Morgan v. Genesee Co., LLC

• Decision Date: 15 March 2004
• Docket Number: No. 03SA276.,03SA276.
• Citation: 86 P.3d 388
• Parties: In re Barbara J. MORGAN, Plaintiff v. The GENESEE COMPANY, LLC; Horseshoe Lake Investors, LLC; The Genesee Company/Horseshoe Lake Investors, LLC; Kathryn A. Fox; Dale Martin; and Gerald J. Forro, Defendants.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

86 P.3d 388

In re Barbara J. MORGAN, Plaintiff v. The GENESEE COMPANY, LLC; Horseshoe Lake Investors, LLC; The Genesee Company/Horseshoe Lake Investors, LLC; Kathryn A. Fox; Dale Martin; and Gerald J. Forro, Defendants.

No. 03SA276.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

March 15, 2004.

Ball, Easley, Wabeke, Brummet, and Johnson, Dwight D. Brummet, Loveland, Colorado, Attorneys for Petitioner.

Liggett, Smith, and Wilson, P.C., Zachary G. Wilson, Amy K. Rosenberg, March, Lilly, and Olive, P.C., Stewart W. Olive, Fort Collins, Colorado, Attorneys for Respondents.

Justice MARTINEZ delivered the Opinion of the Court.

In this original proceeding, brought pursuant to C.A.R. 21, 12 C.R.S. (2003), the plaintiff, Barbara Morgan, seeks relief from a trial court order granting judgment for her, but over her objection, for the amount of damages specified in her initial disclosure statement filed pursuant to C.R.C.P. 26(a)(1)(C), 12 C.R.S. (2003). Defendants Genesee Company and Horseshoe Lake Investors filed a joint motion asking the trial court to grant judgment against them for $24,041.75, the amount of damages listed in Morgan's initial disclosure statement. After considering the arguments of both parties on the issue, the trial court granted the defense motion. The issue central to the case before us is whether a party may have judgment entered against them for a specific amount of damages over the objection of the opposing party. In the procedural context in which this issue is presented to us, we hold that the trial court erred by granting judgment against Genesee Company and Horseshoe Lake Investors for the amount of damages specified in Morgan's initial disclosure statement.

I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW

On August 12, 2002, Morgan filed suit against several defendants (The Genesee Company, LLC, Horseshoe Lake Investors, LLC, Kathryn A. Fox, Dale Martin, and Gerald Forro) asserting claims for relief that include: breach of contract, third party beneficiary breach of contract, negligence, fraud, and consumer protection act violations. These claims arose from flooding that took place on Morgan's property. At no point in the complaint did Morgan specify what monetary damages she had incurred.

On March 21, 2003, Morgan filed her initial disclosure statement pursuant to C.R.C.P. 26(a)(1)(C). In the disclosure statement, Morgan claimed that she had incurred damages totaling $24,041.75. Morgan also noted in her disclosure statement that, "these disclosures are based on the information now known and reasonably available to the Plaintiff. The disclosures made herein may be updated as discovery continues."

On April 10, 2003, defendants Genesee Company, Horseshoe Lake Investors, Kathryn Fox, and Dale Martin, filed a joint motion for judgment and order based upon certain pleadings. The defendants asked that the trial court enter judgment against Genesee Company and Horseshoe Lake Investors for the amount of damages contained within Morgan's initial disclosure statement.¹ In support of their motion, the defendants argued that the damages listed in Morgan's initial disclosure statement, $24,041.75, were less than the $24,753.25 that the defendants offered to settle the matter. Additionally, the defendants contended that the trial court should grant their joint motion because the defendants had cooperated with the city of Loveland to allow certain drainage and other work to be performed on Morgan's property. Although the defendants asked that a $24,041.75 judgment be entered against Genesee Company and Horseshoe Lake Investors for the damage to Morgan's property, they wished to contest attorney fees and interest payments on the property.

On April 15, 2003, the trial court granted the defendants' joint motion and entered judgment against them for $24,041.75. Morgan later filed a response to the defendants' joint motion for judgment. In that response, Morgan indicated that she had based the damages listed in her initial disclosure statement on estimates she received from a contractor and engineering fees she had incurred prior to March 21, 2003. Morgan further stated that the city of Loveland and certain defendants had not yet given her permission to make repairs, and therefore all the damages she listed in the initial disclosure were based on estimates.

After receiving Morgan's response, the trial court vacated its April 15 order and allowed the parties to contest the issue. The defendants argued to the court that Morgan changed the scope of the repairs to her property after receiving the defendants' offer of settlement. Thus, the defendants claimed, Morgan should not be allowed to increase the amount of her damages prior to trial. Further, the defendants insisted that the doctrine of judicial estoppel barred Morgan from increasing claimed damages by changing the scope of work on her property.

On May 9, 2003, the trial court issued an order reinstating its earlier ruling entering judgment against Genesee Company and Horseshoe Lake Investors for $24,041.75. In essence, the trial court ruled in favor of the defendants because Morgan did not specifically characterize the damages listed in her initial disclosure statement as "estimates." The trial court reasoned:

The Disclosure statement of plaintiff submitted on March 21, 2003, provided a computation of damages. No language as to these computations being estimates was used. Rather, plaintiff indicated only "Plaintiff has incurred damages...." Therefore, based on the pleadings and the argument of defendants set forth in their motion and reply, the Court reinstates the order previously signed by the court on April 15, 2003. As to these defendants, the sole remaining issue shall be as to attorney fees and/or interest payments on the unused property.

Following this ruling, Morgan filed a supplemental disclosure statement pursuant to C.R.C.P. 26(a)(1) detailing additional damages she had incurred. Morgan also filed a motion for reconsideration and request for hearing regarding the trial court's entry of judgment against Genesee Company and Horseshoe Lake Investors. In her motion for reconsideration, Morgan again asserted that she used estimates to compute damages in her initial disclosure statement because the repair work had not yet been completed. Further, Morgan argued that the initial estimates related to engineering reports that had been previously submitted to the city of Loveland. Morgan noted that additional engineering reports were currently pending with the city of Loveland and, if approved, would generate further costs and damages. Finally, Morgan contended that the defendants' reliance on the doctrine of judicial estoppel was misplaced.

The defendants filed a response to Morgan's motion for reconsideration on July 14, 2003. In their response, the defendants argued that the engineering reports pending approval by the city of Loveland were based on changes to the drainage system that were completely at Morgan's discretion. Therefore, the defendants contended that they should not be held responsible for the costs associated with these discretionary repairs.

On August 12, 2003, the trial court found that its original order was appropriate and denied Morgan's motion to reconsider. Pursuant to C.A.R. 21, Morgan asks this court to determine whether it was proper for the trial court to grant defendants' joint motion requesting that judgment be entered against Genesee Company and Horseshoe Lake Investors for $24,041.75, the amount of damages listed in Morgan's initial disclosure statement.

II. C.A.R. 21 Jurisdiction

We have original jurisdiction under C.A.R. 21 to review "whether a trial court abused its discretion in circumstances where a remedy on appeal would prove inadequate." Silva v. Basin W., Inc., 47 P.3d 1184, 1187 (Colo.2002); Leaffer v. Zarlengo, 44 P.3d 1072, 1077 (Colo.2002); Todd v. Bear Valley Vill. Apartments, 980 P.2d 973, 975 (Colo.1999). Ultimately, the exercise of original jurisdiction is "governed by the particular circumstances of the case." Hamon Contractors, Inc. v. Dist. Court, 877 P.2d 884, 887 (Colo.1994). Accordingly, given the unique circumstances of the present case and procedural context in which it arose, we exercise original jurisdiction to determine whether the trial court erred in granting judgment against Genesee Company and Horseshoe Lake Investors for the damages contained within Morgan's initial disclosure statement.

Generally, orders relating to discovery are interlocutory in nature and not reviewable in an original proceeding. Silva, 47 P.3d at 1187; Bond v. Dist. Court, 682 P.2d 33, 36 (Colo.1984). However:

we have not been reluctant to exercise that original jurisdiction when an order, otherwise interlocutory in character, will place a party at a significant disadvantage in litigating the merits of the controversy. Although matters of pretrial discovery are ordinarily within the discretion of the trial court, they are not exempted from extraordinary relief under appropriate circumstances.

Sanchez v. Dist. Court, 624 P.2d 1314, 1316-17 (Colo.1981). In the present case, the trial court exceeded its authority to regulate the pretrial discovery process by granting the defendants' joint motion for judgment for the amount of damages specified in Morgan's initial disclosure statement and effectively imposing settlement on Morgan. Thus, we exercise original jurisdiction, make the rule absolute, and direct the trial court to deny the joint motion for judgment that it previously granted.

III. ANALYSIS

This case raises the question of whether the court may enter judgment at the request of the defendants for the specific amount of damages indicated in a plaintiff's disclosure statement, over the objection of a plaintiff. The defendants in this case argue that Morgan is bound by the amount of damages listed in her initial disclosure statement largely because Morgan did not expressly state in the disclosure statement that her...