Moossun v. Orlando Regional Health Care
Decision Date | 20 June 2002 |
Docket Number | No. SC00-1472.,SC00-1472. |
Citation | 826 So.2d 945 |
Parties | DR. M. Hassen MOOSSUN, Petitioner, v. ORLANDO REGIONAL HEALTH CARE, et al., Respondents. |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Zahid H. Chaudhry, Tallahassee, FL, for Petitioner.
Richard L. Allen, and Brian L. Wagner of Mateer & Harbert, P.A., Francis E. Pierce, III and David B. Falstad of Gurney & Handley, P.A., and Thomas E. Dukes and Ruth Osborne of McEwan, Martinez, Luff, Dukes & Ruffier, Orlando, FL, for Respondents.
We have for review Moossun v. Orlando Regional Health Care, 760 So.2d 193 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000), based on conflict with the decisions in Charyulu v. Mercy Hospital, Inc., 703 So.2d 1155 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997), Brown v. Meyers, 702 So.2d 646 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), and Samuels v. Palm Beach Motor Cars Limited by Simpson, Inc., 618 So.2d 310 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993), on the issue of whether a trial court's order setting a case management conference constitutes sufficient "record activity" to preclude dismissal for failure to prosecute under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420(e) even though there has been no other record activity by the litigants in the case. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. For the reasons set out below, we hold that the order setting a case management conference in this case does not constitute sufficient record activity to preclude dismissal under rule 1.420(e).
The relevant proceedings to date are set out in the opinion below:
Id. On appeal to the Fifth District Court of Appeal, Dr. Moossun argued that the trial court's order setting a case management conference constituted sufficient "record activity" to preclude dismissal for failure to prosecute. See id. In rejecting that argument and affirming the circuit court's decision, the district court relied on this Court's ruling in Toney v. Freeman, 600 So.2d 1099 (Fla.1992), wherein we held that a trial court's status order and a response to that order did not constitute sufficient "record activity" to preclude dismissal under rule 1.420(e). See Moossun, 760 So.2d at 196. In its opinion the district court acknowledged several district court decisions apparently to the contrary, Charyulu v. Mercy Hospital, Inc., 703 So.2d 1155 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); Brown v. Meyers, 702 So.2d 646 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); and Samuels v. Palm Beach Motor Cars Limited by Simpson, Inc., 618 So.2d 310 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993). See Moossun, 760 So.2d at 196-97.
Dr. Moossun asserts that an order setting a case management conference requiring a written report and attendance of the parties at a case management conference is designed to hasten the suit to judgment, and therefore constitutes "record activity" sufficient to preclude dismissal for failure to prosecute. For this reason, he argues, the district court's decision should not have relied on the principles announced in Toney in affirming the trial court's order of dismissal.
Rule 1.420(e), of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure is entitled "Failure to Prosecute" and provides:
(e) Failure to Prosecute. All actions in which it appears on the face of the record that no activity by filing of pleadings, order of court, or otherwise has occurred for a period of 1 year shall be dismissed by the court on its own motion or on the motion of any interested person, whether a party to the action or not, after reasonable notice to the parties, unless a stipulation staying the action is approved by the court or a stay order has been filed or a party shows good cause in writing at least 5 days before the hearing on the motion why the action should remain pending. Mere inaction for a period of less than 1 year shall not be sufficient cause for dismissal for failure to prosecute.
Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.420(e). This rule is intended to ensure that actions filed in Florida's courts are diligently prosecuted by the parties. The rule provides for dismissal without prejudice of actions wherein no record activity has taken place for a year.3
This Court construed rule 1.420(e) in Toney as it pertained to a court-ordered status request which required written responses detailing the status of an action. After responses were submitted and a hearing, the trial court dismissed the action due to lack of prosecution. On appeal, the district court reversed the dismissal, holding the status order and responses constituted record activity for purposes of rule 1.420(e). See Toney, 600 So.2d at 1100. Upon review, this Court held that the status request and responses did not constitute record activity under rule 1.420(e).
In our opinion in Toney, we explained that "not every action taken in a case is sufficient to prevent dismissal under the rule." Id. Under the rule "[r]ecord activity must be more than a mere passive effort to keep the case on the docket; the activity must constitute an affirmative act calculated to hasten the suit to judgment." Id. Relying on two district court decisions which had held that a trial court's status request did not preclude dismissal,4 we concluded that such court activity is not the type of activity contemplated by the rule to preclude dismissal in the face of an otherwise dormant record:
Toney, 600 So.2d at 1100-01 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). Hence, in Toney, we rejected an argument almost identical to that asserted here.
The petitioner attempts to distinguish Toney and asserts that the primary issue in Toney was whether a status request was "record activity," whereas, here, the issue is whether a status conference constitutes record activity. He further asserts that although this Court in Toney mentioned "case management activities," we did not...
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