Morales v. Ryder Truck Rental, 89-799

• Decision Date: 03 April 1990
• Docket Number: No. 89-799,89-799
• Citation: 559 So.2d 317
• Parties: 15 Fla. L. Weekly D868 Miguel MORALES, et al., Appellants, v. RYDER TRUCK RENTAL and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Appellees.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 317

559 So.2d 317

15 Fla. L. Weekly D868

Miguel MORALES, et al., Appellants, v. RYDER TRUCK RENTAL and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Appellees.

No. 89-799.

District Court of Appeal of Florida,

Third District.

April 3, 1990.

Dunn & Johnson, P.A., Perse & Ginsberg, P.A., and Edward A. Perse, Miami, for appellants.

Nelson & Tacher and David L. Willing, Miami, for appellees.

Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and JORGENSON and GODERICH, JJ.

JORGENSON, Judge.

Miguel and Luisa Morales appeal from an order of final summary judgment. We affirm.

On February 22, 1985, Miguel Morales and Jack Beaver, both employees of Shell City Liquors [Shell City], were working at the Miami Grand Prix. Shell City had been hired by Gene's Catering [Gene's] to provide liquor at the event. Gene's had leased a truck from Ryder Truck Rental [Ryder]. Beaver drove the Ryder truck and caused injury to Morales, his passenger and coworker. Morales and his wife sued Ryder and its insurer for personal injuries and loss of consortium. Ryder answered and asserted, as an affirmative defense, that Morales's claim was barred by workers' compensation immunity. See generally § 440.11, Fla.Stat. (1987). Ryder moved for summary judgment on the immunity issue; the trial court granted the motion. We affirm.

The Supreme Court of Florida has held that when a dangerous instrumentality is leased to an employer, the lessor shares with the employer workers' compensation immunity from suit by the employee for personal injuries. Smith v. Ryder Truck Rentals, Inc., 182 So.2d 422 (Fla.1966); see also Zenchak v. Ryder Truck Rentals, Inc., 150 So.2d 727 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963) (same), cert. dismissed, 164 So.2d 200 (Fla.1964). In Smith, the court held that the leased vehicle "became, insofar as his [the employer's] employees were concerned, the equivalent of vehicles owned by the employer. They are, so to speak, the vehicles or working tools used in carrying on the employer's business." 182 So.2d at 424. The court reasoned that "[t]he employees are not third party members of the public. They are fellow servants, engaged in operating the vehicles similarly as other owned equipment of their employer. They have agreed by accepting the Workers' Compensation Act to release their employer from any civil liability arising under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine." Id. Under such circumstances, the court held, it would be inequitable to impute vicarious liability to the lessor. Id.

The result and reasoning in Smith require affirmance of the order on appeal. As a matter of law, Ryder is not vicariously liable for the negligence of Morales's coemployee. As lessor of the vehicle, Ryder partakes of the employer's workers' compensation immunity. The truck was used as a "working tool" of Morales's employer and, thus, was the functional equivalent of a truck owned by the employer. It matters not that Gene's, and not Shell City, Morales's immediate employer, leased the truck from Ryder. Shell City had been hired by Gene's; both were engaged in a common enterprise. ¹ Morales and Beaver were co-employees engaged in furthering that enterprise. Therefore, Morales's claim against Ryder is barred by workers' compensation immunity. ²

Affirmed.

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