Moore v. State Bd. of Control

• Decision Date: 30 September 2003
• Docket Number: No. C031821.,C031821.
• Citation: 112 Cal.App.4th 371,5 Cal.Rptr.3d 116
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Jacquetta MOORE et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. STATE BOARD OF CONTROL, Defendant and Appellant.

5 Cal.Rptr.3d 116

112 Cal.App.4th 371

Jacquetta MOORE et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. STATE BOARD OF CONTROL, Defendant and Appellant.

No. C031821.

Court of Appeal, Third District.

September 30, 2003.

Review Denied December 23, 2003.

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Martin H. Milas, Silvia M. Diaz, Jacob Appelsmith, Assistant Attorneys General, Marybelle D. Archibald, James M. Schiavenza, Steven Kaiser, James E. McFetridge and Noreen P. Skelly, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendant and Appellant.

Eisen & Johnston, Jay-Allen Eisen Law Corporation, Jay-Allen Eisen, Marian M. Johnston, Frederic L. Snowden; and Michael J. Siegel for Plaintiffs and Respondents.

SCOTLAND, P.J.

The Legislature has declared that it is in the public interest to assist residents of California in obtaining restitution for the pecuniary losses they suffer as a direct result of criminal acts. (Gov.Code, § 13950.) To this end, the Legislature established the Restitution Fund, formerly known as the Indemnity Fund, and enacted procedures by which crime victims may obtain compensation from the fund. (Gov. Code, § 13950 et seq.; further section references are to the Government Code unless otherwise specified.) A crime victim commences the process by filing an application with the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board, formerly the State Board of Control (the Board). (§§ 13951, 13952 et seq.)

In 1996, when crime victims Jacquetta Moore and Leticia Faxas applied for assistance from the Restitution Fund, former section 13961, subdivision (c), stated: "The period prescribed for the filing of an application for assistance shall be one year after the date of the crime or one year after the victim attains the age of 18 years, whichever is later. The board may for good cause grant an extension of this time period not to exceed three years after the date of the crime or three years after the victim attains the age of 18 years." (Italics added.) Moore and Faxas, both adults when they became crime victims, asserted that they should be relieved of their failure to comply within the three-year deadline because law enforcement officers failed to inform them of their potential eligibility for restitution from the fund.

This court issued an opinion on October 30, 2001, concluding that their applications for compensation were time-barred. The California Supreme Court granted review and transferred the matter to this court with directions to vacate our decision and "to reconsider the cause in light of Stats. 2002, chapter 1141."

That legislation recodified and revised the statutes governing the Restitution Fund. Among other things, it expanded the period in which an application for compensation can be deemed timely. The application has to be filed "within one year of the date of the crime, one year after the victim attains 18 years of age, or one year of the time the victim or derivative victim knew or in the exercise of ordinary diligence could have discovered that an injury or death had been sustained as a direct result of crime, whichever is later." (§ 13953, subd. (a).) But the Board has the discretion "for good cause [to] grant an extension of the time period." (§ 13953, subd. (b).) Unlike the old law, there is no maximum deadline for an extension of time in which to file an application for compensation from the Restitution Fund. (§ 13953, subd. (b).)¹

For reasons that follow, we conclude the statutory revisions are prospective only and the eligibility of both Moore and Faxas for compensation is governed by "the law in effect as of the date [the] application was submitted." (§ 13959, subd. (d).)

Applying the law in effect in 1996, when Moore and Faxas submitted their applications, we conclude the superior court erred in ruling that the Board could not deny as untimely an application for assistance when the victim established the application was not filed earlier because law enforcement failed to inform the victim of her potential eligibility for restitution from the fund. As we shall explain, amendments to the statutory scheme in 1993 eliminated that ground as a basis for relief from the three-year maximum period in which to submit an application to the Board.

Accordingly, we shall reverse the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Board received an application for assistance from plaintiff Jacquetta Moore on January 4, 1996, seeking compensation as the result of an instance of spousal abuse that occurred over three years earlier, in October 1992. Moore requested relief from the one-year filing requirement stating that she had only recently learned of the victim assistance program.

The Board received an application for assistance from plaintiff Leticia Faxas on August 29, 1996, seeking compensation as the result of an instance of spousal abuse that occurred almost five years earlier, in December 1991. Faxas requested relief from the one-year claim filing requirement, stating that law enforcement did not tell her about the crime victim restitution program in 1991, and that she had only recently learned of the program.

The Board denied the claims on the ground they were untimely. Each plaintiff requested an administrative hearing. Following hearings, the claims were denied. The Board also denied requests for reconsideration.

The plaintiffs then filed a petition for writ of mandate and declaratory relief. The superior court held that, when a local law enforcement agency fails to provide a crime victim with information concerning the right to compensation, as required by former section 13968, subdivision (c), the Board is estopped from invoking the time limitations of former section 13961, subdivision (c), as a reason for denying an application for compensation. Hence, the court issued a peremptory writ of mandate requiring the Board to vacate its decisions denying compensation to plaintiffs and to reconsider their applications in a manner consistent with the court's ruling.

DISCUSSION

I

We begin by addressing whether the statutory changes enacted by Statutes 2002, chapter 1141, apply to this case. Under that legislation, there is no maximum deadline for an extension of time granted to a victim of crime by the Board to apply for compensation from the Restitution Fund. (§ 13953, subd. (b).)

"A basic canon of statutory interpretation is that statutes do not operate retrospectively unless the Legislature plainly intended them to do so." (Western Security Bank v. Superior Court (1997) 15 Cal.4th 232, 243, 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 243, 933 P.2d 507.) "The Legislature, of course, is well acquainted with this fundamental rule, and when it intends a statute to operate retroactively it uses clear language to accomplish that purpose." (DiGenova v. State Board of Education (1962) 57 Cal.2d 167, 176, 18 Cal.Rptr. 369, 367 P.2d 865.)

Plaintiffs claim that (1) the time limit for submitting an application for compensation from the Restitution Fund is a statute of limitations, (2) statutes of limitations are procedural, and (3) procedural statutes are not subject to the general rule against retroactive application of a statute. We are not persuaded.

When the Legislature establishes a right or benefit that was unknown at common law and, in the same statute, establishes a time within which a claim to the right or benefit must be exercised, the time period is substantive and jurisdictional. (Roberts v. Title Ins. & Trust Co. (1936) 6 Cal.2d 373, 375, 57 P.2d 916; Williams v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 941, 949, 231 Cal. Rptr. 234.) This is such a case. The time period for presenting an application for compensation from the Restitution Fund "was not a mere statute of limitations, but a condition upon which a new right was given to a special group, and upon which the exercise of that right depended." (Cf. Adams v. Albany (1954) 124 Cal.App.2d 639, 643, 269 P.2d 142.)

In any event, "[i]n deciding whether a statute may be given retroactive application, it is not significant whether the statute is labeled substantive or procedural in nature." (Borden v. Division of Medical Quality (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 874, 880, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 905.) Rather, what is determinative is the effect that application of the statute would have on substantive rights and liabilities. "If substantial changes are made, even in a statute which might ordinarily be classified as procedural, the operation on existing rights would be retroactive because the legal effects of past events would be changed, and the statute will be construed to operate only in futuro unless the legislative intent to the contrary clearly appears. [Citations.]" (Aetna Cos. & Surety Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com. (1947) 30 Cal.2d 388, 394, 182 P.2d 159; Borden v. Division of Medical Quality, supra, 30 Cal.App.4th at p. 880, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 905.)

Therefore, where the application of a new or amended statute of limitations would have the effect of reviving an already time-barred claim the general rule against retroactive application of the statute is applicable in the absence of a clear indication of legislative intent to the contrary. (Barker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 42, 48, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 531; Carr v. State of California (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 139, 147, 129 Cal.Rptr. 730; Singer Co. v. County of Kings (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 852, 866-867, 121 Cal.Rptr. 398.) And when the Legislature intends to revive time-barred claims it does so expressly. (See, e.g., 20th Century Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1247, 1264, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 611 [Code Civ. Proc, § 340.9]; Liebig v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 828, 257 Cal.Rptr. 574 [Code Civ. Proc, § 340.1]; Battle v. Kessler (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 853, 858, 197 Cal.Rptr. 170 [Sts. & Hy.Code, § 6571].)

We have reviewed the statutes of 2002, chapter 1141, in its entirety and find no indication, either by express language or by reasonable implication, that the Legislature intended to...