Zweig v. Marvelwood Sch.
| Citation | 252 A.3d 367,203 Conn.App. 818 |
| Decision Date | 20 April 2021 |
| Docket Number | AC 42660 |
| Court | Appellate Court of Connecticut |
| Parties | Aaron M. ZWEIG v. The MARVELWOOD SCHOOL |
Thomas W. Meiklejohn, with whom, on the brief, was Henry F. Murray, Hartford, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Daniel A. Schwartz, with whom were Christopher E. Engler, Hartford, and, on the brief, Gary S. Starr, for the appellee (defendant).
Alvord, Elgo and Devlin, Js.
The plaintiff, Aaron M. Zweig, appeals from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendant, The Marvelwood School, in this action for wrongful discharge. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly determined that no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether he set forth a valid wrongful discharge claim. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. The defendant is an independent boarding school for grades nine through twelve, plus a post-graduate year. In June, 2012, the plaintiff executed an at-will employment contract with the defendant for the 2012–2013 school year as a history teacher, as well as a newly created position titled "Director of Food Studies." The latter position required the plaintiff to establish a garden on campus and use it to teach a class on food studies.1 The plaintiff also was responsible for maintaining the garden and, like other faculty at the school, he was responsible for supervising sports, community service activities and the dormitory. The plaintiff subsequently executed similar employment contracts for the 2013–2014 and 2014–2015 school years, which required him to teach three classes, coach sports for two seasons, continue as Director of Food Studies, serve as head of the community service program and continue with dormitory supervisory responsibilities.
In the spring and summer of 2014, the defendant's headmaster, Arthur Goodearl, expressed to the plaintiff his concern that the garden, which was located at the entrance to the campus, was not being maintained properly. The plaintiff responded that maintenance staff had not been helpful in his requests for assistance. Goodearl recommended that he engage students for this work, a suggestion that the plaintiff considered impractical because "teenagers ... aren't necessarily interested in hard labor ...."
On May 22, 2014, Alicia Winter, a parent of students enrolled at the school who also had expressed concerns about the garden, sent an e-mail to Goodearl with suggestions for improving its appearance, which were then forwarded to the plaintiff. In an e-mail exchange on June 4, 2014, Winter sent photographs of telephone poles on her property, which she offered to donate for use in the garden, but advised that they would probably need to be lined because they were filled with creosote.2 The plaintiff responded that
In an at-will employment agreement dated February 21, 2015 (February, 2015 contract), Goodearl offered the plaintiff employment for the 2015–2016 school year as Director of Food Studies at an annual salary of $45,900, which represented a 1.6 percent increase in salary. The plaintiff's responsibilities would have required him to teach four instead of three classes, as well as to continue to coach for two seasons and to serve as the head of the community service program. The agreement specified that The plaintiff never signed the February, 2015 contract.
On April 7, 2015, Goodearl advised the plaintiff of his intention to offer Winter the position of "Garden Manager." Winter accepted the offer to fill that role on April 19, 2015, thereby reducing the plaintiff's responsibilities as Director of Food Studies. As Garden Manager, Winter went forward with her plan to build raised beds for the garden using the donated telephone poles, which were delivered to the campus on or after May 7, 2015.
On May 15, 2015, the plaintiff e-mailed Goodearl and informed him that he objected to the use of the telephone poles to make raised beds "because they are made with carcinogenic chemicals that leech into the soil." The plaintiff further indicated his preference to make raised beds out of pine or cedar "because they do not put cancer
in the soil." In response, Goodearl stated in relevant part: "Regarding the poles, [Winter] has used them for years, but [she] is researching to make sure that there is no adverse effect. Your comment about putting cancer
into the soil is gratuitous in the extreme, and frankly, unworthy of you." The plaintiff then sent a reply e-mail to Goodearl, in which he stated: "[Y]ou may feel that protecting our community from known sources of cancer is ‘unworthy’ of my efforts, but I feel as though preventing cancer and known poisons from our environment is a duty." Winter thereafter decided not to use the telephone poles for the garden and arranged for their removal.
In an e-mail dated June 15, 2015, Goodearl advised the plaintiff that he had not yet signed the February, 2015 contract, which at that point had expired. In his e-mail response on June 25, 2015, the plaintiff stated that he was aware that he had not signed his contract and that he had considered resigning his position. He asked Goodearl whether he would consider discussing a part-time position. Following negotiation with Goodearl and given assurances that he would maintain his health insurance, the plaintiff signed a new at-will employment agreement (2015–2016 Agreement) on July 14, 2015, for a full-time position that required him to teach four classes and administer the community service program. That agreement, which provided for an annual salary of $37,000, also eliminated his responsibilities for the Food Studies program and reduced his dormitory duties and coaching responsibilities.
Approximately nine months later, the plaintiff executed another at-will employment contract (2016–2017 Agreement)3 with the defendant for the 2016–2017 school year. That agreement included the same terms as the 2015–2016 Agreement, with two exceptions: the plaintiff's community service obligation was eliminated and his annual salary was increased to $38,000.
Approximately five months later, on September 6, 2016, the defendant terminated the plaintiff from its employ, and this wrongful discharge action followed. The plaintiff filed a two count amended complaint against the defendant in September, 2017. In count one, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had "reduced the plaintiff's pay because he opposed the use of carcinogens in the defendant's vegetable garden."4 In count two, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had terminated his employment for the same reason.5 The plaintiff alleged that both adverse employment actions "violate[d] the public policy of the state of Connecticut."
On March 30, 2018, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment as to both counts of the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to establish "an important public policy which supports his claim."6 On September 4, 2018, the court heard oral arguments on the defendant's motion. In its subsequent memorandum of decision, the court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment because "the plaintiff ... failed to identify any explicit public policy contained in an applicable statute, regulation, constitutional provision, or judicial decision that was violated by the defendant ...." The plaintiff thereafter filed a motion to reargue the decision, which the court denied, and this appeal followed.
The issue presented in this appeal by the plaintiff is whether the court properly granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate as a matter of law that his dismissal occurred for a reason violating public policy. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Romprey v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America , 310 Conn. 304, 312–13, 77 A.3d 726 (2013). "When a court renders summary judgment as a matter of law, our review is plenary, and we must decide whether its conclusions are legally and logically correct and find support in the facts that appear in the record." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Armshaw v. Greenwich Hospital , 134 Conn. App. 134, 137, 38 A.3d 188 (2012).
(Internal quotation marks omitted.)...
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