Morris v. Austraw, 120

Citation152 S.E.2d 155,269 N.C. 218
Decision Date20 January 1967
Docket NumberNo. 120,120
CourtNorth Carolina Supreme Court
PartiesRalph R. MORRIS and wife, Annie Jo Morris v. Richard F. AUSTRAW and wife Jean A. Austraw.

Uzzell & DuMont, by William E. Greene and Robert E. Harrell, Asheville, for defendant appellants.

Williams, Williams & Morris, by William C. Morris, Jr., Asheville, for plaintiff appellees.

PARKER, Chief Justice.

Defendants assign as errors each of Judge Martin's two conclusions of law, each of the three matters adjudged and decreed in the judgment, and the entry of the judgment.

The written lease between the parties referred to in the first paragraph of the stipulated and agreed facts is set forth in fourteen pages in the record. The basis and scope of summary ejectment in actions between the landlord and tenant are established by G.S. § 42--26. Defendants' brief states that the first question involved is: 'Did Richard F. Austraw's violation of 21 USC 331 and 333 constitute a forfeiture of all appellant tenants' rights under the terms and conditions of their lease with appellee landlords?' Plaintiffs' brief states likewise. It seems clear from the stipulated and agreed facts and the first identical question stated in the briefs of the parties that the only section of G.S. § 42--26 which could possibly fit the facts stipulated and agreed to is subsection (2), which provides: 'When the tenant * * * has done or omitted any act by which, according to the stipulations of the lease, his estate has ceased.'

[269 N.C. 222] Paragraph 1(a) of the lease between the plaintiffs as landlord and the defendants as tenants provides, Inter alia: 'Tenant shall not use or permit the use of any portion of said premises for any unlawful purpose or purposes.' The lease or contract of rental disclosed in the record before us contains no provision automatically terminating the estate for breach of provisions of the lease that 'tenant shall not use or permit the use of any portion of said premises for any unlawful purpose or purposes,' nor does such contract or lease reserve the right of re-entry for breach of the quoted provisions of the lease. Appellees in their brief contend:

'Section 16(b) of the lease clearly contemplates in unmistakable language that suit might be brought by the Landlord for possession of the premises in the event of the breach of Any covenant that may be set forth in the lease. The language of the lease is as follows: 'In case Landlord should bring suit for the possession of the premises, for the recovery of any sum due hereunder, Or because of the breach of any covenant herein.' This clearly indicates that it was the intention of the parties that the landlord might bring suit for possession of the premises if any covenant or promise in the contract was broken.'

Paragraph 16(b) of the lease reads as follows:

'In case Landlord should bring suit for the possession of the premises, for the recovery of any sum due hereunder, or because of the breach of any covenant herein, or for any other relief against Tenant, declaratory or otherwise, or should Tenant bring any action for any relief against Landlord, declaratory or otherwise, arising out of this lease, and Landlord should prevail in any such suit, Tenant shall pay Landlord a reasonable attorney's fee which shall be deemed...

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15 cases
  • Chrisalis Properties, Inc. v. Separate Quarters, Inc.
    • United States
    • North Carolina Court of Appeals
    • December 18, 1990
    ...defendant of the forfeiture of the estate. Therefore, proper grounds existed for the summary ejectment proceeding. Morris v. Austraw, 269 N.C. 218, 152 S.E.2d 155 (1967); compare Stanley v. Harvey, 90 N.C.App. 535, 369 S.E.2d 382 General Statute § 42-28 in effect at the time the present cas......
  • Eastern Carolina Regional Housing Authority v. Lofton, COA14–212.
    • United States
    • North Carolina Court of Appeals
    • December 16, 2014
    ...the basis for and scope of summary ejectment proceedings is established and governed by N.C. Gen.Stat. § 42–26. Morris v. Austraw, 269 N.C. 218, 221, 152 S.E.2d 155, 158 (1967). According to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 42–26(a)(2), a tenant may be summarily ejected from a particular premises when the ......
  • ARE 100/800/801 CAPITOLA v. TRIANGLE LAB.
    • United States
    • North Carolina Court of Appeals
    • June 19, 2001
    ...unless the lease provides for termination upon such a breach or reserves the right of re-entry for such breach. Morris v. Austraw, 269 N.C. 218, 222, 152 S.E.2d 155, 159 (1967). The majority concedes that the lease in the instant case provides for the right to "terminate the Lease, or termi......
  • E. Carolina Reg'l Hous. Auth. v. Lofton
    • United States
    • North Carolina Supreme Court
    • August 19, 2016
    ...§ 42–26(a)(2) (2009) ); id. at 595–96, 720 S.E.2d at 429 (rejecting as "clearly dicta " the language in Morris v. Austraw , 269 N.C. 218, 223, 152 S.E.2d 155, 159 (1967), perceived as requiring an unconscionability analysis). If the lease at issue related to a private landlord-tenant relati......
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