Morey v. School Board of Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 492, Austin Public Schools, 39693

• Decision Date: 25 June 1965
• Docket Number: No. 39693,39693
• Parties: Edith MOREY, Respondent, v. SCHOOL BOARD OF INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 492, AUSTIN PUBLIC SCHOOLS, Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 105

136 N.W.2d 105

271 Minn. 445

Edith MOREY, Respondent, v. SCHOOL BOARD OF INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 492, AUSTIN PUBLIC SCHOOLS, Appellant.

No. 39693.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

June 25, 1965.

Rehearing Denied July 13, 1965.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. An administrative body acting quasi-judicially is not bound by strict procedural rules which circumscribe the action of a court, and incompetent evidence is not fatal to its determination. Nevertheless, the determination of the board must find support in relevant evidence which has probative value.

2. An administrative board should state with clarity and completeness the facts and conclusions essential to its determination so that a reviewing court can determine from the record whether the facts furnished justifiable reason for its action.

William J. Nierengarten, Austin, for appellant.

Plunkett & Plunkett, Baudler & Baudler, Austin, for respondents.

Peter S. Popovich and James E. Knutson, Peterson & Popovich, St. Paul, amicus curiae.

MURPHY, Justice.

This is an appeal from an order of the district court denying a motion of appellant school board to reinstate its order terminating the contract of one of its teachers. The determinative question for review is whether the board made and entered proper findings of fact in proceedings brought under Minn.St. 125.12 to terminate a teacher's contract.

This is the second time this proceeding has been before us for review. In Morey v. School Board of Ind. School Dist. No. 492, 268 Minn. 110, 128 N.W.2d 302, we examined the original certiorari proceeding before the Mower County District Court brought to set aside a resolution of the school board which purported to terminate the teacher's contract. An extended restatement of the background of the proceedings would serve no useful purpose here. It is sufficient to say that in February 1962 Miss Morey was served with notice that the board proposed to terminate her contract because her conduct as a teacher was 'acrimonious in content and disruptive of productive school operations'; her method of teaching was 'harmful to the children, to the other teachers * * * and to the operation of the School District'; she had a mental health problem; and she had been insubordinate to her superiors. After an extended hearing on these charges, the board passed a resolution terminating her contract. On certiorari to the district court the matter was remanded to the board. The district court felt that the record contained evidence which might support two of the asserted charges but was insufficient to sustain the others. He was accordingly of the view that the board should be required to make findings of fact so that the record would show reasons upon which the board relied for its action.

We affirmed the trial court's order remanding the matter to the board and in that decision expressed principles by which we must be guided and controlled on this appeal. In our decision we emphasized that even though Minn.St. 125.12 does not expressly require findings of fact, there are strong reasons requiring that they must be made. In our decision we said (268 Minn. 116, 128 N.W.2d 307):

'* * * When such findings are made they should not only set out the specific charge or charges upon which the school board based its decision, but also those basic facts reported in the transcript of the proceedings which, in the school board's judgment, support the charge or charges.'

Upon remand to the board, the membership of that body met to further consider the matter. At that meeting the members of the board, having been provided with a transcript of the testimony taken in the original proceeding, considered separately each stated charge against the teacher. After completing their deliberations on each point, they adopted a resolution to the effect that the record contained evidence supporting each charge and cited the page in the transcript or record of the original hearing where such evidence might be found. Apparently, the board assumed that this action complied with our decision which required that it make findings of fact. On the basis of this resolution, the board presented a motion to the district court to reinstate the original resolution terminating the teacher's contract, 'quashing the writ of certiorari * * * and dismissing the proceedings commenced by Relator subsequent to said resolution.' The order of the trial court denying this motion is now before us for review.

The trial court came to the conclusion that the board had still failed to comply with the order of the court to make findings of fact and stated, 'The board did little more than restate the original charges in making the so-called findings of fact.' It noted that the supplemental proceedings provided page reference to the record which purportedly set forth evidence in support of the board's charges against the teacher and observed that 'the entire transcript of this meeting is devoid of any discussion of evidence favorable to the teacher.' The trial court, nevertheless, reviewed the record as it related to each of the four charges, and after a careful examination of it came to the conclusion that the testimony in support of the charge that the teacher's conduct was 'acrimonious' and 'disruptive' was so mixed with conclusions, characterizations, hearsay, and opinion as to be of little evidentiary value. The trial court was of the view that the record failed to substantiate the charge with relation to harmful teaching methods and observed, 'We cannot help but wonder if there is significance in the fact that in 689 pages of testimony the board could find no evidence which reflected improper teaching methods.' In relation to the charge of mental illness the court observed, 'It is not shown that a person free of mental illness would not have reacted similarly (to the actions of Miss Morey) under the circumstances.' The testimony on this subject, the trial court felt, was remote and irrelevant. The trial court revised his previous view that the record contained some evidence supporting the charge of insubordination. Some of the evidence on this point related to the teacher's refusal to see a psychiatrist. The court observed:

'* * * A fairer interpretation would seem to be that she neither refused nor accepted the assignment, was uncertain of her certification and wanted legal advice before either accepting or refusing. * * * (Her) doubt is readily understood when viewed in the context of the...