More v. Washington State Drs
| Decision Date | 20 June 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 33035-1-II.,33035-1-II. |
| Citation | 137 P.3d 73,133 Wn. App. 581 |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Pauline MORE, Appellant, v. WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF RETIREMENT SYSTEMS, Respondent. |
Sarah Elizabeth Blocki, Attorney at Law, Olympia, WA, for Respondent.
James D. Oswald, Law Offices of James D. Oswald, Seattle, WA, for Appellant.
¶ 1 Pauline More is a member of the Washington State Public Employees' Retirement System, Plan 1 (PERS 1). Due to the nature of her public employment, More is not covered under the Industrial Insurance Act, Title 51 RCW. In 2003, More applied for pension benefits as the result of a degenerative joint disease. A PERS 1 member receives certain pension benefits if she "becomes totally incapacitated for duty and qualifies to receive benefits under Title 51 RCW as a result of an occupational disease." RCW 41.40.200(1). Because she is ineligible for benefits under Title 51 RCW, More's application was denied. More maintains that RCW 41.40.200(1) violates equal protection because it awards pension benefits for an occupational disease to only those members who qualify to receive benefits for the same disease under Title 51 RCW. We disagree and affirm the superior court's decision denying More's benefits claim.
¶ 2 A PERS 1 member is "retired" if she: becomes totally incapacitated for duty as the natural and proximate result of an accident occurring in the actual performance of duty or . . . becomes totally incapacitated for duty and qualifies to receive benefits under Title 51 RCW as a result of an occupational disease, as now or hereafter defined in RCW 51.08.140, while in the service of an employer, without willful negligence on his or her part.
RCW 41.40.200(1). A PERS 1 member retired under RCW 41.40.200(1) receives a disability retirement pension until the age of 60, at which time the member receives a service retirement allowance. RCW 41.40.185, .210.220. The retirement allowance is calculated in part on the number of service credit years. RCW 41.40.185(2). A PERS 1 member retired under RCW 41.40.200(1) continues to receive service credit during any period of total incapacitation. RCW 41.40.220(2).
¶ 3 A totally incapacitated PERS 1 member who does not qualify under RCW 41.40.200(1) does not receive a disability retirement pension. But that member can receive a membership service pension if she has five years of service credit. RCW 41.40.180(1), .185(2). This service pension is calculated the same way as a retirement allowance except that the member does not receive service credit for periods of total incapacitation. RCW 41.40.185(2), .220(2).
¶ 4 Washington State Ferries (WSF) hired More in 1976, and she became a member of PERS 1. More served as an assistant engineer, oiler, and chief for WSF.
¶ 5 In 1998, More was diagnosed with degenerative joint disease in both thumbs and had reconstructive surgery. More opened a claim under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688, maintaining that her thumb condition was the result of her WSF employment, and she received maintenance and cure.1 WSF initially transferred More to a position accommodating her thumb conditions, but in May 2003, that position was eliminated, and More was forced to end her employment.
¶ 6 More then applied to the Department of Retirement Services (DRS) for pension benefits for an occupational disease under RCW 41.40.200(1). DRS denied More's application because, as a vessel crew member excluded from coverage under Title 51 RCW, she was ineligible for retirement under RCW 41.40.200(1). See RCW 51.12.100(1). More appealed to DRS and the superior court, and she now appeals to this court.
¶ 7 As she did below, More maintains that RCW 41.40.200(1) violates her right to equal protection by excluding her profession from retirement benefits for total incapacitation due to an occupational disease. We disagree.
¶ 8 The doctrine of equal protection guarantees that similarly situated persons receive like treatment under the law. O'Hartigan v. Dep't of Pers., 118 Wash.2d 111, 121, 821 P.2d 44 (1991). The critical first step in an equal protection analysis is to define the classification at issue; this, in turn, defines the standard of review. State ex rel. Sigler v. Sigler, 85 Wash.App. 329, 334, 932 P.2d 710 (1997); see also Willoughby v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 147 Wash.2d 725, 748, 57 P.3d 611 (2002) (Madsen, J., concurring/dissenting) (). More argues that the pertinent class division is between WSF employees and all other PERS 1 employees. But under RCW 41.40.200(1), the pension benefits for an occupational disease turn on whether the PERS 1 member qualifies to receive benefits under Title 51 RCW as a result of the occupational disease. It is this qualification, or legislative line, that More challenges.
¶ 9 Title 51 RCW is Washington's Industrial Insurance Act (IIA). The legislative decision to tie PERS 1 retirement benefits for an occupational disease to qualification for IIA benefits for the same disease does not implicate a fundamental right or a suspect class. See Harris v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 120 Wash.2d 461, 477, 843 P.2d 1056 (1993). Thus, we review More's equal protection challenge to RCW 41.40.200(1) under the rational basis test. Wash. Pub. Employees Ass'n v. Wash. Pers. Res. Bd., 127 Wash. App. 254, 263, 110 P.3d 1154 (2005); see also Willoughby, 147 Wash.2d at 739, 57 P.3d 611 ().
¶ 10 Only in the rarest of cases will a statute fail to survive rational basis review. DeYoung v. Providence Med. Ctr., 136 Wash.2d 136, 144, 960 P.2d 919 (1998). Rational basis review is extraordinarily deferential and enacted statutes carry a heavy presumption of constitutionality. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 116 Wash.2d 352, 362, 804 P.2d 621 (1991). A statute passes the rational basis test if it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Put another way, a statute is unconstitutional only if it classifies groups on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of a legitimate state objective. DeYoung, 136 Wash.2d at 144, 960 P.2d 919. A statute will survive rational basis review if there is a conceivable legitimate objective for the classification; the objective need not have motivated the legislature or be supported by evidence or empirical data. DeYoung, 136 Wash.2d at 147-48, 960 P.2d 919; Haberman v. Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys., 109 Wash.2d 107, 140, 744 P.2d 1032, 750 P.2d 254 (1987). A conceivable rational speculation is sufficient to uphold the classification. DeYoung, 136 Wash.2d at 147-48, 960 P.2d 919.
¶ 11 If there is a legitimate objective for the classification, then there need not be a perfect fit between the objective and the means employed; all that is required is a rational relationship. DeYoung, 136 Wash.2d at 144, 960 P.2d 919. A statute survives rational basis review even if it is to some extent both underinclusive and overinclusive. Campbell v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 150 Wash.2d 881, 901, 83 P.3d 999 (2004). This is particularly true in circumstances related to the beneficial disbursement of limited resources, for a line must be drawn somewhere. Campbell, 150 Wash.2d at 901, 83 P.3d 999; Willard v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 91 Wash.2d 759, 763-64, 592 P.2d 1103 (1979).
¶ 12 IIA coverage for an occupational disease depends on the nature of the employment and the disease. Employee coverage under the IIA is mandatory for most jobs. See RCW 51.12.010 (). Certain jobs are excluded from coverage under the IIA unless the employer opts in.2 Washington employees of a common carrier engaged entirely in interstate and foreign commerce are covered under the IIA unless the employees are covered under another state's workers' compensation laws. RCW 51.12.095(1). The IIA expressly excludes coverage for federal employees, RCW 51.12.060, railway employees, RCW 51.12.080, and, pertinent here, a seaman, i.e., the "master or member of a crew of any vessel," RCW 51.12.100(1). As a crewmember of a vessel, More's WSF employment undisputedly excludes her from coverage under RCW 51.12.100(1).
¶ 13 The IIA defines an "occupational disease" as "such disease or infection as arises naturally and proximately out of employment." RCW 51.08.140. This definition does not include "mental conditions or mental disabilities caused by stress." RCW 51.08.142. Under RCW 51.12.102, crewmembers otherwise excluded under Title 51 RCW may receive coverage for asbestos-related occupational diseases. RCW 51.12.102(1).
¶ 14 In 1986, the legislature amended RCW 41.40.200(1) to provide PERS 1 members with pension benefits for occupational diseases.3 Before the 1986 amendment, pension benefits were available only to PERS 1 members totally incapacitated as the result of an accident. Former RCW 41.40.200 (1982). In reviewing More's claim, the superior court suggested the following hypothesis for why the legislature may have tied PERS 1 benefits for an occupational disease to qualification for IIA benefits for the same disease: The Department of Labor and Industries (L & I), which administers the IIA, has historically been involved in the diagnosis and assessment of occupational diseases; PERS 1 members are largely covered by the IIA and such members will usually seek coverage under the IIA for an alleged occupational disease; and once L & I uses its expertise to determine whether coverage exists, DRS can invoke this determination to establish whether the PERS 1 member is entitled to pension benefits for an occupational disease. The thrust of the trial court's hypothesis is that the legislature amended RCW...
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