Moore v. State
| Decision Date | 18 December 1940 |
| Docket Number | No. 21308.,21308. |
| Citation | 145 S.W.2d 887 |
| Parties | MOORE v. STATE. |
| Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
Appeal from Criminal District Court No. 2, Dallas County; Henry King, Judge.
Andrew Moore was convicted of striking another with a motor vehicle and failing to stop and carry injured person to physician and surgeon for medical and surgical treatment, and he appeals.
Reversed and remanded.
Baskett & Parks, of Dallas, for appellant.
Lloyd W. Davidson, State's Atty., of Austin, for the State.
Appellant, a negro man, was charged by indictment with driving an automobile on a public street in the city of Dallas, Texas, about midnight on the 13th day of January, 1940, and striking one Orvelle Polly with said automobile, and refusing to stop and render "all necessary assistance to the said Polly in this, to-wit: that the said Andrew Moore did then and there fail to stop and to carry the said Orvelle Polly to a physician and surgeon for medical and surgical treatment required by the said Orvelle Polly by reason of the said injury received as aforesaid," etc.
Appellant was by the jury convicted and given a term of two years in the penitentiary.
The testimony shows that appellant was driving an old sedan about midnight, on the date alleged, on Merlin Street, and near the house of Ellen Lofton, on one side of the street and the Central Freight Lines on the other side of the street, he struck a car belonging to Ellen Lofton, which was parked in front of her home. The night watchman for the Freight Company, who was upstairs on its property and could see out of the windows, stated that he heard one slight impact, and within a second or two he heard another louder crash; that he immediately looked out of the window and saw one car backing around another car, which first car immediately drove off; that it soon stopped and backed up and the driver thereof opened the door on the opposite side from the car he had struck, and stood up and looked out and then sat back down and drove off. This person was afterwards shown to be the appellant, whose defense was embodied in the statement that he did not know he had hit anyone in the accident. The night watchman immediately came downstairs and unlocked a gate and went across the lighted street to the scene of the accident, and there found a man's body lying diagonally behind the car that was struck. He immediately went back across the street and phoned for an ambulance. In about ten minutes the ambulance came and the man, Mr. Polly, was found to be dead. He evidently died from a hemorrhage of the stomach, there being evidence that the major portion of the blood in his body was in his stomach and was drawn therefrom by the undertaker, as shown by his testimony.
Appellant offers the proposition that the court should have charged the jury that "if Orvelle Polly was struck by defendant's automobile and death was instantaneous, then medical or surgical treatment would not have been either necessary or required, and under those conditions, the defendant having stopped, he would not be guilty of the offense charged."
In the first place it was appellant's duty to stop, regardless of whether or not anyone was injured, see Garcia v. State, 131 Tex.Cr.R. 84, 96 S.W.2d 977; Bevil v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 141 S.W.2d 362, 363; and further it is our opinion that the stop demanded by statute, Vernon's Ann.P.C. Art. 1150, does not mean a stop for an instant, enabling but a cursory examination of the surroundings, but does mean a definite cessation of movement for a sufficient length of time for a person of ordinary powers of observation to fully understand the surroundings of the accident and to possess himself of an accurate knowledge of the results of the accident. We further observe that the mere fact that the injured person was found to be dead some few minutes after the accident, would not be a sufficient excuse to absolve appellant from blame on account of a failure to stop an appreciable length of time.
We find in 42 Corp.Jur., p. 1385, Sec. 1451, the following: "The fact that an injured person is unconscious and so unable to receive the information required by the statute to be given him, or is dead and therefore not in need of assistance does not excuse the failure of the driver to stop or to comply with other provisions of the statute." In line with this text we find the case of People v. McKee, 80 Cal.App. 200, 251 P. 675, 677, a California case, which law is practically the same as ours. We quote: ...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Sattiewhite v. State
...of the indictment. The Moore rule has become firmly established in the criminal jurisprudence of this State. See Moore v. State, 140 Tex.Cr.R. 482, 145 S.W.2d 887 (1940); Garza v. State, 162 Tex.Cr.R. 655, 288 S.W.2d 785 (1956); Morter v. State, 551 S.W.2d 715 (Tex.Crim.App.1977); West v. S......
-
Eckert v. State
...indictment. Compare Infante v. State, 612 S.W.2d 603 (Tex.Cr.App.); Perkins v. State, 528 S.W.2d 598 (Tex.Cr.App.); and Moore v. State, 140 Tex.Cr.R. 482, 145 S.W.2d 887. See also Sifford v. State, 511 S.W.2d 526 PART III Appellant next asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in ......
-
McGuire v. State
...of the accident.” Galvan v. State, 846 S.W.2d 161, 164 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ) (quoting Moore v. State, 140 Tex.Crim. 482, 145 S.W.2d 887, 888 (1940) ). If a person “stops as close as possible to the scene and returns to the scene, then he must remain at the scene.” Huf......
-
Turner v. State
...identity of the offense charged the trial court is limited in its charge to those matters specifically alleged. Moore v. State, 140 Tex.Cr.R. 482, 145 S.W.2d 887. For when the issue is determined in a criminal case by indictment or information and pleadings of the defendant, the issue is th......