Reaves v. State

• Decision Date: 20 June 2002
• Docket Number: No. SC00-840.,SC00-840.
• Citation: 826 So.2d 932
• Parties: William REAVES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

826 So.2d 932

William REAVES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. SC00-840.

Supreme Court of Florida.

June 20, 2002.

Rehearing Denied September 9, 2002.

Neal A. Dupree, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and William M. Hennis, III, Assistant CCRC, Law Office of the Capital Collateral Regional Counsel-South, Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Celia A. Terenzio, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, FL, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

William Reaves, a prisoner under sentence of death, appeals the summary denial of his motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. For the reasons detailed below, we remand for an evidentiary hearing on Reaves' claim that counsel was ineffective.

FACTS

Reaves was convicted of first-degree murder for the shooting death of an Indian River County deputy sheriff and was sentenced to death. On direct appeal, this Court reversed the conviction. Reaves v. State, 574 So.2d 105 (Fla.1991). Upon retrial, a jury again found Reaves guilty and recommended the sentence of death by a vote of ten to two, a recommendation which the trial court followed. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the conviction and sentence, finding the relevant facts as follows:

The victim, Deputy Sheriff Richard Raczkoski, at or about 3 a.m. on September 23, 1986, responded to a 911 call from a phone booth outside a Zippy Mart near Vero Beach. The deputy acknowledged his arrival at the Zippy Mart and inquired about outstanding warrants on William Reaves. Within minutes of the call, the deputy was found near the phone booth with four gunshot wounds from which he died later that morning. A piece of paper inside the deputy's vehicle had written on it: William Reaves, black male, 4336 38th Avenue, date of birth 12/30/48.

Witness Whitaker, who discovered the deputy, testified that he saw a black man wearing red shorts and a white T-shirt running from the scene in a manner similar to men in Vietnam under fire. (William Reaves served in Vietnam.) Witness Hinton was ruled unavailable to testify, [pursuant to] section 90.804(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1991), and his testimony from the 1987 trial was read into the record. According to Hinton, Reaves, wearing red shorts and carrying a gun wrapped in a white T-shirt, came to his apartment after the shooting and said: "I done ... up. I just shot a cop, I just shot a police." Hinton testified that Reaves quoted the deputy as saying, "Don't shoot me. Don't shoot me. Don't kill me," to which Reaves responded, "One of us got to go. One of us got to go, me or you." Hinton had no trouble understanding Reaves; his speech was not slurred and he appeared to be in full control of his faculties. Witness Fredell testified that Reaves was wearing red shorts and a white T-shirt on the afternoon prior to the early-morning murder and did not appear to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs.

Detective Pisani quoted Reaves as stating that while he and the deputy were conversing, a gun fell out of Reaves' shorts. The deputy put his knee on the weapon, Reaves pushed the knee back, picked up the gun, refused to surrender it, and in a panic and "wired on cocaine" shot the deputy as he was running away. Reaves admitted that he emptied the seven-round clip of his .38 when he fired. A firearms expert testified that Reaves' gun was a type that required a pull of the trigger each time it was fired; it was not an automatic.

The jury convicted Reaves of premeditated first-degree murder and recommended death by a vote of ten to two. The trial judge imposed the death sentence, finding three aggravating circumstances[2] and no statutory mitigating circumstances. The judge found three nonstatutory mitigating circumstances.[3.]

[2.] Reaves was previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person; the capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody; and the capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. § 921.141(5)(b), (e), (h), Fla. Stat. (1985).

[3] Reaves was honorably discharged from military service, had a good reputation in his community up to the age of sixteen, [and] was a considerate son to his mother and was good to his siblings.

Reaves v. State, 639 So.2d 1, 3 (Fla.1994) (footnote 1 omitted).

On February 21, 1996, Reaves filed his initial motion for postconviction relief. He later amended this motion and filed the current motion on February 17, 1999. After a Huff¹ hearing, the trial court entered an order summarily denying the motion for postconviction relief without holding an evidentiary hearing. Reaves appeals this order and raises fourteen claims on appeal.² We find that several of these claims are procedurally barred,³ insufficiently pled,⁴ or premature.⁵ For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that the trial court erred in summarily dismissing Reaves' claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel.

ANALYSIS

This Court has recently summarized the applicable standard when reviewing a summary denial of a postconviction motion:

[A] defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a postconviction relief motion unless (1) the motion, files, and records in the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, or (2) the motion or a particular claim is legally insufficient. The defendant bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case based upon a legally valid claim. Mere conclusory allegations are not sufficient to meet this burden. However, in cases where there has been no evidentiary hearing, we must accept the factual allegations made by the defendant to the extent that they are not refuted by the record. We must examine each claim to determine if it is legally sufficient, and, if so, determine whether or not the claim is refuted by the record.

Freeman v. State, 761 So.2d 1055, 1061 (Fla.2000) (citations omitted). With this standard in mind, we turn to the individual claims which Reaves now raises.

A. Guilt Phase Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In Reaves' first claim, he contends that his counsel performed below the constitutional threshold of adequate representation as established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).⁶ Reaves alleges seven instances which allegedly constitute ineffective assistance of counsel: (1) counsel was ineffective in failing to present a voluntary intoxication defense and a related Ake⁷ claim; (2) counsel conceded guilt and failed to object to evidence of drug use and other "bad acts"; (3) counsel was ineffective during jury selection; (4) counsel failed to prepare for and cross-examine certain witnesses; (5) counsel failed to adequately investigate and present various mitigation including Reaves' family background; (6) counsel failed to object to prejudicial testimony during the penalty phase; and (7) counsel failed to have sufficient mental health experts.

In Reaves' first subclaim, he asserts that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing regarding whether trial counsel was ineffective in failing to present a voluntary intoxication defense. The record shows that during the guilt phase, the State introduced Reaves' confession—evidence which could have supported a voluntary intoxication defense since Reaves claimed to be "coked up" when he fired the gun. Defense counsel, however, never argued this defense or presented any evidence which supported voluntary intoxication despite the fact that there was other evidence which could have supported this theory. During the jury charge conference, the trial judge noted that during Reaves' first trial, the jury was informed as to this defense, and it was decided that such a jury instruction should be given again. Notwithstanding this fact, Reaves' counsel never mentioned voluntary intoxication during closing arguments, and never discussed how the evidence could have supported this theory or how cocaine affects the user. During the penalty phase, even more evidence was presented which would have supported a voluntary intoxication defense, including additional testimony that Reaves was on drugs at the time of the crime. Moreover, numerous witnesses testified that Reaves had a history of serious drug abuse dating back to the Vietnam War, that he became involved in "heavy drugs" towards the end of his service in Vietnam, and that his prior convictions were drug-related.

This case is similar to Patton v. State, 784 So.2d 380 (Fla.2000), a case in which defense counsel knew of but did not present evidence that the defendant had a substantial history of drug and alcohol abuse, that he had taken drugs seven hours prior to the crime, and that the defendant had fresh track marks on his arm at the time he was arrested. Id. at 387. In remanding the case for an evidentiary hearing, this Court held:

Because the record does not conclusively refute some of Patton's allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, the court should have held an evidentiary hearing. Specifically, the court should have held a hearing to determine if counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate and present evidence that Patton was intoxicated or insane at the time of the shooting. Instead, the court summarily denied this claim stating a strategy must be presumed. If this were the standard, a strategy could be presumed in every case and an evidentiary hearing would never be required on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. To the contrary, it was necessary for the court to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether counsel was acting competently when she chose not to present an intoxication or insanity defense to a charge of first-degree premeditated murder, where she had conceded that the defendant shot the victim.

Id. at 386-87. Compare Kitchen v. State, 764 So.2d 868,...