Moore v. Town Of Stamford

• Decision Date: 16 July 1947
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: MOORE et al. v. TOWN OF STAMFORD et al.

134 Conn. 65

54 A.2d 588

MOORE et al.

v.TOWN OF STAMFORD et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

July 16, 1947.

Appeal from Superior Court, Fairfield County; Mellitz, Judge.

Action by Charles E. Morse and others, for an injunction restraining the town of Stamford from laying taxes upon plaintiffs' property within the city of Stamford to defray expenses for objects serving only inhabitants of the town outside of city limits. Judgment for defendants after trial to the court, and plaintiffs appeal.

No error.

Frank Rich, of Stamford, for appellants (plaintiffs).

George Wise, of Stamford, f or appellees (defendants).

Before MALTBIE, C. J., and BROWN, JENNINGS, ELLS, and DICKENSON, JJ.

DENNINGS, Judge.

The question to be determined is whether property located within the limits of the city of Stamford, a municipal corporation contained within the territorial limits of the town of Stamford but not coterminous therewith, is subject to town taxes levied to meet the expense of services performed in the town outside of the territorial limits of the city. The plaintiffs do not pursue in their brief assignments of error attacking findings of facts. They rely on their claim that the facts found do not support the conclusions reached and set forth both among the findings of fact and specifically as conclusions.

In 1830 an area in the southerly part of the town of Stamford was incorporated as a borough. The charter of the borough has been amended from time to time by adding territory to be included within its limits and by increasing its corporate powers. This process culminated in the incorporation of the city of Stamford in 1893. 11 Spec.Laws 1893, p. 797. It and the town function as independent political entities. The charter of the city grants to it exclusive jurisdiction over various activities within its territorial limits. The town continues to perform the following functions within the city limits: education; care of poor and incompetent persons; conduct of town elections and making of voters; fence disputes and other town duties prescribed by statute; appropriation of funds recommended by the board of finance of the town. It shares the cost of the city court with the city and pays six ten-thousandths of its total grand list to the city for the care and maintenance of roads and bridges within the city. The assessment and collection of taxes are also a joint affair and are described in detail in State ex rel. Schenck v. Barrett, 121 Conn. 237, 244, 184 A. 379.

In addition to the functions of the town performed within the city limits it conducts certain activities which serve only that portion of its territory outside of the city limits and which do not benefit taxpayers like the plaintiffs who own property within those limits. These activities are as follows: The town appoints and pays or maintains a tree warden, health officer, zoning commission and zoning board of appeals, planning commission, public works department and police department; it maintains and pays for highways and a public dump and contributes substantial funds to a number of volunteer fire departments. The inconsistent finding that the city benefits from some of these activities is disregarded.

The town grand list is $162,648,508; of this amount, properties assessed at $112,315,136 are within the city limits. The net city budget for 1945-1946 was $1,705,369.09 and that of the town $2,867,056.14; $255,970.50 was appropriated by the town to pay for its activities carried on outside the city limits as described above. All residents of the town, including those within the city limits, pay a town tax which includes a levy to cover the expenses last mentioned, and have done so ever since the city existed. Property located in the town outside of the city limits is not charged with a city tax.

The right of voters residing within the city limits to vote in town meetings is equal in all respects to the right of voters residing outside of those limits but within the town.

The trial court concluded that the town was required by law to levy taxes on all of the property within its limits, including property within the city limits, sufficient to pay its estimated expenditures, and that it had no power to separate any item from its budget and levy separate taxes for it.

The grand list of a town is made up in accordance with the directions contained in General Statutes, chapter 62, as amended. When completed, it covers all of the property subject to taxation by the town. A tax is laid ‘on such list’ sufficient to cover the expenditures as estimated for the ensuing year. Cum.Sup.1935, § 87c. The property of the plaintiffs is in the town of Stamford, is included in the grand list of the town and, in accordance with the foregoing statutes, must be taxed by the town. Comstock v. Town of Waterford, 85 Conn. 6, 9, 81 A. 1059, 37 L.R.A.,N.S., 1166. The conclusion of the trial court must stand unless the plaintiffs can establish that their particular stituation brings them within a recognized exception to this general principle.

The underlying basis of the plaintiffs' principal claim is that property not benefited should not be taxed. The plaintiffs state this as follows: ‘Property within the city limits should not be taxed for those matters which are for the sole and exclusive benefit of the town outside of the city, and from which the taxpayers in the city derive no benefit.’ This claim, that property not benefited cannot be taxed, has been frequently made and almost uniformly denied. It is true that most of the cases involve complaints by owners of outlying property that they have no benefit from city improvements rather than the reverse, as here. The principle remains the same. Absence of special benefit does not prevent taxation for public purposes authorized by law. Bailey v. Collector of Manasquan, 53 N.J.L. 162, 20 A. 772; Kelly v. City of Pittsburgh, 85 Pa. 170, 27 Am.Rep. 633, affirmed 104 U.S. 78, 26 L.Ed. 658; Atherton v. Village of Essex Junction, 83 Vt. 218, 223, 74 A. 1118, 27 L.R.A., N.S., 695, Ann.Cas.1912A, 339. The rule was formerly otherwise in Kentucky, Utah and Nebraska, but those states have now joined the majority. Hughes v. Carl, 106 Ky. 533, 50 S.W. 852; Kimball v. City of Grantsville City, 19 Utah 368, 386, 57 P. 1, 45 L.R.A. 628; Turner v. Althaus, 6 Neb. 54. Iowa only stands out. Durant v. Kauffman, 34 Iowa 194; Taylor v. City of Waverly, 94 Iowa 661, 63 N.W. 347; McKeon v. City of council Bluffs, 206 Iowa 556, 560, 221 N.W. 351, 62 A.L.R. 1006. Courts cannot properly inquire into the ‘expediency, wisdom, or justice of [such] legislation.’ Kimball v. City of Grantsville City, supra [19 Utah 368, 57 P. 6]. It is not unconstitutional. Ferguson v. City of Snohomish, 8 Wash. 668, 673, 36 P. 969, 24 L.R.A. 795. Unless the General Assembly has violated constitutional limitations, recourse must be had to it rather than to the courts. McLaughlin v. Estate of Cooper, 128...