice. A purchaser must plead and prove that he gave timely notice of a breach of warranty.

6. Principal and Agent: Notice. Apparent authority of an agent may exist beyond termination of the principal-agency relationship when notice of the termination has not been given.

Duane M. Katz, Omaha, for appellants.

Gerald L. Friedrichsen of Fitzgerald, Brown, Leahy, Strom, Schorr & Barmettler, Omaha, for appellee.

KRIVOSHA, C.J., and BOSLAUGH, McCOWN, WHITE, HASTINGS, and CAPORALE, JJ.

CAPORALE, Justice.

Dennis and Lois Moore, plaintiffs-appellants herein, brought an action in the municipal court of the city of Omaha for damages against Puget Sound Plywood, Inc., defendant-appellee, alleging that Puget Sound breached an implied warranty. The municipal court dismissed plaintiffs' petition and the District Court affirmed that action. In this appeal the Moores assign as error the holding that the period of limitations began to run on the date of delivery, and the finding and holding that the Moores failed to prove proper notice of the breach. Although we do not agree with the parties' and lower courts' analyses of the case, we do agree with the Moores' arguments of error and reverse the judgment of the District Court.

Puget Sound had manufactured certain lauan siding which the Moores purchased during the construction of their house in 1970-71. In October 1977 the Moores noticed some "problems" with its appearance. The problem, delamination, had gotten severe enough by 1979 that they began to investigate what could be done to remedy the situation. They first attempted to contact their supplier but found that it had gone out of business. Another lumber dealer directed them to Rehcon, Inc., which had been engaged by Puget Sound, since at least December 1976, to make investigations and undertake remedial work for Puget Sound on homes which had delaminating siding. On March 13, 1980, Rehcon terminated its relationship with Puget Sound because of an "inability to develop a satisfactory working relationship." The record does not reveal that Puget Sound took any steps to make the public aware that Rehcon was no longer its agent, nor does it appear that Puget Sound appointed anyone else to represent it. On June 24, 1980, Mr. Moore complained to Rehcon about the subject siding. This action was filed on April 24, 1981. The president of Puget Sound testified that the particular species of lauan tree used by it in the making of the siding involved was not susceptible to being glued together with the resin which Puget Sound was then using. Accordingly, some of the lauan siding was defective in that it delaminated relatively quickly. In other words, it came apart. The parties agreed that the municipal court could take judicial notice that "generally siding, when it's put on, is supposed to take, last the life of the house." The evidence establishes that the damages are $4,550, the cost of remedying the defect by replacing the siding.

The Moores argue substantially to the effect that where a seller impliedly warrants the future performance of a product, the statute of limitations is extended until the breach is or should have been discovered. Puget Sound in essence argues that an implied warranty is by its very nature incapable of such extension, since the period of limitations must toll at tender of delivery, regardless of the purchaser's lack of knowledge of the breach. In our view an appropriate analysis of this case makes it unnecessary for us to determine at this time whether the period of limitations specified in Neb. U.C.C. § 2-725 (Reissue 1980) precludes recovery.

This analysis is required by reason of the operation of Neb. U.C.C. § 2-313(1)(b) (Reissue 1980) as delineated in England v. Leithoff, 212 Neb. 462, 323 N.W.2d 98 (1982), decided after the municipal court trials herein. That opinion foreshadows the outcome of this case. We held therein that an oral representation concerning the origin of goods, made in the course of a sale, constitutes an express warranty under § 2-313(1)(b), which provides, among other things, that any description of goods which becomes a part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the description. According to the parties, the description of the goods as "siding" carried with it the representation that it would last the lifetime of the house. Therefore, the requisite elements of § 2-313(1)(b) are present; that is, the description of the goods became a part of the bargain and created in the minds of the parties the expectation that the siding would last the lifetime of the house. Section 2-725(2) provides in part: "A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered." The instant breach did not occur upon tender of delivery since, in light of the expectations of the parties, the warranty herein necessarily extended explicitly to future performance.

The case of Grand Island School Dist. # 2 v. Celotex Corp., 203 Neb. 559, 279 N.W.2d 603 (1979), relied upon by Puget Sound, is not factually apposite here. Therein,...

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