Moriarty v. State

• Decision Date: 07 April 1986
• Docket Number: No. 184S17PS,184S17PS
• Citation: 490 N.E.2d 1106
• Parties: James D. MORIARTY, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 1106

490 N.E.2d 1106

James D. MORIARTY, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.

No. 184S17PS.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

April 7, 1986.

James D. Moriarty, pro se.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Lee Cloyd, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

SHEPARD, Justice.

James D. Moriarty is before this Court appealing from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Initially charged with two counts of robbery, petitioner pleaded guilty and received concurrent twelve year sentences.

Petitioner presents the following two issues:

(1) Whether trial counsel's advice that voluntary intoxication did not constitute a defense renders his guilty plea one which was not made knowingly and intelligently, and

(2) Whether his guilty plea was made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently when the trial court failed to advise him of all of the statutory requirements.

I. Voluntary Intoxication Defense

Moriarty argues that his guilty plea was not knowingly and intelligently made because counsel did not advise him that voluntary intoxication was a viable defense to the charges. He maintains that the evidence indicates that he was under the influence of PCP when he committed both of the robberies.

Petitioner pleaded guilty to two robberies: cause numbers 87 and 88. The record does not disclose when the robbery in cause 87 was committed; however, the robbery in cause 88 was committed on September 30, 1978. The defendant and the prosecutor submitted to the court a plea agreement under which he would receive a twelve year sentence for each of the robberies.

At the guilty plea hearing for the robbery in cause 87, which was held on December 22, 1978, the court inquired whether defendant was under the influence of narcotic drugs at the time of the offense; defendant responded affirmatively. The court then took the plea agreement under advisement. On January 4, 1979, a guilty plea and sentencing hearing was held for both robberies. Defendant also informed the court at this hearing that he had been under the influence of drugs when he committed both of the robberies and counsel reiterated this at defendant's request. At the post-conviction relief hearing defendant testified that he had told his counsel of his drug problem. Apparently, counsel responded that drug abuse did not constitute a defense in Indiana. However, Moriarty also testified that he was aware of his acts when he committed the robberies and knew that it was wrong but that he needed the money to purchase drugs.

Defense counsel had an affirmative obligation to inform his client of the existence of defenses. Mosley v. State (1979), 271 Ind. 164, 390 N.E.2d 659; Conley v. State (1972), 259 Ind. 29, 284 N.E.2d 803. When appellant committed the robberies, voluntary intoxication was a defense only when it negated specific intent. Ind.Code Sec. 35-41-3-6 (Burns 1976 Supp.). This Court had construed the offense of robbery to be a specific intent crime. Fordyce v. State (1981), Ind., 425 N.E.2d 108; Pardue v. State (1980), 273 Ind. 291, 403 N.E.2d 1072; Williams v. State (1980), 273 Ind. 105, 402 N.E.2d 954; Snipes v. State (1974), 261 Ind. 581, 307 N.E.2d 470; Ind.Code Sec. 35-42-5-1 (Burns 1979). However, voluntary intoxication does not constitute a complete defense unless the defendant is shown to have been so intoxicated as to be incapable of forming the specific intent necessary to commit the crime. Patterson v. State (1978), 267 Ind. 515, 371 N.E.2d 1309. As we have noted several times, the potential of this defense should not be confused with the reality of the situation. Hubbard v. State (1984), Ind., 469 N.E.2d 740; Terry v. State (1984), Ind., 465 N.E.2d 1085; Anderson v. State (1984), Ind., 469 N.E.2d 1166.

Moriarty essentially challenges the effectiveness of his attorney's assistance based upon the legal advice rendered prior to his decision to plead guilty. While he has presented evidence that counsel's advice may have been incorrect, appellant has not shown that counsel's performance was prejudicial to him. Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674; Shackelford v. State (1986), Ind., 486 N.E.2d 1014. The defense of voluntary intoxication may have been available to a person charged with the crime of robbery. However, appellant's own testimony indicated that he was aware of his actions when he committed the crimes. Therefore, as a practical matter, he would not have been able to show that his drug intoxication made him incapable of forming the specific intent necessary to commit the crime.

II. Guilty Plea

Moriarty argues that the trial court accepted his guilty plea without first advising him that:

(1) he was waiving his right to a public and speedy trial;

(2) he was waiving his right to face his accusers;

(3) he was waiving his right to require the State to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and

(4) by pleading guilty he was admitting the truth of the facts alleged in the information.

Compliance with the terms of the statute for a guilty plea entered before December 3, 1981, is evaluated by reviewing the entire record of the proceedings to determine whether a defendant was adequately advised of his rights and knowingly waived them. Williams v. State (1984), Ind., 468 N.E.2d 1036. Under this standard of review, the trial court need not personally inform the defendant of the advisements enumerated by statute; a plea agreement which recites the advisements is sufficient.

During the...