Moore v. Wilkerson

Decision Date18 June 1902
Citation68 S.W. 1035,169 Mo. 334
PartiesMOORE v. WILKERSON, Appellant
CourtMissouri Supreme Court

Appeal from Linn Circuit Court. -- Hon. Jno. P. Butler, Judge.

Reversed.

E. R Stephens for appellant.

(1) The petition does not state facts which warranted the trial court in its finding for the plaintiff, either as to the facts, or its conclusions of law, under section 2135, Revised Statutes 1889; therefore, the judgment is erroneous on the record proper. (2) At the time of the conveyances, Joel H. Wilkerson was solvent, and there was not an element of fraud in the transfers. The findings of facts, conclusions of law, and the judgment of the circuit court in favor of the plaintiff, are manifestly against the evidence. Therefore, the judgment should be reversed. Carroll v. Rapid Trans. Co., 107 Mo. 653; Powell v. Railroad, 76 Mo. 80; Ackley v Staehlin, 56 Mo. 558.

A. W Mullins for respondent.

The gift of the property from Joel H. Wilkerson to his wife, by means of the deeds of conveyance, was invalid and void as to his creditors. If not already insolvent, he was very largely involved, with all his property incumbered except this in question, with many thousands of dollars indebtedness and liabilities unsecured. In such circumstances he could not make a valid gift of the property to his wife to the injury of his creditors. Bump on Fraudulent Conveyances (4 Ed.), secs. 252, 253, 254; Lionberger v. Baker, 88 Mo. 447; Grocery Co. v. Monroe, 142 Mo. 165; Bohannan v. Combs, 79 Mo. 305; Snyder v. Free, 114 Mo. 360.

OPINION

MARSHALL, J.

In 1872 and 1874, Joel H. Wilkerson acquired the property in controversy, which is located in Linneus, Missouri, and used it and occupied it as his homestead, his wife, the defendant, and his family residing thereon with him. On June 12, 1890, he and his wife conveyed the property to his son, Charles, and on the same day Charles conveyed it to his mother, the defendant. The purpose of these conveyances was to transfer the property from Joel to his wife, as a gift, and to make provision for her. After the transfer he and his wife and family continued to occupy the property, until his death on June 19, 1891, and Mrs. Wilkerson has occupied it ever since. Mrs. Wilkerson was appointed administratrix of her husband's estate and served as such about a year, and upon her resignation, W. W. Brinkley was appointed administrator de bonis non, and finally wound up the estate. He paid 72.365 per cent of the face amount of the fifth-class claims. The plaintiff herein purchased a number of the allowed fifth-class claims from the holders thereof, and after the estate was finally wound up, he instituted this suit in equity seeking to have the conveyances from Wilkerson and wife to Charles Wilkerson, and from the latter to the defendant, set aside and the land subjected to the payment of the said claims held by him. The evidence does not show that any of the debts evidenced by the claims held by the plaintiff were contracted prior to the time Wilkerson acquired the land and established his home thereon, nor is there any allegation or pretense that such debts were outstanding when the homestead was acquired. On the contrary, all the evidence goes to show that Wilkerson was a prominent man, a large landowner, a farmer and a banker, and that when the land in question was transferred to his wife he thought he was perfectly solvent and was generally reputed to be solvent. When his affairs were wound up by the probate court, however, there was a balance left unpaid on his debts. There are allegations and some evidence in the case going to show that but for certain acts of the plaintiff the estate might have paid in full all the debts, but in the view herein taken of the case it is not necessary to consider those matters.

The defendant asked the circuit court to make a special finding of facts, as provided by section 2135, Revised Statutes 1889, and that court attempted to comply therewith, and in pursuance thereto entered a combined finding of facts and decree, reciting therein that it found all the issues for the plaintiff, except as to one of the claims, and except that it found "that the defendant is entitled to homestead in the real estate" described, and then set aside and declared void the deeds aforesaid which transferred the title to the defendant, and ordered that the premises, "be sold, subject to the homestead right of the said Judith B. Wilkerson in the real estate and premises aforesaid to continue during her natural life, for the purpose of paying said judgments of said probate court," etc. The circuit court did not find as a fact that Wilkerson was insolvent when he transferred the premises to his wife, nor that such act was fraudulent in fact or in law, nor did that court find any fact upon which it based its conclusions of law, except in the general way stated, to-wit, that it found all the issues in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant appealed.

I.

The land was the homestead of Mr. Wilkerson from 1874 to 1890, when he transferred it to his wife. The claims now owned by the plaintiff were not in existence when the land was acquired and devoted to the homestead. Therefore, the land was exempt from seizure or sale for the payment of these claims during the life and ownership of Mr. Wilkerson. [R. S. 1889, sec. 5435; Peake v. Cameron, 102 Mo. 568, 15 S.W. 70; Davis v. Land, 88 Mo. 436; Bank v. Guthrey, 127 Mo. 189, 29 S.W. 1004; Macke v. Byrd, 131 Mo. l. c. 682, 33 S.W. 448; Ratliff v. Graves, 132 Mo. 76, 33 S.W. 450; Bank v. Brown, 165 Mo. 32, 65 S.W. 297.] The land could not be sold during that time subject to the homestead rights of Mr. Wilkerson, and such a sale would convey no title whatever to the purchaser. [Cases supra.]

But Wilkerson, with the co-operation of his wife, had express power under the statutes of this State to convey, mortgage alienate or in any other manner dispose of it or any part of it. [R. S. 1889, sec. 5435; R. S. 1899, sec. 3616.] And this is true whether he was solvent or insolvent, and whatever may have been his motive in so disposing of it. [Bank v. Brown, 165 Mo. 32, 65 S.W. 297.] For, "no fraud upon creditors can be perpetrated by any disposition the debtor may see proper to make of his homestead. It is beyond their reach, both at law and in equity, and there can be no fraudulent disposal, of such property within the meaning of the attachment law." [Davis v. Land, 88 Mo. 439.] "There is no such thing under our laws as subjecting the fee in the land, subject to the homestead right or interest, to seizure and...

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