Morehead v. State
| Decision Date | 18 October 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 25901.,25901. |
| Citation | 145 S.W.3d 922 |
| Parties | James MOREHEAD, Movant-Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent-Respondent. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Circuit Court, Jasper County, William C. Crawford, J Rosalynn Koch, Columbia, MO, for appellant.
Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Dora A. Fichter, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, MO, for respondent.
James Morehead ("Morehead") appeals from an order overruling his Rule 24.035 motion after an evidentiary hearing. His amended motion sought relief on the ground that his guilty plea was involuntary because he did not receive the benefit of his plea agreement. After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied relief. We affirm.
On May 1, 2001, Morehead pled guilty to the class C felonies of second-degree burglary, second-degree arson and stealing. See § 569.170; § 569.050; § 570.030.1 At the guilty plea and sentencing hearing held on that date, Morehead admitted he had committed the aforementioned crimes by entering the victims' home with the intent to steal, removing property worth more than $750, and then setting the home on fire. After the prosecutor outlined the State's evidence to support the charges, the court determined there was a factual basis for Morehead's guilty plea.
The trial court then discussed the Memorandum of Plea Bargain that had been signed by Morehead. The agreement contained the following statement:
Defendant to enter a plea of guilty to the charges of Count I Burglary in the Second Degree, Count II Arson in the Second Degree, Count III Felony Stealing. If the Defendant is placed on probation, the Court is free to impose any sentence it deems appropriate within the law. If Defendant is not placed on probation the sentence shall not exceed 20 years on each count in the Department of Corrections. It is understood that the State is free to present evidence and argue against probation at sentencing and will oppose any sentence to the Jasper County Jail on a felony charge. The sentences on each count are to run concurrent with each other and, to the extent allowable, concurrent with any sentence imposed in the State of Oklahoma.
The last sentence of this paragraph was included because, at the time of the guilty plea and sentencing hearing, Morehead was on parole from a 15-year sentence previously entered in an Oklahoma case. The State of Oklahoma had filed a detainer with the State of Missouri because of an alleged parole violation by Morehead. After the trial court read the above-quoted statement to Morehead, the following colloquy occurred:
....
After this discussion, Morehead also acknowledged the following facts: (1) he had read and fully understood the Memorandum of Plea Bargain; (2) the plea bargain had been fully explained to him by his attorney; and (3) he knowingly, freely and voluntarily agreed to it. Morehead stated that he was entering a guilty plea to the three charges against him "because I know I'm guilty, Your Honor."
Following the occurrence of these events, the trial court accepted Morehead's guilty plea because "defendant's plea of guilty is made voluntarily and intelligently with the full understanding of the charges and the consequences of the plea...." As authorized by § 558.016.7(3), the trial court sentenced Morehead to a term of 20 years imprisonment on each of these class C felonies and ordered "the sentences to run concurrently with each other and concurrent with the sentences defendant currently faces in the State of Oklahoma."2
On August 1, 2001, Morehead then filed a pro se motion to vacate, set aside or correct the judgment or sentence pursuant to Rule 24.035.3 The trial court appointed counsel, who filed an amended motion to set aside his plea. The motion alleged that Morehead's guilty plea was involuntary because he did not receive the benefit of his plea agreement, in that the judgment did not specify Morehead was to serve his sentence in the Oklahoma Department of Corrections.
On October 23, 2001, the trial court entered an order nunc pro tunc at Morehead's request. In the order, the trial court corrected its prior sentence and judgment in the following respects: (1) Morehead's Missouri sentences were expressly designated as running "concurrent with the sentence in Oklahoma County State of Oklahoma, Case Number CF90-5113...."; (2) the Missouri sentences were to "be served in the Oklahoma Department of Corrections until such time as [Morehead] has completed that sentence or until otherwise released from Oklahoma Department of Corrections."; (3) Morehead was to be returned to the Missouri Department of Corrections upon any release from the Oklahoma Department of Corrections; and (4) Morehead was "released from Missouri Department of Corrections into the custody of the Oklahoma Department of Corrections, where he shall answer the parole violation warrant currently outstanding." On December 18, 2001, the Missouri Department of Corrections notified the Oklahoma Department of Corrections by letter that Morehead was available for transportation to Oklahoma.
The docket sheet reveals that there was no further activity with respect to Morehead's Rule 24.035 motion until March 11, 2003. The entry made by the trial court on that date stated Morehead's counsel "was having difficulty getting the Oklahoma authorities to honor this Court's order, and she would prefer to leave this action pending." The court left the matter on the active docket as Morehead's counsel requested.
In June of 2003, the court received a letter from Morehead's counsel "indicating she was having no success in getting anyone to comply with the Nunc Pro Tunc Order." Therefore, counsel requested the previously-filed Rule 24.035 motion be set for evidentiary hearing.
An evidentiary hearing was held on September 8, 2003. Although Morehead was present in person, he did not testify. His counsel asked the trial court to take judicial notice of the underlying criminal file and transcript, which the court did. During the hearing, the trial court noted that Morehead's counsel had been unsuccessfully trying "month-in and month-out to get the Oklahoma Department of Corrections to at least respond to her request...." Morehead rested without adducing any further evidence, and the court took the matter under advisement.
On September 12, 2003, the trial court entered an order overruling Morehead's motion. The court made a factual finding "that movant was, at the time of his plea, fully aware that the Court could not bind or direct Oklahoma authorities to do anything concerning his sentence in the State of Oklahoma." In the trial court's conclusions of law, it denied relief for the following reasons:
The final claim is that the movant's plea was involuntary in that he did not receive the benefit of the plea bargain. The difficulty now faced is precisely the difficulty the trial court warned movant of when he was entering his plea. The trial court went to great length to make sure the movant understood the risk that he was running. He understood the risk, and he continued to request the trial court to accept his plea and the plea bargain.
It has long been the law that the validity of a plea of guilty depends on whether it was made voluntarily and intelligently. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970). A thorough reading of the transcript of the plea hearing convinces the Court that movant entered his plea voluntarily and intelligently as the trial court found in that proceeding. The future expectations that movant had concerning the serving of the sentence in Oklahoma did not render the plea involuntary. The movant was fully informed of the risk of the State of Oklahoma not honoring the agreement. He chose to accept that risk.
While this Court may sympathize with the fact that movant has not been moved to the State of Oklahoma so that he may serve his Missouri sentence while serving the Oklahoma sentence, there is no legal basis for setting aside the judgment and sentence entered in his underlying criminal case, particularly in view of the fact that the trial court amended to the judgment and sentence so that it would conform to the precise language selected by movant and his attorney.
The court, therefore, denied...
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