Morabito's Auto Sales v. Com., Dept. of Transp.

• Decision Date: 20 July 1998
• Parties: MORABITO'S AUTO SALES, Appellant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Appellee.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 384

715 A.2d 384

552 Pa. 291

MORABITO'S AUTO SALES, Appellant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted May 4, 1998.

Decided July 20, 1998.

David A. Regoli, New Kensington, for Morabito's Auto Sales.

Barbara A. Darkes, Timothy P. Wile, Harrisburg, for PennDOT.

Before FLAHERTY, C.J., and ZAPPALA, CAPPY, CASTILLE, NIGRO, NEWMAN and SAYLOR, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

FLAHERTY, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal by allowance from an order of Commonwealth Court which affirmed an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Armstrong County dismissing statutory appeals from penalties levied against an automobile dealership by the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (DOT).

The appellant, Morabito's Auto Sales (Morabito), is a dealership that sells used cars. In that capacity it serves as an issuing agent for temporary registration plates and cards. In August of 1994, DOT conducted a hearing to review charges that Morabito was not properly handling various documents and fees for which issuing agents are responsible. DOT issued an order imposing a penalty of $2,700.00, in total, for twenty-seven violations of 75 Pa.C.S. § 1374(a)(5), which requires that properly assigned certificates of title be delivered in a timely fashion. By separate order, and based on the same twenty-seven occurrences, DOT suspended Morabito's authority to issue temporary registration plates and cards for a period of one month. The suspension was imposed for violations of 67 Pa.Code 43.11(a)I(4), which requires that documents and fees be delivered in a timely manner.

Appeals from both orders were taken to the court of common pleas. A de novo hearing on both appeals was held on March 22, 1995. On April 12, 1996, the orders were affirmed.

Determination of the exact dates when documents were received by DOT was of critical importance in this case because all of the violations with which Morabito was charged involved failures to timely submit documents and fees. Morabito contends that the court of common pleas erred in admitting certain evidence that DOT utilized to establish such dates. At the hearing, DOT submitted certified photocopies of its records pertaining to the twenty-seven violations. The photocopies depicted twenty-seven untimely title and registration application forms submitted by Morabito. Morabito objected to admission of the records, but the objections were overruled.

Morabito's objection was that the records did not meet the statutory requirement that photocopies of business and public records admitted into evidence be legible. Specifically, in 42 Pa.C.S. § 6109(b), it is provided that "[a]ny such reproduction ... must accurately reproduce all lines and markings which appear on the original." Morabito argues that the photocopies are illegible, and, in particular, that many of the "work identification numbers" cannot be read. These numbers, which are stamped on the original of each document, contain information as to the date when each document was received by DOT. The court initially agreed with Morabito, noting that "[a]fter careful inspection of the documents, this court concedes that the work identification numbers are illegible on many of the documents."

Nevertheless, the court admitted the documents into evidence under 75 Pa.C.S. § 1103.1(d.1), which provides:

Within one business day of receiving an application referring to a vehicle purchased from a dealer, the department shall stamp the application with a work identification number, which shall include the year and day that the application was received at the department.... An application, or copy thereof certified by the department, which displays the stamped work identification document number shall be accepted by any issuing authority or court in any proceeding as prima facie evidence of the date that the application was received by the department. If the displayed stamp is not legible, a certification by the department of the date that the application was received shall be accepted by the issuing authority or court as prima facie evidence of that date.

(Emphasis added). This provision, rather than 42 Pa.C.S. § 6109(b), was deemed controlling because it pertains specifically to the admission of applications relating to vehicles purchased from dealers, whereas section 6109(b) is more general in its scope. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1933 (statutory provision that is more specific overrides one that is more general); Olshansky v. Montgomery County Election Board, 488 Pa. 365, 370, 412 A.2d 552, 554 (1980) (specific statutory provisions prevail over general ones). Further, inasmuch as 75 Pa.C.S. § 1103.1(d.1) is the more recently enacted of the provisions, it was regarded as controlling on that basis as well. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1936 (where two statutes are irreconcilable, the one latest in date of enactment shall prevail).

Documents with illegible work identification numbers were, therefore, admitted into evidence. Attached to the set of documents was a certification of the date that each document was received, such certification having been attested by a manager of DOT's Bureau of Motor Vehicles.

Morabito contends that 75 Pa.C.S. § 1103.1(d.1) should have been deemed inapplicable to this case, and, in particular, that the provision has been given an improper retroactive effect. The provision was enacted on December 7, 1994 and became effective sixty days later, i.e., on February 5, 1995. All of the alleged violations occurred between April and November of 1993. Hence, although the statute was in effect at the time if the hearing, to wit, on March 22, 1995, it was not in effect when the violations allegedly occurred. In addition, the statute had not yet been enacted when, on September 12, 1994, the manager of DOT's Bureau of Motor Vehicles provided the certification as to the dates when the documents were received.

A statute will not generally be construed to be retroactive unless clearly and manifestly so intended by the legislature. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1926. It is well settled, however, that legislation concerning purely procedural matters will be applied not only to litigation commenced after its passage, but also to litigation existing at the time of passage. Galant v. Department of Environmental Resources, 534 Pa. 17, 21-22, 626 A.2d 496, 498-99 (1993); Misitis v. Steel City Piping Co., 441 Pa. 339, 342, 272 A.2d 883, 884 (1971). As stated in Galant,

The general rule in determining whether a statute will be applied retroactively is as follows: "Legislation which affects rights will not be construed to be retroactive unless it is declared so in the act. But, where it concerns merely the mode of procedure, it is applied, as of course, to litigation existing at the time of its...