Moore v. Shanahan Eng'g, Inc.
| Decision Date | 25 August 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:20-cv-00021 |
| Parties | PETER MOORE, Individually and for Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. SHANAHAN ENGINEERING, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee |
MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff Peter Moore, individually and on behalf of a putative collective, brings claims against defendant Shanahan Engineering, Inc. ("Shanahan") under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") and Ohio labor laws for failure to pay overtime to him and others similarly situated. (Am. Compl., Doc. No. 22.) Now before the court are (1) Shanahan's Motion to Dismiss Moore's claims against it under Rule 12(b)(2), on the basis that this court lacks personal jurisdiction over it, and, alternatively, under Rule 12(b)(3) for improper venue (Doc. No. 24) and (2) Shanahan's Motion to Dismiss Opt-in Plaintiff Stephen Scheithauer (Doc. No. 29), also based on a claim that the court lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant, irrespective of whether the court has jurisdiction over the named plaintiff's claims.
The plaintiff insists that the court has jurisdiction and that venue is appropriate in this district. Alternatively, he requests that the court transfer the case to an appropriate venue rather than dismiss it. Finding that it lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant, that venue here is improper, and that the plaintiff has not carried his burden of showing that transfer to an appropriate venue is warranted, the court will grant the first Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 24), dismissing the case without prejudice rather than transferring it. (Doc. No. 24.) The remaining Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 29) will be denied as moot.
In the First Amended Complaint ("FAC"),1 Peter Moore alleges that Shanahan is a "worldwide company that provides construction, commissioning and plant operation on large scale projects." (Doc. No. 22 ¶ 20.) He asserts that the company is "headquartered in Florida, but provides services through the country." (Id. ¶ 13.) Shanahan hired Moore around January 2017 to perform work in Lordstown, Ohio. (Id. ¶¶ 21, 23.) When it hired him, however, Moore was a resident of Brentwood, Tennessee. (Id. ¶ 7.) Shanahan offered to hire him by sending him an offer letter to his address in Tennessee. Moore accepted the offer and was hired while he was living in Tennessee, and, even though he performed work only in Ohio, Shanahan paid Moore by sending "each deficient paycheck to Moore at his address in Brentwood, Tennessee." (Id. ¶ 10.) Moore asserts that each of his paychecks was then "deposited into his bank, First Tennessee Bank." (Id. ¶¶ 10-11.) Moore stopped working for Shanahan in February 2018. (Id. ¶ 26.) He alleges that, throughout the time he worked for Shanahan, he was paid an hourly wage; he normally worked more than 40 hours a week; if he worked fewer than 40 hours a week, he was paid only for the hours he worked; and, when he worked overtime, he was not paid at the overtime rate required by the FLSA and Ohio state law. (Id. ¶¶ 30, 34-36.)
Rather than an Answer to the FAC, Shanahan filed its Motion to Dismiss and supporting Memorandum of Law (Doc. Nos. 24, 24-1), arguing that the allegations in the FAC, accepted as true for purposes of its motion, do not establish a basis for this court's exercise of general orspecific personal jurisdiction over it. It also submitted the Declaration of James Greaney, who attests that Shanahan is not authorized or licensed to do business in Tennessee and has no current projects in Tennessee. (Doc. No. 24-2 ¶¶ 3-4.)
In his Response, the plaintiff concedes that Shanahan is not subject to general jurisdiction in Tennessee, but he contends that the FAC "describes, with reasonable particularity, sufficient and purposeful contacts Shanahan made with Moore in Tennessee, and because the claims in Moore's FAC arise from those contacts, it is reasonable and fair for this Court to exercise [specific] personal jurisdiction over Shanahan." (Doc. No. 26, at 1.) He also argues that venue is appropriate in this district. Alternatively, however, he asks that, if the court finds jurisdiction lacking or venue improper, the court should transfer this action to the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division, or to the Southern District of Florida, Orlando Division, under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), rather than dismiss the case.
The defendant filed a Reply, arguing that none of the legal authority to which the plaintiff points establishes that personal jurisdiction exists; the plaintiff has not addressed the import or impact of the Supreme Court's decision in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017); and dismissal rather than transfer is appropriate, because the plaintiff has not satisfied his burden of showing that transfer to either of the two jurisdictions he references in his Response would be appropriate.
When a defendant challenges personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2), "[t]he plaintiff bears the burden of making a prima facie showing of the court's personal jurisdiction over the defendant." Intera Corp. v. Henderson, 428 F.3d 605, 615 (6th Cir. 2005). A plaintiff "can meet this burden by 'establishing with reasonable particularity sufficient contacts between [a defendant] and the forum state to support jurisdiction.'" Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen Screening, Inc., 282 F. 3d 883, 887 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Provident Nat'l Bank v. Cal. Fed. Savs. Loan Ass'n, 819 F.2d 434, 437 (3d Cir. 1987)). Generally, a plaintiff may not rest on his pleadings "but must, by affidavit or otherwise," set forth specific evidence supporting jurisdiction. Carrier Corp. v. Outokumpu Oyj, 673 F.3d 430, 449 (6th Cir. 2012).2 When a district court relies solely on written submissions and declarations to resolve a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff's burden to establish a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction is "relatively slight." Air Prods. & Controls, Inc. v. Safetech Int'l, Inc., 503 F.3d 544, 549 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Am. Greetings Corp. v. Cohn, 839 F.2d 1164, 1169 (6th Cir. 1988)). The court construes the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See id. (citing Theunissen v. Matthews, 935 F.2d 1454, 1459 (6th Cir. 1991)).
When sitting pursuant to federal question jurisdiction, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant "'if the defendant is amenable to service of process under the [forum] state's long-arm statute and if the exercise of personal jurisdiction would not deny the defendant[] due process.'" Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865, 871 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Mich. Coal. of Radioactive Material Users, Inc. v. Griepentrog, 954 F.2d 1174, 1176 (6th Cir. 1992)). It is well established, however, that "Tennessee law extends its jurisdiction to due process's limits," Parker v. Winwood, 938 F.3d 833, 839 (6th Cir. 2019), as a result of which the dual analysis collapses into one inquiry: whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with due process. Id. (citing Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Still N The Water Publ'g, 327 F.3d 472, 477 (6th Cir. 2003)).
The Due Process Clause requires that a non-resident defendant have at least "certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" Youn v. Track, Inc., 324 F.3d 409, 417 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). "There are two kinds of personal jurisdiction within the Federal Due Process inquiry: (1) general personal jurisdiction, where the suit does not arise from defendant's contacts with the forum state; and (2) specific jurisdiction, where the suit does arise from the defendant's contacts with the forum state." Conn v. Zakharov, 667 F.3d 705, 712-13 (6th Cir. 2012).
General jurisdiction allows a plaintiff to sue a defendant "'on any and all claims,' regardless of the connection (or lack thereof) between the claim and the forum." Maxitrate Tratamento Termico e Controles v. Super Sys., Inc., 617 F. App'x 406, 408 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 127 (2014)). Specific jurisdiction "exposes the defendant to suit in the forum state only on claims that 'arise out of or relate to' a defendant's contacts with the forum." Kerry Steel, Inc. v. Paragon Indus., Inc., 106 F.3d 147, 149 (6th Cir. 1997) (quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia S.A v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-15 & nn. 8-10 (1984)).
The plaintiff does not contend that the court has general jurisdiction over Shanahan, so the court proceeds directly to a discussion of whether it may exercise specific jurisdiction over the defendant.
"The inquiry whether a forum State may assert specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant focuses on the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation." Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 283-84 (2014) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). "[S]pecific jurisdiction is confined to adjudication of issues deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdiction." Indah v. SEC, 661 F.3d 914, 920 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)). The Sixth Circuit has established a three-part test for determining whether there is specific jurisdiction:
First, the defendant must purposefully avail himself of the privilege of acting in the forum state or causing a consequence in the forum state. Second, the cause of action must arise from the defendant's activities there. Finally, the acts of the defendant or consequences caused by the defendant must have a substantial enough connection with the forum state to make the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant reasonable.
S. Mach. Co. v. Mohasco Indus., Inc., 401 F.2d 374, 381 (6th Cir. 1968), ...
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