Moreno v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 92-CV-6550-DT.

• Decision Date: 02 February 1994
• Docket Number: No. 92-CV-6550-DT.,92-CV-6550-DT.
• Citation: 909 F. Supp. 480
• Parties: Charles MORENO, Plaintiff, v. CONSOLIDATED RAIL CORPORATION, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

909 F. Supp. 480

Charles MORENO, Plaintiff, v. CONSOLIDATED RAIL CORPORATION, Defendant.

No. 92-CV-6550-DT.

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division.

February 2, 1994.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Michael D.P. Burwell, Bloomfield Hills, MI, for plaintiff.

Robert C. Ludolph, Detroit, MI, for defendant.

OPINION

DUGGAN, District Judge.

Plaintiff had been employed by defendant or its predecessors for more than 30 years in a variety of capacities. In 1991, plaintiff held the position of car inspector supervisor and, in general, he was responsible for assuring the movement of freight along the main line and protecting the delivery of freight in defendant's and its customers' industrial yards. In November, 1991, plaintiff underwent surgery for a carotid artery blockage to reduce the risk of stroke. Subsequent to his return to work, plaintiff's medical records relating to his November hospitalization were forwarded to defendant's Medical Director. Defendant became aware that plaintiff suffered from a diabetic condition when the Medical Director reviewed plaintiff's hospital summary.

On December 19, 1991, the Medical Director issued a medical department report which qualified plaintiff to return to work with certain stated restrictions. In response to the medical department report, management personnel of defendant agreed that plaintiff should be removed from services because of those restrictions. Plaintiff was therefore terminated from his position. On November 10, 1992, plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that defendant had discriminated against him on the basis of his handicap, to wit: diabetic and vascular conditions, when defendant determined that he was not qualified to perform his duties and terminated plaintiff. Plaintiff sought relief under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 ("§ 504") and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.

Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment seeking a dismissal of the action against it claiming that it was not a recipient of federal financial assistance under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 794 ("§ 504") and thus was not subject to the provisions of the Act. On August 23, 1993, this Court issued an Opinion and Order rejecting defendant's contention and ruling that defendant was a recipient of federal financial assistance and thus was subject to the Act.¹

This matter was tried before a jury from August 18, 1993, through August 23, 1993. This Court denied defendant's motion for a directed verdict at the close of plaintiff's proofs, and upon conclusion of all evidence. On August 23, 1993, defendant moved for a directed verdict on the issue of punitive damages, which this Court took under advisement. On August 23, 1993, the jury awarded plaintiff $62,500 in back pay, $125,000 in pain and suffering and emotional distress, and $1,312,572 in punitive damages. Judgment was entered on August 24, 1993.

On September 8, 1993, defendant filed a motion for directed verdict, judgment notwithstanding the verdict, new trial, and remittitur to which plaintiff has responded.² A hearing on this matter was held on January 13, 1994.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW

The standard of review is the same whether it arises in the procedural context as a motion for judgment as a matter of law or a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 50, 1991 Notes of Advisory Committee; 9 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2524. A motion for judgment as a matter of law ("JNOV") raises the issue of whether sufficient evidence was presented to raise a question of fact for the jury to decide. Cline v. United States, 997 F.2d 191, 196 (6th Cir.1993) (citation omitted).

The standard of review is clear:

in determining whether the evidence is sufficient, the trial court may neither weigh the evidence, pass on the credibility of witnesses nor substitute its judgment for that of the jury. Rather, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is made, drawing from that evidence all reasonable inferences in his favor. If, after thus viewing the evidence, the trial court is of the opinion that it points so strongly in favor of the movant that reasonable minds could not come to a different conclusion, then the motion should be granted.

Cline, 997 F.2d at 196 (citations omitted). A renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law is appropriate when the evidence produced at trial fails to establish an element necessary to plaintiff's cause of action. Douglass v. Eaton Corp., 956 F.2d 1339, 1343 (6th Cir.1992). Thus, while the district court has the duty to intervene in appropriate cases, the verdict should not be disturbed simply because different inferences and conclusions could have been drawn or because other results are more reasonable. Further, a jury verdict should not be overturned as excessive if the verdict is within the range of proof and the jury was properly instructed. Black v. Ryder/P.I.E. Nationwide, Inc., 970 F.2d 1461, 1470 (6th Cir.1992). As the Black court instructs:

a damage award should not be overturned unless a court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake resulting in plain injustice has been committed, or unless the award is contrary to all reason.... A damage award may also be overturned if it is so disproportionately large as to shock the conscience.

Id. at 1470 (internal citations omitted); Matulin v. Lodi, 862 F.2d 609, 614-15 (6th Cir.1988).

B. NEW TRIAL

Defendant alternatively argues that the jury's verdict is clearly against the weight of the evidence. The standard to which a movant is held pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 59 is less onerous than the standard for a judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b). The decision to grant or deny a new trial pursuant to Rule 59 is a procedural matter which lies within the broad discretion of the district court. Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 36, 101 S.Ct. 188, 191, 66 L.Ed.2d 193 (1980) (per curiam); United States v. L.E. Cooke Co., Inc., 991 F.2d 336, 343 (6th Cir.1993) (citation omitted). Rule 59 states in pertinent part that:

a new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues (1) in an action in which there has been a trial by jury, for any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted in actions at law in the courts of the United States....

Rule 59(a).

When a party bases its motion for a new trial upon the ground that a verdict is against the weight of the evidence, a trial court "must compare the opposing proofs, weight the evidence, and set aside the verdict only if it determines that the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence." L.E. Cooke Co., 991 F.2d at 343 (citation omitted). If the verdict is one which could reasonably have been reached, a court may not set aside a jury verdict simply because the jury could have drawn different inferences or conclusions, or because the court believes that another result is more reasonable. L.E. Cooke Co., 991 F.2d at 343; Woodbridge v. Dahlberg, 954 F.2d 1231, 1234 (6th Cir.1992) ("the verdict is not unreasonable simply because different inferences and conclusions could have been drawn or because other results are more reasonable."). Accordingly, a trial court will grant a motion for a new trial only if the trier of fact's verdict is one that could not reasonably have been reached. Id.

II. DISCUSSION

A. PRIMA FACIE CASE — § 504 OF THE REHABILITATION ACT

Plaintiff's complaint was filed pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973). To establish a prima facie case of handicap discrimination under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, plaintiff must establish:

1. That he is a "handicapped" person under the Act;

2. That he is "otherwise qualified" for the position sought;

3. That he was excluded from the position "solely by reason of his handicap"; and

4. That the position was part of a program or activity which receives federal assistance.

See e.g. Pesterfield v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 941 F.2d 437, 441 (6th Cir.1991).

Defendant's first contention is that it is not an employer within the meaning of § 504. Defendant's argument was entertained and rejected by this Court both on defendant's motion for summary judgment, and defendant's motion for reconsideration. Defendant has not cited anything in its renewed objection which persuades this Court to vacate its earlier ruling on this issue.

Second, defendant argues that plaintiff failed to establish that he was "otherwise qualified for the position sought." This Court disagrees. As fully set forth in plaintiff's brief, ample medical and lay testimony was presented at trial to support plaintiff's contention that he was qualified to carry out the essential functions of the position he held prior to defendant's decision to disqualify him. (See P's Brief 4-5 and portions of trial transcripts attached thereto). This Court acknowledges that there was conflicting testimony presented on this issue. Nevertheless, based upon a review of the evidence presented at trial, a jury could reasonably conclude that plaintiff was capable of performing the essential functions of his former job. The jury's verdict cannot be disturbed simply because different inferences and conclusions could have been drawn or because defendant believes that a different result is more reasonable. Cline, 997 F.2d at 196.

Alternatively, defendant argues that even if plaintiff is considered "otherwise qualified" under § 504, defendant could not have reasonably accommodated plaintiff's handicap so that he could continue to function in a supervisory capacity. (D's Brief at 9). Defendant contends that the only way plaintiff could have been accommodated was to rewrite his job requirements, which would impact and possibly violate the collective bargaining rights of other employees. Accordingly, defendant...