Moore v. State
| Decision Date | 22 April 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 49A05–1408–CR–398.,49A05–1408–CR–398. |
| Citation | 30 N.E.3d 1241 |
| Parties | Derek L. MOORE, Appellant–Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Frederick Vaiana, Voyles, Zahn & Paul, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Ellen H. Meilaender, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
, Judge.
[1] Derek L. Moore (“Moore”) appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to correct error, which challenged the court's denial of his petition for sentence modification. We hold that the trial court erred in finding that it did not have the authority to entertain Moore's petition for sentence modification. However, we affirm the trial court's judgment to deny Moore's petition on its merits.
[2] Moore raises one issue on appeal, which we restate as: whether the trial court erred when it denied Moore's petition for sentence modification because the trial court did not apply a recent statutory revision that provided Moore procedural, as opposed to substantive, relief. We also address an issue first raised in the State's brief: whether Moore's appeal should be dismissed as moot.
[3] On February 13, 2006, pursuant to a plea agreement, Moore pleaded guilty in cause number 49G06–0410–FB–187118 (“FB–7118”) to three counts of Robbery, as Class B felonies, and two counts of Unlawful Possession of a Firearm by a Serious Violent Felon, as Class B felonies. He also admitted to being a habitual offender.
[4] On March 16, 2006, the court imposed ten year sentences for each of the five Class B felony convictions and ordered that they be served consecutively. The court also enhanced Moore's first Robbery conviction sentence by ten years because of his habitual offender adjudication. The result was an aggregate sentence of sixty years.
[5] On July 11, 2014, Moore petitioned the trial court to modify his sentence in FB–7118.1 The sentence modification statute under which Moore sought relief provides:
(the “revised statute”). The revised statute became effective July 1, 2014.
[6] On July 16, 2014, the court denied Moore's petition, citing a prior version of Indiana Code section 35–38–1–17
, which provides, in relevant part:
(b) If more than three hundred sixty-five (365) days have elapsed since the convicted person began serving the sentence and after a hearing at which the convicted person is present, the court may reduce or suspend the sentence, subject to the approval of the prosecuting attorney. [....]
(Supp.2006). The court found that it lacked authority to entertain Moore's petition because the prosecuting attorney had not consented to a modification. The court also noted that Moore's crime and sentence occurred prior to 2014 and “[t]he new statutes, effective on July 1, 2014, do not have retroactive application.” (App. at 31.)
[7] On August 15, 2014, Moore filed a motion to correct error, arguing that the court had authority to entertain his petition because it was filed after the effective date of the revised statute. Moore argued that under the revised statute, the court had authority to modify his sentence without the prosecutor's consent.
[8] The court denied Moore's motion to correct error, reasoning that a savings clause enacted in 2014 “clearly indicates the legislature's intent that the new criminal code has no retroactive application.” (App. at 35.) The court's order also stated that even if the court had authority to entertain Moore's petition, it would not grant the petition “given the serious nature of these charges and the defendant's criminal history[.]” (App. at 35.)
[9] Moore now appeals.
[10] A ruling on a motion to correct error generally is reviewed only for an abuse of discretion. Becker v. State, 992 N.E.2d 697, 700 (Ind.2013)
. When a motion to correct error depends on a question of law, we review the trial court's resolution of that question de novo. Id. Matters of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo because they present pure questions of law. Gardiner v. State, 928 N.E.2d 194, 196 (Ind.2010).
[11] The overarching principle in statutory interpretation is to first decide “whether the legislature has spoken clearly and unambiguously on the point in question.” Sloan v. State, 947 N.E.2d 917, 922 (Ind.2011)
(quoting Rheem Mfg. Co. v. Phelps Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc., 746 N.E.2d 941, 947 (Ind.2001) ). If a statute is clear and unambiguous, we do not apply any rules of construction other than giving effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of the language. Id. Thus, we will not delve into legislative intent unnecessarily if no ambiguity exists. Id.
[12] As an initial matter, the State argues that Moore's appeal is moot because the trial court stated that, even if the revised statute applies, it would decline to grant Moore's petition on the merits “given the serious nature of these charges and the defendant's criminal history[.]” (App. at 35.)
[14] In his reply brief, Moore argues that if we hold that the revised statute applies to him, subsection (h) permits him to petition for sentence modification a second time. See I.C. § 35–38–1–17(h) (2014)
. Therefore, Moore argues that even though the court indicated that it would deny Moore's petition on its merits, it is not unnecessary to decide the question in Moore's case. We agree that the revised statute, if applicable, would provide Moore future opportunity for relief. Thus, Moore's appeal is not moot.
[15] Moreover, even if the statute did not contain an additional avenue for relief for Moore, the terms under which a convicted person may petition for sentence modification have implications for numerous other convicted persons whose offenses were committed prior to the effective date of the revised statute. Because of the statute's wide applicability and the likelihood that the same issue will appear again before this Court, Moore's case, even if moot, falls within the public interest exception.
[16] We turn now to the substance of Moore's appeal.
[17] Moore argues on appeal that, because the Indiana Code section under which Moore filed his petition was recently revised so that prosecutorial consent is not required, the trial court erred when it found that it had no authority to modify or reduce his sentence absent the consent of the prosecutor.
[18] In 2013, the Indiana General Assembly passed substantial revisions to the Indiana criminal code. See Pub.L. No. 158–2013 (2013). As a result of the 2013 bill and further revisions passed in 2014, Indiana Code section 35–38–1–17
was amended to remove the need for prosecutor approval when a convicted person seeks a sentence modification more than 365 days after he or she began serving his or her sentence. See Pub.L. No. 158–2013, § 396 (2013); Pub.L. No. 168–2014, § 58 (2014).
[19] The revised statute states:
(c) If more than three hundred sixty-five (365) days have elapsed since the convicted person began serving the sentence, the court may reduce or suspend the sentence and impose a sentence that the court was authorized to impose at the time of sentencing. The court must incorporate its reasons in the record.
. The revised statute became effective July 1, 2014.
[20] Moore filed his petition on July 11, 2014, eleven days after the revised statute's effective date. No provision in the revised Indiana Code section 35–38–1–17
limits the statute's application to persons convicted after July 1, 2014. Therefore, by the plain language of subsection (c), the trial court did not need to obtain the prosecutor's consent to reduce or suspend Moore's sentence. Accordingly, the trial court erred when it found that it did not have the authority to entertain Moore's petition on its merits without the prosecutor's consent.
[21] The State argues, however, that the revised statute does not apply to Moore because Moore was convicted and sentenced in 2006. The State contends that the laws in effect at the time of Moore's offense, not the laws in effect at the time he filed his petition, govern his petition for sentence modification.
[22] It is true that, as a general rule, courts must sentence a convicted person under the statute in effect at the time the person committed the offense. Payne v. State, 688 N.E.2d 164, 165 (Ind.1997)
. We disagree, however, that the general rule bars Moore's petition from proceeding under the revised statute. We confronted the same argument in Willis v. State, 567 N.E.2d 1170 (Ind.Ct.App.1991), trans. denied. At the time Willis originally was sentenced, the modification statute “limited the time in which sentence modification could take place to a period within 180 days of sentencing.” Id. at 1171. However, before Willis filed his petition, the statute was amended to permit modifications more than 180 days after...
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