Morris v. Glenridge Children's Ctr., Inc.

• Decision Date: 22 July 2014
• Docket Number: No. ED 100917.,ED 100917.
• Citation: 436 S.W.3d 732
• Parties: Larry MORRIS, Respondent, v. GLENRIDGE CHILDREN'S CENTER, INC., Appellant, and Division of Employment Security, Respondents.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

436 S.W.3d 732

Larry MORRIS, Respondent,
v.
GLENRIDGE CHILDREN'S CENTER, INC., Appellant,
and
Division of Employment Security, Respondents.

No. ED 100917.

Missouri Court of Appeals,
Eastern District,
Division One.

July 22, 2014.

[436 S.W.3d 734]

S. Scott Brinkman, St. Louis, MO, for appellant.

Christine Lesicko, Jefferson City, MO, for respondent.

ROY L. RICHTER, Presiding Judge.

Glenridge Children's Center, Inc., (“Employer”) appeals from the decision of the Missouri Labor and Industrial Relations Commission (“Commission”) finding Employer discharged Larry Morris (“Claimant”) on June 7, 2013. The Commission's decision reversed the decision of the Appeals Tribunal, which affirmed the decision of the deputy of the Division of Employment Security (“Division”) finding that Claimant was disqualified for benefits until he has earned wages from insured work equal to ten times his weekly benefit amount after June 7, 2013, because he left work for Employer voluntarily without good cause. We reverse.

I. Background

Claimant worked for Employer for five years as a recreational supervisor at Employer's child care center. He worked part-time for Employer and part-time for the Clayton School District. Both jobs were ten-month jobs, requiring Claimant to work only during the time coinciding with the school year. The childcare center was closed during the school's summer vacation.

Claimant's last day of work was June 7, 2013. He had the option of coming back to work for Employer in August, when the school again opened. However, by May 7, 2013, Employer had provided Claimant with a paper asking him to indicate whether he was interested in working the following school year. He was given three options: First, “Yes IF there is a position available I would like to return to GCC [Employer] for the 2013–14 school year;” second, “No I am unable to return to GCC [Employer] for the 2013–14 school year;” and third, “I am looking for full time employment for the fall. If I am not able to find a full time job and there is a position available at GCC [Employer], I would like to work the schedule below.” Claimant indicated unequivocally that he would be unable to return the following school year. Claimant decided not to return because he wanted a full-time job, thought he possibly could be hired full-time at the library, and was ready for a change.

The Commission found Employer discharged Claimant on June 7, 2013. The Commission concluded that Employer had no work for Claimant, and there were no facts supporting a finding of short-term layoff or suspension in this case. The Commission also stated that Employer did not enjoy the protections provided by the legislature in Section 288.040.3(1), RSMo

[436 S.W.3d 735]

(Cum.Supp.2011), ¹ for educational institutions. Next, the Commission concluded that Claimant did not engage in any type of bad behavior to cause the lack of work for a finding of misconduct. Thus, the Commission concluded Employer did not meet its burden of proving that Claimant should be disqualified from the receipt of unemployment insurance benefits under Section 288.050.2.

This appeal follows.

II. Discussion

Employer raises four points on appeal. In its first point, Employer alleges the Commission erred in reversing the decision of the Appeals Tribunal and applying the legal standard of “involuntary discharge” under Section 288.050.2 because the Commission should have used the standard of “voluntary quit” under Section 288.050.1 in that Claimant made his intention to resign his employment clear and unambiguous.

Second, Employer alleges the Commission erred in reversing the decision of the Appeals Tribunal and applying the legal standard of “misconduct connected with work” under Section 288.030.1 because Claimant was not involuntarily discharged in that Claimant made his intention to resign from his employment clear and unambiguous.

Third, Employer argues the Commission erred in reversing the decision of the Appeals Tribunal because, had the Commission applied the correct legal standard of “voluntary quit” under Section 288.050.1, it would have found in favor of Employer in that the substantial weight of the evidence proves that Claimant quit voluntarily, that he did not have good cause for quitting voluntarily, and that the cause was not attributable to the work or Employer.

Lastly, Employer contends the Commission erred in reversing the decision of the Appeals Tribunal because it appears as if the Commission confused two separate unemployment claims filed by Claimant (one with Employer and one with Clayton School District), and in so doing, mistakenly applied a set of facts and certain provisions of law to reach an erroneous conclusion.

Appellate review of an award made by the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission is governed by Section 288.210. The appellate court may set aside the decision of the Commission only where (1) the Commission acted without or in excess of its powers, (2) the decision was procured by fraud, (3) the facts found by the Commission do not support the award, or (4) there was not sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the making of the award. Ayers v. Sylvia Thompson Residence Ctr., 211 S.W.3d 195, 197–98 (Mo.App.W.D.2007). Under Section 288.210, we review the whole record to determine if it contains sufficient competent and substantial evidence to support the award. Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection, 121 S.W.3d 220, 222–23 (Mo. banc 2003). “Substantial evidence is evidence which has probative force on the issues and from which the trier of facts can reasonably decide the case.” Miller v. Great Southern Bank, 367 S.W.3d 111, 118...