Morris v. Jackson

Decision Date06 February 2012
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 11–701 (RMC).
PartiesSusan MORRIS, Plaintiff, v. Lisa P. JACKSON, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Columbia

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

David H. Shapiro, Swick & Shapiro, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

Javier M. Guzman, U.S. Attorney's Office, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ROSEMARY M. COLLYER, District Judge.

Susan Morris is a former employee at the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). She complains of discrimination based on her sex (female) and race (Caucasian), relating to a seven-day suspension and later removal from her job. She also claims that she was subjected to a hostile work environment. Defendant moves (1) to dismiss the suspension and removal claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and (2) for summary judgment on the hostile work environment allegation for failure to state a claim. As explained below, the motion will be granted with one exception—the suspension claim was, in fact, exhausted and will not be dismissed.

I. FACTS

Ms. Morris is a career federal employee who spent the last ten years with EPA in a GS–15 level position. She joined EPA's Office of Civil Rights in 2001 as a Team Leader for the agency's Workforce Diversity and Employment Program. She then became an Assistant Director with the title “Equal Employment Manager.” Ms. Morris alleges that she received outstanding ratings from her supervisors as well as various awards, including a Bronze Medal in 2004 and an Award for Superior Accomplishment in 2006.

In 2005, a contractor produced Management Directive 715, which was critical of EPA's personnel policies, procedures and practices. Ms. Morris certified the report and submitted it to EPA's Director of Civil Rights at the time, Karen Higginbotham. Ms. Morris alleges that “because this report raised issues that Ms. Higginbotham believed cast doubt on her leadership of EPA's Office of Civil Rights, and that of management as a whole ... she began a campaign to harass plaintiff and drive her from the agency and from federal employment.” Compl. ¶ 9.

Ms. Morris further contends that Ms. Higginbotham and Ray Spears, Deputy Chief of Staff at EPA, both of whom are African American, harassed her because she is White. Id. ¶ 10. She claims that they created a hostile work environment as follows:

Beginning in 2005 and continuing into 2010, Ms. Higginbotham ... [and Mr. Spears] engaged in a concerted effort to harass and discredit plaintiff by, among other things: (a) undercutting—indeed, usurping—her authority with subordinates though (sic) prevarication, deceit, threats, and racist remarks; (b) initiating and/or hyping knowingly false and scurrilous allegations of misconduct and ethics violations and substance abuse by plaintiff, and subjecting her to a year-long Inspector General's investigation (20062007), in which she was ultimately exonerated; (c) inciting employee groups to attack plaintiff on false claims of bias and misconduct; (d) falsely charging plaintiff with insubordination when she merely responded to false allegations made against her and mistreatment she was made to endure as a result of Ms. Higginbotham's and Mr. Spears's actions; (e) withholding acclaim, visibility, and recognition from plaintiff; (f) denying her opportunities to exercise authority to the same degree as her peers; (g) unduly monitoring plaintiff's time and attendance; and (h) refusing to submit MD–715 reports to EEOC [the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission] which plaintiff has prepared and certified after 2005.

Id.

On April 29, 2008, Ms. Morris was suspended without pay for seven days, from May 5–11, 2008. She asserts that the suspension was due to a bogus charge that she engaged in insubordination.

Ms. Morris filed formal complaints of discrimination with the Department of Energy Office of Civil Rights, acting as EEO designee for EPA, on May 19, 2008 and January 8, 2009, and she amended them on April 21, 2009. Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss [Dkt. # 6], Ex. 1 (Notice of Acceptance/Dismissal of Formal Complaint of Discrimination). On June 19, 2009, the investigating agency issued a notice of acceptance for investigation of claims. The accepted claims included, among other things, whether Ms. Morris was discriminated against due to her gender and race based on (1) harassment and a hostile work environment from January 24, 2007 to May of 2008 and (2) a seven day suspension, from May 5–11, 2008. Id.

On March 23, 2010, Ms. Higginbotham issued a notice of proposed removal from federal service to Ms. Morris, charging insubordination, wrongful disclosure of confidential personal information of another employee, misuse of supervisory authority, and inappropriate statements made in work product. Id., Ex. 6 (Notice of Proposed Removal). The next day, Ms. Morris filed a whistleblower complaint with the Office of Special Counsel. Id., Ex. 7 (OSC Complaint).

On September 8, 2010, Ms. Morris filed with the Merit Service Protection Board (“MSPB”) a “mixed case” appeal of the decision to remove her from federal service.1 MSPB stayed the removal to allow the Office of Special Counsel to complete its investigation of the whistleblower complaint.See id., Ex. 9 (MSPB Decision) at 1. Finding that the Office of Special Counsel might resolve the issue between the parties, MSPB dismissed the appeal without prejudice, but indicated that the appeal would be automatically refiled after the stay was lifted. Id. at 3.

Ms. Morris returned to her job while the stay was in place. When the stay expired, EPA again removed Ms. Morris from her position, effective January 22, 2011. On January 24, 2011, the mixed case appeal was refiled with MSPB and a hearing was scheduled. On April 8, 2011, Ms. Morris filed this lawsuit and withdrew her appeal before the MSPB. Id., Ex. 13 (Notice of Withdraw of Appeal). As a result, MSPB dismissed the appeal with prejudice. Id., Ex. 14 (MSPB Apr. 21, 2011 Decision). On May 9, 2011, the EEOC also dismissed Ms. Morris' administrative complaint because this suit had been filed and it advances the same claims. Id., Ex. 15 (EEOC Order of Dismissal).

The Complaint alleges that EPA subjected Ms. Morris to a seven-day suspension, a hostile work environment, and removal from her job based on gender and race discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.2 EPA moves to dismiss the claims relating to the seven-day suspension and termination due to failure to exhaust administrative remedies and moves for summary judgment with regard to the hostile environment claim.

II. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Motion to Dismiss

Motions for failure to exhaust administrative remedies are properly analyzed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Hairston v. Tapella, 664 F.Supp.2d 106, 110 (D.D.C.2009). Because failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense, the defendant bears the burden of proof on the issue. Id. Once a defendant has met its burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to make the case that dismissal is not warranted. Bowden v. U.S., 106 F.3d 433, 437 (D.C.Cir.1997).

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) challenges the adequacy of a complaint on its face. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). A complaint must be sufficient “to give a defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (internal citations omitted). Although a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is “plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955.

A court must treat the complaint's factual allegations as true, “even if doubtful in fact.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. But a court need not accept as true legal conclusions set forth in a complaint. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). In deciding a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), a court may consider the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached to the complaint as exhibits or incorporated by reference, and matters about which the court may take judicial notice. Abhe & Svoboda, Inc. v. Chao, 508 F.3d 1052, 1059 (D.C.Cir.2007).

B. Summary Judgment

Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgement as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); accord Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Moreover, summary judgment is properly granted against a party who “after adequate time for discovery and upon motion ... fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must draw all justifiable inferences in the nonmoving party's favor and accept the nonmoving party's evidence as true. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A nonmoving party, however, must establish more than “the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence” in support of its position. Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. In addition, the nonmoving party may not rely solely on allegations or conclusory statements. Greene v. Dalton, 164 F.3d 671, 675 (D.C.Cir.1999). Rather, the nonmoving party must present specific facts that would enable a...

To continue reading

Request your trial
9 cases
  • Akosile v. Armed Forces Ret. Home
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • November 2, 2015
    ...humiliating or was merely offensive, and whether it unreasonably interfered with the employee's work performance.Morris v. Jackson, 842 F.Supp.2d 171, 179–81 (D.D.C.2012) (citing Harris, 510 U.S. at 23, 114 S.Ct. 367 ). The plaintiff's allegations fall far short of meeting this exacting sta......
  • Bell v. Dep't of Def.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • September 27, 2018
    ..."Once a federal employee chooses a particular administrative route, she must exhaust the remedies in that forum." Morris v. Jackson, 842 F. Supp. 2d 171, 177 (D.D.C. 2012) (internal citation omitted);see also Stoll v. Principi, 449 F.3d 263, 265-66 (1st Cir. 2006) ("The lodging of either a ......
  • Craig v. Dist. of Columbia
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • August 2, 2012
    ...1201 (D.C.Cir.2008) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993)); Morris v. Jackson, 842 F.Supp.2d 171, 180 (D.D.C.2012). A hostile work environment is usually characterized by a series of events that cumulatively give rise to a claim, alth......
  • Koch v. Walter
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • March 30, 2013
    ...did not begin counseling until the fall of 2000, he nonetheless “initiated” contact when he sought counseling. See Morris v. Jackson, 842 F.Supp.2d 171, 178 (D.D.C.2012) (“The regulation does not require that a plaintiff meet with a counselor within 45 days, just that she initiate contact w......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT