Morris v. Evans

• Decision Date: 12 March 1918
• Docket Number: 9183.
• Citation: 95 S.E. 385,22 Ga.App. 11
• Parties: MORRIS v. EVANS.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

95 S.E. 385

22 Ga.App. 11

MORRIS v. EVANS.

No. 9183.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Second Division

March 12, 1918

Syllabus by the Court.

As the alleged defamatory words did not charge the commission of a crime, and were not for any other reason slanderous per se and no special damage being alleged in the petition, the court did not err in sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the petition.

Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.

If the words spoken are plain and unambiguous and do not impute a crime, they cannot be enlarged and extended by innuendo.

The office of an "innuendo" is merely to explain the ambiguity when the precise meaning of the terms employed in the alleged slanderous statement may require elucidation.

The general rule is that oral words, to be actionable per se must impute a crime involving moral turpitude, punishable by indictment.

The words "debasing act," as used in Civil Code 1910, § 4433, making it slander to charge another with having some contagious disorder, or of being guilty of some "debasing act which may exclude him from society," have reference to those repulsive acts which would cause him to be shunned or avoided, in the same way as would a contagious disease.

Error from Superior Court, Whitfield County; M. C. Tarver, Judge.

Suit by Mrs. Victoria Morris against J. L. Evans. Demurrers to petitions sustained, and petition dismissed, and plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.

Glenn & House and Wm. E. Mann, all of Dalton, for plaintiff in error.

J. J Copeland and Maddox, McCamy & Shumate, all of Dalton, for defendant in error.

HARWELL J.

Mrs. Victoria Morris brought suit against J. L. Evans for slander, alleging that he had defamed her by saying that she had raised up her children to steal, brought them up to steal, that she had plotted to burn him out, and that he would heap coals of fire on her head in hell, for that was where she was going when she died. The petition alleged no special damages, the prayer being only for general damages in the sum of $5,000. General and special demurrers to the petition were sustained, and the petition was dismissed.

If the alleged slanderous words properly come under the fourth subdivision of section 4433 of Civil Code 1910, that is, "disparaging words productive of special damage flowing naturally therefrom," then it was essential to allege special damage; and, none being alleged in this case, the court did not err in sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the petition. "If merely fraud, dishonesty, immorality or vice be imputed, no action lies without proof of special damage." Roberts v. Ramsey, 86 Ga. 433, 12 S.E. 644; Ford v. Lamb, 116 Ga. 655, 42 S.E. 998. The words complained of do not charge the commission of a crime punishable by law. The most that can be said of the alleged defamatory words is that they charged an intention to commit crime or to have others (her children) commit crime. "Oral defamation is generally more strictly construed than is libel, and yet even written words, imputing a criminal disposition to another, are not libelous per se.

Spoken words, showing merely an intention or disposition to commit crime in the future, are not actionable, since such intent constitutes no crime. * * * Dickey v. Andros, 32 Vt. 55. In the case last cited it was held not to be slander per se to say of another that he was going to start a house of ill fame, since the words only charge an intention to commit the offense." Whitley v. Newman, 9 Ga.App. 97, 70 S.E. 686; 25 Cyc. 277 (8).

If the words spoken are plain and unambiguous and do not impute a crime, they cannot be enlarged and extended by an innuendo. "The office of an innuendo is merely to explain the ambiguity, where the precise meaning of terms...