Moran v. Dunphy

• Decision Date: 04 January 1901
• Citation: 59 N.E. 125,177 Mass. 485
• Parties: MORAN v. DUNPHY.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

177 Mass. 485

59 N.E. 125

MORAN v. DUNPHY.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

January 4, 1901

COUNSEL

James H. Hickey, for plaintiff.

Clarence F. Eldredge, for defendant.

OPINION

HOLMES C.J.

The first count of the declaration in this case substantially follows the form held bad in May v. Wood, 172 Mass 11, 51 N.E. 191, and Rice v. Albee, 164 Mass. 88, 41 N.E. 122, and the plaintiff's argument is directed to getting those cases overruled. It appears in the Reports that the later decision did not command the assent of all of us and it is quite possible, at least, that if the question case up now for the first time the majority might be found to be on the side which did not prevail. Van Horn v. Van Horn, 56 N. J. Law 318, 319, 28 A. 669. But it is not desirable that decisions should oscillate with changes in the bench, and we accept what was decided as the law. Still we deem it proper to call attention to the fact that the cases cited go only to a point of pleading. What they decide so far as they bear on the present case, is merely that the substance of false statements by which a defendant is alleged to have induced a third person to break or end his contract must be set out. That we accept. But in view of the series of decisions by this court, from Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555, through Morasse v. Brochu, 151 Mass. 567, 25 N.E. 74, 8 L. R. A. 524; Tasker v. Stanley, 153 Mass. 148, 26 N.E. 417, 10 L. R. A. 468; Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 44 N.E. 1077, 32 L. R. A. 722; Hartnett v. Association, 169 Mass. 229, 47 N.E. 1002, 38 L. R. A. 194; and Weston v. Barnicoat, 175 Mass. 454, 56 N.E. 619,--to Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 57 N.E. 1011, we cannot admit a doubt that maliciously and without justifiable cause to induce a third person to end his employment of the plaintiff, whether the inducement be false slanders or successful persuasion, is an actionable tort. See, also, Angle v. Railway, 151 U.S. 1, 13, 14 S.Ct. 240, 38 L.Ed. 55.

We apprehend that there no longer is any difficulty in recognizing that a right to be protected from malicious interference may be incident to a right arising out of a contract, although a contract, so far as performance is concerned, imposes a duty only on the promisor. Again, in the case of a contract of employment, even when the employment is at will, the fact that the employer is free from liability for discharging the plaintiff does not carry with it immunity to the defendant who has controlled the employer's action to the plaintiff's harm. The notion that the employer's immunity must be a nonconductor, so far as any remoter liability was concerned, troubled some of the judges in Allen v. Flood [1898] App. Cas. 1, but is disposed of for this commonwealth by the cases cited. See also, May v. Wood, 172 Mass. 11, 14, 15, 51 N.E. 191. So, again, it may be taken to be settled by Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 501, 502, 57 N.E. 1011, that motives may determine the question of liability; that, while intentional interference of the kind supposed may be privileged if for certain purposes, yet, if due only to malevolence, it must be answered for. On that point the judges were of one mind. See 176 Mass. 504, 57 N.E. 1011. Finally, we see no sound distinction between persuading by malevolent advice and accomplishing the same result by...