Morgan v. Feagin, 17232

Decision Date10 December 1956
Docket NumberNo. 17232,17232
Citation230 S.C. 315,95 S.E.2d 621
PartiesJ. Philip MORGAN, Appellant, v. H. S. FEAGIN, A. K. DeHay, D. Herman Ergle, C. L. Wyndham, Wilder S. Funk, J. W. Bradwell, and V. J. Hill, constituting the County Board of Education of Berkeley County, and T. C. Callison, Attorney General of the State of South Carolina, Respondents.
CourtSouth Carolina Supreme Court

George B. Bishop, Moncks Corner, for appellant.

Dennis & Dennis, Moncks Corner, Sinkler, Gibbs & Simons, Charleston, for respondents.

STUKES, Chief Justice.

This action is an attack upon the validity of Berkeley County school bonds to be issued under the authority of Act No. 956 of the Acts of the General Assembly of 1956, 49 Stat. 2318. The required contents and publication of the notice of the special election thereupon are specified in Sec. 5 of the Act. The publication in the Berkeley County newspaper was exactly as required by the statute; but the publication in the Charleston newspaper, having circulation in Berkeley County, was not precisely timed and the first appearance of it in that newspaper was in the form of a news item rather than an official notice. The lower court held, however, that the publication was in substantial compliance with the terms of the statute and overruled the point. (The election resulted: 1416 in favor of the issuance of the bonds and 356 opposed, which was a relatively large vote for a special, bond election. Bolt v. Cobb, 225 S.C. 408, 82 S.E.2d 789.) This portion of the judgment under appeal need not be considered because defendants successfully pleaded in bar of the action the limitation contained in Sec. 6 of the act which provides that after declaration of the result of the election by resolution of the school trustees, filed in the office of the Clerk of Court, quoting, 'neither the results of such election, as declared by the aforesaid resolution, nor the manner of holding the election shall be open to question except by a suit or proceedings instituted within thirty days from the date of the filing of such certified copy of such resolution.'

Similar short statutes of limitation, applicable to actions which question the proceedings upon the issuance of municipal and other bonds have been of force in this State for many years, apparently without challenge heretofore. Code of 1952, Sec. 1-645, twenty days; Sec. 21-976, thirty days; and Sec. 47-842, thirty days. The practical necessity of them is obvious. Purchasers of bonds could hardly be found if the bonds were subject in their hands to attack for alleged illegality in the proceedings upon the issuance of them. Furthermore, it is within common knowledge that sales of bonds are frequently timed to take advantage of a favorable market, which might well be hindered by long delay.

Less urgent circumstances were present in Hite v. Town of West Columbia, 220 S.C. 59, 66 S.E.2d 427, 430. It was a contest of the validity of the proceedings and election upon the annexation of territory to a municipality. The applicable statute provided that notice of objection must be filed within sixty days and action thereupon commenced within ninety days from the time of the declaration or publication of the result of the election. In upholding the validity of the statute as not unreasonable or arbitrary, after the citation of authorities, we said 'In our opinion, the time limitations fixed by the 1946 Act are neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. It was doubtless in the mind of the general assembly that annexation issues should be decided without undue delay, so that the town officials would be advised whether the affected area would become a part of the municipality. Many questions connected with municipal...

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5 cases
  • Elliott v. McNair
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • July 14, 1967
    ...of these circumstances the time permitted for challenge and the statutes of limitation are not offensive to due process. Morgan v. Feagin, 230 S.C. 315, 95 S.E.2d 621. For the reasons above stated, the relief sought by the appellant must be denied. The Act here under consideration is a vali......
  • Scott v. Meek
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • December 10, 1956
  • Sadler v. Lyle
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • August 21, 1970
    ...not institute his action within the statutory period permitted, consequently he was not entitled under our decisions, Morgan v. Feagin, 230 S.C. 315, 95 S.E.2d 621 (1956), and under the Kolodziejski case, to raise the question in this case. The respondents asserted this ground on circuit, a......
  • S.C. Pub. Interest Found. v. Calhoun Cnty. Council
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • February 10, 2021
    ...challenge over the "casting and counting of ballots," but instead to the entire annexation process. Id. at 65, 66 S.E.2d at 429.Similarly, in Morgan , the Court upheld a thirty-day statute of limitations concerning a challenge to a county's decision to obtain bonds after approval from the v......
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